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Summary |
Indian epistemology or the theory of knowledge attempts to provide a rational basis for an intelligible discourse on matters of common, everyday experience, on the one hand, and in concentrating on the subject of cognition, it attempts to offer insights into the real, that is, essential, nature of this subject, the being who cognizes. The theme is dealt with under three general topics: 1. the relevance of the emergence of debate for philosophical activity in India; 2. the significance of epistemology in Indian philosophy and the sense in which ›religion‹ is involved in it; and 3. an attempt to extract some inter-culturally significant points from relevant aspects of the history of Indian philosophy. |
Content |
Introduction |
In order to display correctly the diacritical marks in this text, your operating system requires a Unicode font: InformationDarshana: Indian Philosophy Page:  Internet GuideIndian Philosophy and Religion: Internet GuideSparsabhumi: Buddhist and Indological Studies: Internet GuideEncyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Encyclopedia
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1 | Indian thought is well-known for the fact that in the various works of the different schools dealing, among other things, with the nature of the world, the human being and the objects of knowledge, ›religion‹ and ›philosophy‹ are often implicitly merged together and together form the basis for their insights. 1 Given this situation the question is: in which way are epistemological questions also implicitly ›religious‹? The short answer is that philosophical activity is identical with the urge for knowledge, and knowledge (to speak from the point of view of Indian thought) entails cognition in which a clear subject-object distinction is made; cognition encompasses three areas: the object that is cognized, the subject that cognises and the means or instruments of cognition, (such as perception, inference, etc.); when epistemology leads to insights about the intrinsic nature of the subject of cognition then, in this particular context, it may be said to have religious, if not mystic, overtones. | ||
| 2 | In other words, Indian epistemology or the theory of knowledge attempts to provide a rational basis for an intelligible discourse on matters of common, everyday experience, on the one hand, and in concentrating on the subject of cognition, it attempts to offer insights into the real, that is, essential, nature of this subject, the being who cognizes. In this sense, the concern with epistemology in Indian philosophy may be said to represent a philosophy of being and knowing involving, thereby, the metaphysical concern implicit in epistemology, where the subject-object distinction in the case of a knowledge of the subject breaks down. This is the short answer. The long answer is what this paper is about, including the attempt to see what inter-cultural significance may be extracted from relevant aspects of the history of Indian philosophy. | |||
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Indian Philosophy: Hindu philosophy: Orthodox schools: 1. Sāṁkhya 2. Yoga 3. Vaiśeṣika 4. Nyāya 5. Pūrva Mīmāṁsā 6. Uttara Mīmāṁsā (Vedānta) Śaivism Vaiṣṇavism Śāktism Buddhism: Hīnayāna Mahāyāna Vajrayāna Jainism: Śvetāmbara Digambara Materialism |
3 | But first, the term Indian philosophy or Indian thought is as much a misnomer as the term western philosophy or western thought. Although most traditions of thought in India share several common presuppositions (like the efficacy of karma, acceptance of the theory of rebirth, that knowledge of ultimate reality has a liberating effect, etc.) 2 when it comes to specific details it is the uniqueness of each school that comes to the fore. In the concern with epistemology in Indian philosophy, for example, there is a general consensus regarding the distinctions of the object that is cognized, the subject that cognises and the means or instruments of cognition, such as perception, inference, etc. This is as far as the generalization goes. When it comes to the essential natures of the subject of cognition and the objects of cognition, these questions have to be dealt with from the specific standpoint of a particular school, on the basis of its own ontological and metaphysical presuppositions. In this sense a short article as this one is quite limited to certain generalizations, with due alterations of details being necessary when comparing specific cases among the different schools. | ||
| 4 | A convenient classification of the different kinds of Indian philosophy is a fourfold one, divided in terms of whether a particular school belongs to: 1. the general category of Hindu philosophy (including within it the so-called six orthodox schools 3 and a philosophical activity which reflects the influence of Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism and Śāktism); 2. Buddhism, encompassing views not only of the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna traditions, but also the Vajrayāna school, especially with its Tibetan influence; 3. Jainism, with its thinkers who belong either to the Śvetāmbara or the Digambara traditions; and 4. Materialism; even though it did not survive in exactly the same way as the other schools did, its influence is clearly reflected by the fact that almost all the other schools attack its view of the world and its emphasis on perception as the only really valid means or instrument of knowledge. | |||
