polylog / themes / focus / Aharon Shear-Yashuv: Talmudic Thoughts about the »Perceptions of Beliefs«

Talmudic Thoughts about the »Perceptions of Beliefs«

Summary

The dialectics between revelation and reason can be found throughout the history of Jewish philosophy of religion and Rabbinic thought. The different schools all try, each according to its special understanding, to point to the rational character of the contents of revelation. This paper differentiates between three main positions on that theme, illustrated by three Aggadot (stories) from the Talmud: The maximal position understands the revelation at Sinai as completely given, the minimal position as revelation of certain general contents, and, finally, the midway position understands revelation as contents which can be interpreted differently. Despite the differences, all the positions are based on the principle that in each generation the traditional texts have to be actualized. The necessary process of interpretation will be guided by the principle of reason which may also be termed the perceptions of beliefs.

Introduction

Aharon Shear-Yashuv:
Jewish Philosophers on Reason and Revelation.
Paideia World Philosophy Conference Paper.
1998.

Article

One of the first important books which was written at the beginning of Jewish Medieval Philosophy by Sa'adja ben Josef (882-942) is called Kitab al-Amanat wal I'tiqad, which is usually translated as The Book about Philosophical Opinions and Beliefs. But the author does not intend to speak about double truth, that is, one concerning the divine and the other, the human realm. On the contrary, he wants to prove that the contents of divine revelation is by and large identical with human reason. Therefore, it should be translated as Perceptions of Beliefs. 1

The different schools in the history of Jewish philosophy of religion, the rationalistic ones as well as the so-called anti-rationalistic and above-rationalistic ones are not irrationalistic oriented but all try, each according to its special understanding, to point to the rational character of the contents of revelation. According to the rationalists the rational perceptions of the contents of revelation is fully or at least partly identical with reason, while according to the antirationalists certain rational operations are captured by revelation. 2

My following essay deals with the talmudic perceptions of beliefs, exemplified by some discussions about the immanent relation between reason and revelation. But first of all some short remarks about the endeavour of the talmudic Sages that discuss philosophical problems with the representatives of their Greek counterparts. According to biblical understanding each human being is created in the image of God and has a part in divine reason. Therefore, man is able, in addition to his specific understanding of revelation, to accomplish certain theological and philosophical insights by means of his intellectual endeavours.

Discussions between Rabbis and Philosophers

The universal character of classical Judaism allows for the openness and readiness of the talmudic Sages to debate with the representatives of Greek philosophy.

The universal character of classical Judaism, which is expressed in the theology of the Noachides, 3 allows for the openness and readiness of the talmudic Sages to debate with the representatives of Greek philosophy. Thus, we find in the talmudic and midrashic literature many discussions between Rabban Gamliel II and his Roman counterparts during Domition's reign. They argued about theodicy, idolatry, the empirical proof of God's existence or about the conflict within the Godhead as creator, since he is bound on the one hand to his natural order, and on the other hand to his ethical order. 4 Highly revealing are also the discussions about ethical matters between Rabbi Yehuda, the president of the Sanhedrin, and the emperor Marcus Aurelius Antonius, one of the most important representatives of the late Stoa. 5

The close relationship of the Jewish Sages to various representatives of the Greek and Roman philosophical schools led to the generally accepted view that classical philosophy drew from Jewish revelation. Thus, for example, Theophrastos, the pupil and successor of Aristotle, calls the Jews philosophoi to genos, philosophers by birth. And his contemporary Megasthenes, ambassador of the Seleucid Empire at one of the Indian courts, compared the Jews with the Brahmins in India, both regarded as philosophers in their respective area. The Peripatetic philosopher Hermippos writes in his Life of Pythagoras that the philosophy of Pythagoras is partly rooted in the Jewish tradition. And the Neopythagorian thinker Numenios traces Greek philosophy back to the Oriental thought and moreover calls Platon a Greek speaking Moses. The Church Fathers Justinus and Clemens Alexandrinus were also of the opinion that the Greek conceptions about God were borrowed from the Mosaic Scriptures. This view was, according to Averroes, generally accepted during the Middle Ages. 6

Talmudic Sages about Revelation and Reason

»Turn it and turn it for all is in it, by means of it you will understand, and grow grey and old in it, and turn not away from it, for there is no better rule for thee than it.«

The Sayings of the Fathers

The rational character of talmudic theology can be seen in the rich discussions between the Sages and the non-Jewish philosophers and theologians. These discussions also include the latter's opinions of the Jewish tradition's influence on Greek philosophy. There are also numerous Aggadot (stories) in the »sea of the Talmud« that reflect the rational character of revelation. In my opinion one should differentiate between three main positions on that theme, which are connected through the principal of reason: the maximal, minimal and midway position, the latter being the most frequent one.

