In recent days many of us have witnessed the election disaster in the US with some subdued delight. However, this dubious enjoyment could have come to an end rather quickly given the consternation about the damage for democracy itself. It is a damage that has been manifested in an exceptional controversy during the past few weeks. The post-electoral rhetorics of national unity did not resolve that discomfort, but might even have had an effect to the contrary.

»Back to the issue of democratic consensus: before its sensibility can be debated, the question that has to be addressed is what it can mean at all.«

  Very much in contrast to the case of the US elections, the insistence on consensual decision-making by the European Union was criticized fiercely, as an obstacle to democratic progress. More courage had been hoped for in regard to the conference in Nice, courage for majority decisions. But here too, national self-interest and the spirit of provincial misers dominated the scene.

  But back to the issue of democratic consensus: before its sensibility can be debated, the question that has to be addressed is what it can mean at all. The answers will vary greatly, as will the responses to the questions of its applicability, its requirements and aims, its procedures and its scope, its further developments and the experiences connected to it.

  The two examples above rather seem to show what consensus is not meant to be: a simple agreement among the heads of parties or governments. Such a consensus always threatens to keep other voices out. Another look at the American continent may illustrate this: in Columbia, such an agreement existed between the leaders of the liberals and the conservatives. This effectively excluded other social groups from political action, with fatal consequences for the possibilities of meaningful political discourse. It seems a cynical irony of history that even mafia bosses refer to a consensus in order to justify their criminal operations.

»Consensus, therefore, needs to be built on clear presuppositions. Its goals, starting-point, perspective, and scope have to be spelled out, as well the group of persons included in it, those who control it, and the procedure leading to it.«

  Consensus, therefore, needs to be built on clear presuppositions. Its goals, starting-point, perspective, and scope have to be spelled out, as well the group of persons included in it, those who control it, and the procedure leading to it. All of these issues concern philosophy, since the concept of consensus needs clear presuppositions as well.

  Following the suggestion of the Ghanaian philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu, to develop a form of democracy based on consensus, this issue of polylog wishes to discuss some of these questions, especially in regard to the challenges of an intercultural context. Here, too, the opinions expressed differ widely.

  Even if we do not think of such extreme cultural conflicts as we have witnessed recently – like President Robert Mugabe's incitement to a murderous chase of whites in Zimbabwe, or the merciless terror of the fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan which has as little to do with the spirit of the Qur'an as with humanity or justice – even then the occupation with consensus as a democratic principle remains a difficult task. And it is also a necessary task, for politics just as much as for philosophy.

Translation from the German by Kai Kresse.

polylog: Forum for Intercultural Philosophy 2 (2000).
Online: http://them.polylog.org/2/edit-en.htm
ISSN 1616-2943

Author: Bertold Bernreuter
© 2000 Bertold Bernreuter & polylog e.V.