| 5 | It is clear that this paper cannot even try to be exhaustive. It attempts to give a general orientation and introduction to the theme, in the hope to facilitate more detailed study. In any case, it has to be borne in mind that the differences among the various schools of thought in India are philosophically more significant than certain generalizations which in some cases may be drawn. | |||
| 6 | The theme of this paper is dealt with under three general topics: 1. the relevance of the emergence of debate for philosophical activity in India; 2. the significance of epistemology in Indian philosophy and the sense in which ›religion‹ is involved in it; and 3. as stated above, an attempt to extract some inter-culturally significant points from relevant aspects of the history of Indian philosophy. 4 |
Debate and Philosophy in India |
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David Melling: Verbal Combat in the Brahmana. ArticlePhilip Groom: Formal Debate in the Early Upanisads. Article
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7 | The role of debate and discussion has characterized Indian philosophical activity since its very beginnings several centuries before our common era. This dialogic attitude, whether in a written form, or in actual public debates, contributed greatly to a sharpening of the philosophical tools, whilst at the same time contributing towards the setting down of rules of debate which had to be strictly adhered to in the kings' courts where they usually took place. The following summary of the situation also brings out its significance: | ||
| 8 | … a person who wrote thought provoking works was not regarded as a great philosopher if he did not also know how to effectively present his theory and to successively defend it in a debate with opponent views. The result was that public discussions and debates always had a significant role in the intellectual life of India since ancient times. We hear of them even in the Vedic period and there are recurring reports throughout the centuries of how great masters successfully defended their theories in public disputations and defeated their opponents. 5 | |||
| 9 | It is interesting to note how debate and discussion in India implicitly involved philosophical categories. In an early work on Indian medicine compiled by one Caraka and called Carakasaṃhitā ("Caraka's Collection«, datable to the early years of our era, although the basic ideas may have been much older), Caraka advises medical practitioners (already in chapter 3,8) to debate with others because, as he says: discussion increases the zeal for knowledge, clarifies knowledge, increases the power of speech, makes one famous, removes doubt and establishes the knowledge already gained. Moreover, carried away by the zeal of the discussion, the other person might disclose information which would otherwise be kept secret, and so one can learn something new. In this very early period of the history of Indian debate it was also recognized that a discussion which forms the basis of a debate can be of different kinds, and Caraka distinguishes two kinds, one that is »friendly« and one that is »hostile«. 6 | |||
| 10 | In the basic work of the Nyāya school of Indian philosophy which was composed in its present form perhaps a century or so after Caraka's work, by which it is clearly influenced, three kinds of discussions are distinguished, vāda, jalpa and vitaṇḍā: | |||
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Agenda on debate of the Nyāya school: 1. instruments or means of knowledge 2. the objects of knowledge 3. doubt 4. purpose 5. example 6. tenet 7. members or steps of the argument 8. deliberation 9. conclusion 10. disputation 11. debate 12. wrangling 13. fallacious reasons 14. quibble 15. false objections 16. reasons for defeat |
11 | Vāda means a discussion for the ascertainment of truth, jalpa a dispute in which the main object is the overthrow of the opponent rightly or wrongly, and vitaṇḍā a dispute in which attempts are made to discover the faults of the opponent's thesis without any attempt to offer any alternative thesis. Vāda is thus essentially different in its purpose … vāda is an academical discussion with pupils, teachers, fellow-students and persons seeking truth solely for the purpose of arriving at right conclusions, and not for fame or gain. Jalpa, on the other hand, is that dispute which a man carries on while knowing himself to be wrong or unable to defend himself properly from his opponents except by trickery and other unfair methods of argument. 7 | ||