The maximal position can be summarized with the dictum, according to which »God has shown to Moses all the details of the written and oral law and what will be renewed in the future by the sages« (Babylonian Talmud, Megilla, Folio 19b). According to this statement Moses already received the whole contents of revelation. And that which will be renewed by the Sages has to be understood only as a rediscovery of the already given truth and not as the result of their philosophical self-endeavour. A similar view is expressed by Ben Bag-Bag at the end of the fifth chapter of The Sayings of the Fathers: »Turn it and turn it for all is in it, by means of it you will understand, and grow grey and old in it, and turn not away from it, for there is no better rule for thee than it.« 7

The two following examples illustrate the minimal view. The first one is a midrashic explanation of Exodus 31, 18: »And he gave unto Moses, when he finished speaking with him upon Mount Sinai, two tablets of testimony, tablets of stone, written with the finger of God.« The Midrash Tanchuma explains the word »finished« as a word play: »Has Moses really finished learning [has he really learned everything]? Doesn't it say ›Its measure is longer than the earth and broader than the sea‹ (Job 11, 9)? One rather should understand it as follows: the Hoy One, blessed be He, has given to Moses only general rules.« 8 The »general rules« are probably the thirteen hermeneutic rules of Rabbi Yishmael at the beginning of the Midrash Sifra to Leviticus, according to which the Hebrew Bible is explained. They are an important part of talmudic logic. 9 The second example for the minimal view is the following story from the Babylonian Talmud, Menachot, Folio 29b:

Rab Judah said in the name of Rab, When Moses ascended on high… the Holy One said to him, ›There will rise a man, at the end of many generations, Akiba b. Joseph by name, who will expound upon each tittle heaps and heaps of laws‹. ›Lord of the universe‹, said Moses, ›permit me to see him‹. He replied, ›turn thee round‹. Moses went and sat down behind eight rows [and listened to the discourses upon the law]. Not being able to follow their arguments he was ill at ease, but when they came to a certain subject and the disciples said to the master ›Whence do you know it?‹ and the latter replied ›It is a law given unto Moses at Sinai‹ he was comforted.

According to this Aggada Moses received on Sinai only certain parts of revelation. Through the course of history the Sages, like Rabbi Akiba, expounded these parts which are merely hinted in Sinai's revelation. And they also spelled out laws, which are not mentioned in the biblical text, yet are of ancient tradition. 10

»That the Torah had already been given at Mount Sinai; we pay no attention to a Heavenly Voice, because Thou hast long since written in the Torah at Mount Sinai, After the majority must one incline.«

Babylonian Talmud
Baba Mezia

The following brings forth two examples of the aforementioned midway position.

R. Abba stated in the name of Samuel: For three years there was a dispute between Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel, the former asserting ›The halachah is in agreement with our views‹ and the latter contending, ›The halachah is in agreement with our views‹. Then a bath kol issued announcing, ›[The utterances of] both are the words of the living God, but the halachah is in agreement with the rules of Beth Hillel‹. Since, however, ›both are the words of the living God‹, what was it that entitled Beth Hillel to have the halachah fixed in agreement with their rulings? – Because they were kindly and modest, they studied their own rulings and those of Beth Shammai. ('Erubin 13b)

Thus, for both schools the contents of revelation were given on Mount Sinai, but its meaning has to be found out through discussions. To a certain degree the bath kol, a lower grade of prophecy, criticizes the law of contradiction in favour of a synthesis or a coincidentia oppositorum, which denies the contradictions within the Godhead. 11

A similar midway position is expressed in the following Aggada from the Babylonian Talmud, Baba Mezia, Folio 59a.b, to which I refer in length.

We learnt elsewhere: If he cut it into separate tiles, placing sand between each tile: R. Eliezer declared it clean, and the Sages declared it unclean; and this was the oven of 'Aknai. Why [the oven] of 'Aknai? – Said Rab Judah in Samuel's name: [It means] that they encompassed it with arguments as a snake, and proved it unclean. It has been taught: On that day R. Eliezer brought forward every imaginable argument, but they did not accept them. Said he to them: ›If the halachah agrees with me, let this carob-tree prove it!‹ Thereupon the carob-tree was torn a hundred cubits out of its place – others affirm, four hundred cubits. ›No proof can be brought from a carob-tree‹, they retorted. Again he said to them: ›If the halachah agrees with me, let the stream of water prove it!‹ Whereupon the stream of water flowed backwards. ›No proof can be brought from a stream of water‹, they rejoined. Again he urged: ›If the halachah agrees with me, let the walls of the schoolhouse prove it‹, whereupon the walls inclined to fall. But R. Joshua rebuked them, saying: ›When scholars are engaged in a halachic dispute, what have ye to interfere?‹ Hence they did not fall, in honour of R. Joshua, nor did they resume the upright, in honour of R. Eliezer; and they are still standing thus inclined. Again he said to them: ›If the halachah agrees with me, let it be proved from Heaven!‹ Whereupon a Heavenly Voice cried out: ›Why do ye dispute with R. Eliezer, seeing that in all matters the halachah agrees with him!‹ But R. Joshua arose and exclaimed: ›It is not in heaven.‹ What did he mean by this? – Said R. Jeremiah: That the Torah had already been given at Mount Sinai; we pay no attention to a Heavenly Voice, because Thou hast long since written in the Torah at Mount Sinai, After the majority must one incline. R. Nathan met Elijah and asked him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do in that hour? – He laughed [with joy], he replied, saying, ›My sons have defeated Me, My sons have defeated Me.‹ It was said: On that day all objects which E. Eliezer had declared clean were brought and burnt in fire. Then they took a vote and excommunicated him. 12

Our Aggada informs us about a legal dispute between R. Eliezer and the Sages. Can the snake-oven become impure or not? This refers to an oven, which, instead of being made in one piece, was made in a series of separate portions with a layer of sand between each. R. Eliezer maintains that since each portion in itself is not a utensil, the sand between prevents the whole structure from being regarded as a single utensil, and therefore it is not liable to uncleanness. The Sages however hold that the outer coating of mortar or cement unifies the whole, and it is therefore liable to uncleanness.

»R. Nathan met Elijah and asked him: What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do in that hour? – He laughed [with joy], he replied, saying, ›My sons have defeated Me, My sons have defeated Me.‹«

Babylonian Talmud
Baba Mezia

R. Eliezer, besides R. Joshua is one of the most important Sages in the generation after the destruction of the second temple (between 90 to 130 post), who unsuccessfully tries to convince the Sages to accept his opinion. Therefore, he decides to strengthen his view by means of wonders. He conjures all four elements – the carob-tree (fire and air), the stream of water (water) and the walls of the schoolhouse (earth). R. Joshua criticises the behaviour of the walls, which should know better, since they are witnesses to the use of reason in the halls of judical talmudic learning. And when R. Eliezer invokes the Divine Voice to his favour, R. Joshua loses his temper and reminds him that the Torah is no longer in heaven but rather here on earth for us to utilize democratic decision-making. The Sages deny all proofs in halachic decisions which are based on wonders. R. Joshua was known as a sharp opponent to Christian views, while R. Eliezer was influenced by the wonder-theology of the New Testament.

Therefore one has to understand that our Aggada, which is in spirit of the Sages, including R. Joshua, lies on antichristian polemics. 13 The Holy One, Blessed be He, who confirms the decision of the majority, joyfully laughs at the fact that His sons are defeating Him with the help of the Torah. 14 It seems that both, the Sages and R. Joshua, as well as R. Eliezer, are representing the midway-position, since all of them, including R. Eliezer (at the beginning of the story ) encompass the oven with twist like rational arguments similar to a snake twisting around his prey. That is, they are trying to solve the question concerning the character of the oven through halachic argumentation, though at the end R. Eliezer applies magic force. 15

All three aforementioned positions, which understand the revelation at Sinai as completely given (maximal position) or as revelation of certain general contents (minimal position) or finally as contents which can be interpreted differently (midway position), share anti-fundamentalistic attitudes. Despite the differences, all the positions are based on the principle that in each generation the traditional texts have to be actualized, since the eternal process of interpretation is the ongoing process of revelation. The Sinaic event is the »axis of history« 16 on which created reason is always newly discovering the contents of revelation. The eternal process of revelation is thus rooted in Sinai, yet goes beyond it, so that one not only discovers certain hidden truths, but is also effectively creative in the process of revelation. The authoritative character of these new creations is guaranteed in every generation by the generally accepted Sages. 17 These new creations can also lead to legal decisions, which were unusual in talmudic times, since »times have changed«. 18