| 12 | Apart from this perceptive observation of human behaviour even in early times, significant for the discussions were the rules for proper argumentation, in other words, the rules of logic on the basis of which an argument was decided to be valid or not. Further, epistemological issues concerning, for example, the means of cognition, the objects of cognition and the content of cognition, occupied Indian thinkers very early in their philosophical activity. This was in fact the favourite occupation of the Nyāya school, especially in its later phase, when an attempt was made to clearly assess what constitutes a valid inference in which the relations among the major, minor and middle terms became the chief concern of the school. | |||
| 13 | Caraka not only advises his colleagues in the manner mentioned above but he also helps them by supplying a list of 44 items which they should have a command over before accepting an invitation to enter into a debate. Suffice it to mention a few terms out of this list to depict how epistemological categories were interwoven into the emergence of debate in India: 8 perception, inference, comparison, thesis, statement of the proof of the thesis, the reason, the example, the doubt. The list becomes more compact later when the Nyāya school includes them as a starting point for the 16 themes it deals with in its basic work. The list of 16 items given at the beginning of the work (Nyāyasūtra) is further evidence for the point being made here about debate and epistemology: 1. instruments or means of knowledge, 2. the objects of knowledge, 3. doubt, 4. purpose, 5. example, 6. tenet, 7. members or steps of the argument, 8. deliberation, 9. conclusion, 10. disputation, 11. debate, 12. wrangling, 13. fallacious reasons, 14. quibble, 15. false objections, and 16. reasons for defeat. | |||
| 14 | This 16 point agenda of the Nyāya school, and what has been said above, show that since ancient times not only did the art of debate play a direct role in the philosophical activity of the Indians, but also that many philosophical categories (as in Caraka and the Nyāya school) implicitly evince an occupation with epistemology. Some basic points on epistemology in India should lead us a step further in the long answer being given to the question about the epistemological relation in philosophy and religion. |
Epistemology in India |
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Conditions for validity of means of cognition: (a) the knowledge which one means of cognition furnishes must be new and not attainable by any other means; (b) one means of cognition may aid another in furnishing knowledge, but the means of cognition in question should not be reducible to another; (c) the knowledge obtained by one means of cognition should not be contradicted by another means of cognition; (d) the accepted means of cognition should appeal to reason. |
15 | By about the third century of our era the different schools were quite established with their fundamental ontological, metaphysical and epistemological theories clearly summarized in their respective basic works. The basic ideas contained therein, which were compiled by the different thinkers into a system of thought, were certainly older. The commentators to these basic works elaborated the fundamental points from within their own tradition in order to make them understandable to the uninitiated, whilst at the same time defending the tradition against attacks from opponents. It is significant to note that the commentators took the first opportunity to mention the means or instruments of cognition accepted by the school, because this epistemological concern set the framework within which the ontology and the metaphysics were established. | ||
| 16 | Each school accepted a fixed number of means of cognition and, for the major schools of Indian philosophy, the number ranges from one to six. So, for example, the materialist accepts only sense perception as the most important and reliable means of cognition, the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣika school accept inference as well, the Sāṁkhya school accepts verbal testimony or scriptural authority in addition to these two, with the Nyāya school accepting four means by granting, in addition to the three, ›comparison‹ also as a means of valid cognition, etc. The enumeration of the means of cognition accepted by a school, although traditional, is not merely arbitrary. Reasons are supplied by the commentators to show why the specific number and nature of the instruments of knowledge are adequate for the school in question, thereby preempting any criticism by an opponent for being irrational. In other words, there are a certain implicit conditions on the basis of which the number of the instruments or means of cognition were regarded as valid by each school. | |||
| 17 | These conditions may be summarized into four points: (a) the knowledge which one means of cognition furnishes must be new and not attainable by any other means; (b) one means of cognition may aid another in furnishing knowledge, but the means of cognition in question should not be reducible to another—so, e.g., when perception aids inference, as in inferring fire by seeing only the smoke in the distance, the knowledge gained here cannot be reduced to the cognition supplied by perception (of the smoke) alone; (c) the knowledge obtained by one means of cognition should not be contradicted by another means of cognition; and (d) the accepted means of cognition should appeal to reason, a condition that applies especially to verbal testimony or scriptural authority as a means of cognition, in which case the knowledge concerning the revealed truth must appear probable and be made intelligible in terms of human experience, otherwise such a means of cognition would fail in its intention. | |||
| 18 | A noteworthy feature in the history of Indian epistemology, and one relevant for inter-cultural dialogue, is that when one discusses the theories of other schools by way of a critique of their views, this has to be done on the basis of their own basic presuppositions. In other words, the materialists, for example, cannot be simply criticized for merely accepting the validity of only sense perception as a means of cognition. A case has to be made out for the fact that sense perception alone cannot by itself prove the validity of sense perception itself since it can be asked: how can one perceive that sense perception alone is valid? This is to say that the materialist should be shown that arguments in favour of sense perception as the only means of cognition would entail inference as well. Such an attitude, namely, discussing a system of thought on the basis of its own presuppositions, can be immensely fruitful in inter-cultural dialogue when employed constructively. | |||
| 19 | Let us assume that theories of cognition of the different schools of Indian philosophy are acceptable for the reasons they themselves supply. However, these theories do not in themselves guarantee that cognition in each and every case is valid because, on the assumption of human fallibility, one would also have to grant the possibility that cognition can be invalid or incorrect. In other words, the theories of what constitute the means of valid cognition should, in addition, seek to explain the phenomenon of human error. Indeed the success of a theory of valid cognition is commensurate with the success in which error in our cognition is also explained. It is not often noticed that Indian thinkers dealing with epistemological issues also implicitly dealt with theories of error as well. So, in addition to the theories of what constitutes valid cognition we also find a similar number of theories of error in cognition. Let us look at a couple of these theories of error for the point being made here. | |||
| In terms of the twofold concern in Indian epistemology a distinction may be drawn between ›cognition-experience‹ and ›knowledge-experience‹. | 20 | Some thinkers (e.g., Rāmānuja of the Vedānta school of qualified monism) say that error should be seen rather as a lack of knowledge. In other words, there is no error as such and one should speak, instead, of a failure in cognition to distinguish the positive features of an object from the negative ones. Error is thereby explained away by saying that, for example, seeing a rope as a snake is a confusion of two elements, namely, the memory of a snake over-shadowing the perception of the rope which under certain conditions may resemble a snake. The criterion which finally decides the problem of whether the cognition is erroneous or not is the application of the cognition to practical life. | ||
| 21 | Another theory of error (e.g., of the Śaiva Siddhānta and Yoga schools) is that error is the cognition of an object as something ›other than what it is‹. A rope seen as a snake entails an affirmation of qualities which in fact can only be denied of the object. Separately, both the rope and the snake are real objects, and the realization later that in fact ›the rope is not a snake‹ is for all intents and purposes the same as to say ›this is a rope‹. Here the object perceived is seen as something different from what it is on the grounds of features ascribed to it which in fact should be denied. | |||
| 22 | The Yogācāra school of Buddhism, for example, holds the view that experience as such, including the cognition of an object, is in its objectivised mode illusory and, by extension, the ›error‹ that may occur in daily life is a ›double error‹. In other words, life is a kind of dream and therefore unreal. The cognitions that take place in dreams are errors to a second degree. It is only the subjective consciousness which exists per se, without any corresponding object outside. Just as the waking state reveals the unreality and error of the dream state so too, it is claimed, the errors, and even unreality, of the waking state will be revealed when a knowledge of ultimate reality is gained (as defined by the school, with the means to its realization). | |||