Talmudic Wisdom as mirrored in Modern Philosophy

»As long as we do not have a concept, we have no knowledge, and without knowledge we cannot obtain a concept. Only through knowledge can we obtain it.«

Maimonides

The three sketched positions concerning the dialectics between revelation and reason can be found throughout the history of Jewish religious philosophy and Rabbinic thought. They led to rational and above-rational, but not irrational conceptions. The following example for the Wirkungsgeschichte of Rabbinic thought in the field of epistemology will illustrate this fact. In the third chapter of the Sayings of the Fathers, we read: »R. Elazar ben Azariah said: ›If there is no knowledge there is no understanding, and if there is no understanding there is no knowledge.‹« In this statement R. Elazar, the successor of R. Gamliel II as president of the Sanhedrin in Javne (about 95 CE), describes his epistemology in nuce. With this epistemology one can interpret the tradition and recognize theological and philosophical truths. In his commentary on this statement Maimonides (1135-1204) highlights ben Azariah's epistemology.

R. Elazar says that each one of the two parts contributes to the existence of the other and completes it. What he holds about knowledge and understanding is a delicate philosophical speculation. I will only touch upon it, relying on the intellectual power of the person who had thought about it. So knowledge is what we receive and gain, but the attaining of concepts of understanding is twofold, first abstracting form from matter thereby creating a concept, second recognizing the separate forms as existing without making them knowable, because they are knowable as such, and this is called understanding. And this is also knowledge and through knowledge we also understand and it is possible to obtain what can be obtained. He thus wants to say: As long as we do not have a concept, we have no knowledge, and without knowledge we cannot obtain a concept. Only through knowledge can we obtain it. This is very difficult to understand, even from the books which write about it, so especially here where we only touch upon the problem. 19

The philosopher Salomon Maimon (1753-1800) tries to explain the commentary of Maimonides in his essay »Probe rabbinischer Philosophie« (An example of rabbinic Philosophy), basing himself on the Hebrew philosophical language of Maimonides and on Kantian epistemology. 20 According to this epistemology, Hermann Cohen, the founder of the neokantian school of Marburg, develops his Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums (Religion of Reason out of the sources of Judaism). 21 For Cohen created reason becomes the originative principle of revelation. »Reason does not begin with history, but history has to begin with reason. For the beginning has to be more than a temporal beginning; it has to mean the eternal originative principle.« 22

It is hoped that this essay shows that the talmudic dictum »The study of the Torah surpasses all duties« (Shabbath, Folio 127a) is reflected in all the above mentioned positions, thereby producing a talmudic and philosophical matrix, climaxing in Cohen's »Religion of Reason«. Judaism is for Cohen the example par excellence of this type of religion, since its originality and classical sources are characterized by the principle of reason which may also be termed the »Perceptions of Beliefs«.

polylog: Forum for Intercultural Philosophy 4 (2003).
Online: http://them.polylog.org/4/fsa-en.htm
ISSN 1616-2943
© 2003 Author & polylog e.V.

Anmerkungen

Cf. H. Cohen (1951): Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie. Giessen, 13.

I deal with this theme in my speech which I delivered during the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, which took place in Boston from 10th to 16th August 1998: "Jewish Philosophers on Reason and Revelation". Online:

http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Reli/ReliShea.htm.

Cf. my article "Der universale Aspekt des Judentums – Israel und die Völkerwelt". In: A. Shear-Yashuv (1987): Religion, Philosophy and Judaism. Jerusalem, 232-240.

Babylonian Talmud, Abodah Sarah, Folio 44,45.

Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin, Folio 91.

Cf. A. Weiss (1923): Mose ben Maimon. Führer der Unschlüssigen, 1. Buch. Leipzig, 280, and Leo Baeck (1957): "Maimonides – der Mann, sein Werk und seine Wirkung". In: In Memoriam Leo Baeck. Düsseldorf, 36 (Schriften des Zentralrats der Juden in Deutschland 1).

The rationalist Maimonides speaks in his commentary ad.loc. about the recognition of truth, which can be seen by »the eye of understanding«.

In Hebrew the three words »finished« (kekaluto), »everything« (kol) and »general rules« (kelalim) sound similar.

An example of these rules is the conclusion a minori ad maius or vice versa: the Sabbath is in some respects regarded as being of more importance than a common holiday. If, therefore, a certain kind of work is permitted on Sabbath, we justly infer that such a work is the more permissible on a common holiday; and vice versa, if a certain work is forbidden on a common holiday it must all the more so be forbidden imperatively on Sabbath (Mishna Betza V.2). Cf. M. Mielziner (1968): Introduction to the Talmud. New York. 4th ed., part II.