| 23 | According to the theory of error of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism error consists in the cognition of what does not exist. The view is more radical than the above theory in that all knowledge as such is questioned. Since nothing really exists the objects of everyday experience are as non-existent as those which are erroneously cognized. | |||
| 24 | The renowned thinker Śaṅkara (perhaps 8th century CE) holds the view that finally one cannot adequately explain or account for how an object is erroneously cognized. How a rope comes to be seen as a snake, for example, cannot be determined. In error there is some kind of reality that exists as long as the error obtains, which is why one may be afraid of the so-called ›snake‹. Some kind of relative truth has to ascribed to such a (false) cognition; just as in a dream water can quench thirst, and seeing a rope as a snake can cause fear, a certain validity obtains as long as one remains in error. When the actual truth dawns on one, when waking up or when realising that the ›snake‹ is in fact a rope, then the error disappears. How such (error) experiences take place may be ascribed to ›ignorance‹, insofar as we do not cognize the objects as they really are, but the role of ›ignorance‹ itself has to be explained. Precisely here it is impossible, according to Śaṅkara, to account for it adequately. | |||
| 25 | In the Indian context one can speak of a twofold function of the concern with epistemology: 1. a concern which is closely connected with what comes under the general theme of the cognition of an object, and 2. a concern—on the basis of the ›validity‹ of cognition (in which case error, doubt and illusion are ruled out)—with knowledge (jñāna) as such. The Sanskrit term for epistemology, prāmāṇyavada (literally: the ›theory of being established by proof‹), entails three cognate words which are useful for the distinction that may be drawn between ›knowledge‹ and ›valid cognition‹, namely, prameya or the object of cognition, pramā or pramiti which is the cognition itself, and pramātṛ or the subject that cognizes. | |||
| 26 | In terms of the twofold concern in Indian epistemology a distinction may be drawn between ›cognition-experience‹ and ›knowledge-experience‹. The former would then be the contact which takes place between an object and a subject of cognition through the means of the senses, leading to such experiences as listening, tasting, touching, etc. Cognition in this sense would encompass inference, verbal testimony and other means of cognition. The latter, ›knowledge-experience‹, on the one hand, may be equated with valid cognition-experience, as when one knows the reality of an object through a perception of it (without any error in the process) and, on the other hand, it would involve an experience, for example, of one's nature which cannot be derived through the usual means of valid cognition. Knowledge, or self-knowledge, in this latter sense would also preeminently include an experience that can be described as intuitive, transcendental, or religious, namely without the subject-object distinction which characterizes cognition. | |||
| »There exists no greater knowledge than that of the ātman. One should be intent on this knowledge of the ātman; what the ātman is is the supreme.« | 27 | At the empirical level, therefore, knowledge may be said to involve or include cognition but not vice versa, that is, cognition, insofar as it could be false or erroneous, does not necessarily involve or assume the status of knowledge. Moreover, granted the possibility of self-knowledge (which all schools accept as a basic presupposition) one cannot compare such a knowledge with a knowledge of the external world. Knowledge or valid cognition of the external world entails a clear distinction between the subject and object of cognition; whereas self-knowledge obviously cannot involve making the subject the object of valid cognition involving a means of knowledge different from those used for a knowledge of the external world. | ||
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The question that now arises in the context of self-knowledge or a knowledge of the subject is: what are the means of knowledge for it? How can the subject be known? It is in this context that the second role of epistemology comes into play and one enters in the realm of intuition, religion, and even mysticism, especially when ones comes across statements like this about the ātman, the self or the true subject of cognition or knowledge: »One should contemplate the ātman through the ātman; the abode of the ātman is verily the ātman«and »There exists no greater knowledge than that of the ātman. One should be intent on this knowledge of the ātman; what the ātman is is the supreme«. 9 |
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| 29 | Here the subject of knowledge knows itself through itself, without the subject-object distinction which obtains in the case of a knowledge or cognition of the outside world. The subject of knowledge can be known without itself becoming an object. How exactly each school in Indian philosophy deals with this theme has to be seen in the light of its own presuppositions and its own ontology and metaphysics. |