These laws are called »Laws of Moses from Sinai«. This expression should not be understood literally. According to Maimonides in his commentary on the Mishna the Talmud mentions 23 such laws. Moses in our story was comforted only, because Rabbi Akiba mentioned his name, which does not mean that Moses did receive these laws on Sinai.

That might be the case here, but does not mean that the Rabbis generally deny the law of contradiction.

Translation of the Soncino-Talmud.

Cf. A. Guttmann (1968): The Significance of Miracles for Talmudic Judaism, Bd. XX. New York: HUCA, 363-406. His research, which deals above all with our story, comes to the following conclusion: »The decline of miracle as regards influencing law and practice goes parallel with the growth of Christianity. The Bat Kol, a post-Biblical revelation, at first recognized as the highest authority chiefly in deciding the Beth Hillel versus Beth Shammai controversies and playing elsewhere, too, a role in legal matters, later became all but outlawed. This step was taken about the time when Pharisaic Judaism became aware of the imminent danger coming from nascent Christianity which had previously been considered as one of many obscure ephemeral sects. With such revelation, all other miracles had been outlawed, too, as an active agent influencing the decision of halakic controversies.« (405f)

»Have defeated Me« occurs twice, referring to the oral and written Torah. In addition to this »to defeat« (lenazeach) and »eternal« (nizchi) have the same Hebrew root, hinting to the eternal validity of the oral and the written law.

The behaviour of the walls has to be understood because of his wisdom. »A Heavenly Voice cried out: ›Why do you dispute with R. Eliezer, seeing that in all matters the halachah agrees with him!‹«. Furthermore we learn from the continuation of the story about the greatness and spiritual power of R. Eliezer. As a result of the grievous offence of the excommunication everything he put an eye on was destroyed. And his brother in law, R. Gamliel, the president of the Sanhedrin, who was responsible for the excommunication, passed away. But this magic power did not help him in halachic decisions.

According to Karl Jaspers the main ideas of the great cultures (China, India and the Occident) were born during the Achsenzeit between 800-200 BCE. According to classical Jewish understanding the talmudic epoch is the axis of history (200 BCE-500 CE). During that period the talmudic Sages canonized the Hebrew Scriptures. Thus, the oral law determines the holiness of the written law and therefore the Achsenzeit of Sinai reflects the talmudic Achsenzeit.

Cf. Jochanan Silman (1992): "The Torah of Israel in light of its renewal. A phenomenological Study" (Hebrew). In: Publications of the American Academy for Jewish Studies 57.

New scientific results of research work in the exact sciences, humanities, medicine and Technology allow according to the halachic principle of shinnui ha'ittim (change of times) new creations in all fields of the law, for example, concerning the position of women in modern society, sexual behaviour and the Sabbath.

Cf. also the German translation of Salomon Maimon, in: K. Wilhelm (Hg.) (1961): Jüdischer Glaube. Bremen, 334f.

The essay was printed in the Berliner Monatsschrift, Berlin 1789. Cf. my essay "An epistemological explanation of 'The ethics of the Fathers' 3, 17" (Hebrew). In: Mosche Hallamisch (ed.) (1990): Alei Shefer. Studies in the Literature of Jewish Thought. Ramat-Gan, 163-173.

This is the title of his last book, which appeared in 1919. The English translation Religion of Reason out of the sources of Judaism was published in New York in 1972. A new critical edition of his collected works is currently made by the Cohen Archives of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Zurich under the leadership of Helmut Holzhey.

Hermann Cohen: Religion of Reason out of the sources of Judaism, 84.

Author

Aharon Shear-Yashuv (*1940 in Bochum, Germany, as Wolfgang Schmidt) is, since 1984, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Bar-Ilan University in Ramat-Gan (Israel). From 1960-67, he studied Theology, Philosophy, and Classical Languages in Wuppertal, Mainz, and Hamburg. He received his PhD in Modern Jewish Theology from Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati; his thesis deals with the theology of Salomon Ludwig Steinheim. In 1970, he immigrated to Israel, where he did Rabbinical Studies in Jerusalem. His Rabbinical Ordination was in 1976, which was followed by several commitments as Rabbi and Scholar. His fields of expertise are modern Jewish philosophy (in its relation to modern Western philosophy) and Rabbinic thought.


	themes	literature	agenda	archive	anthology	calendar	links	profile

Aharon Shear-Yashuv