Inter-cultural Relevance of Epistemology in Indian Philosophy |
| »Through intellectual non-violence one can advance the cause of peaceful, mutual respect in our strife-ridden day and age. It is the cure for extremism, dogmatism and fanaticism which are largely responsible for the despair and disaster that arise out of a misunderstanding and lack of tolerance.« | 30 | Is there a school in Indian philosophy which on epistemological grounds clearly helps us extract elements of it which can be relevant in an inter-cultural context? Can old and even ancient ideas be relevant for us in this day and age? We have seen that in Indian philosophy debate and discussion were crucial for the development of ideas and for the sharpening of the tools in philosophical activity. Early in the history of Indian philosophy it was understood that there can be different points of view with regard to any object of inquiry; debate and discussion brought these out to the fore. Jainism is an inalienable part of Indian philosophy with its contribution based on the teachings of Mahāvīra who was a contemporary of the Buddha. In his teaching Mahāvīra indicated simply that one could see a thing differently from different sides and that, accordingly, different answers would be possible. Later thinkers developed his method into a philosophical system according to which one tried, as a rule, to see everything from different standpoints and perspectives. They called it the »theory of manifoldness« which avoids making one-sided, absolutistic statements about any object of inquiry. 10 | ||
| 31 | Jainism accepts that theoretically there can be an infinite number of standpoints and perspectives, although seven have come be traditional. One Jaina thinker says that these are the only logical possibilities if one combines the following possible statements about any object of inquiry: a statement can be either positive, or negative, or neutral (i.e., indescribable, namely that an object cannot be described adequately from all viewpoints at once). The conclusion, then, is that the theory of manifoldness in Jainism takes all cases into consideration when talking about an object. | |||
| 32 | Basically it is a simple theory which avoids making one-sided (ekānta), absolutistic judgements and statements about any object of enquiry. This is to say that an object or any theme of discussion should be approached, according to Jainism, from various perspectives and standpoints. Depending on the point of view an observation may be, for example, both correct and incorrect, as with the colour of an object depending on the light, or with a person who can be both father and son at the same time. The basic point is simple: depending on the standpoint or perspective a particular view or statement can be both true and false at the same time: someone can be both a father and a son at the same time, namely, with respect to a particular person, i.e., depending on the standpoint. The crux of the theory lies in the fact that each of the seven statements is explicitly being made from one perspective or point of view, and that it says at the same time that there can be another perspective or point if view, and that all statements apply simultaneously. | |||
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To take the example of a person or an object like a pot, the following statements can be made about them according to the theory: 1. from one point of view he is a father, or this is a pot; 2. from one point of view he is not a father, or this is not a pot; 3. from one point of view he is both a father and not a father, (i.e., he is a son), namely, at the same time, or this object is both a pot and not a pot. This assertion combining the first and second statements into a single unit is not contradictory. The assertion may be fully expressed in the form: a person can be a son of so and so but not a son at the same time, namely, of another person, or from one point of view this object exists (as a pot) and from another point of view it does not exist (namely, as a tree); 4. from one point of view it is not possible to adequately describe a person as a son, father, brother, etc. all at once; so the person is indescribable, or it is not possible to describe an object adequately from all possible perspectives all at once; 5. from one point of view a person is both a father and is indescribable; this combines statements 1 and 4, the same with a pot; 6. from one point of view a person is both not a father and is indescribable, this combines statements 2 and 4, the same with a pot; 7. from one point of view a person is all at once: a father, not a father, and is indescribable , this combines 3 and 4 into one single statement, the same with a pot. |
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| 34 | If one bears in mind that the theory of non-violence, which is built into the metaphysics of Jainism, and its practice, is one of the fundamental teachings then it is understandable that the theory of manifoldness can easily be interpreted as a kind of intellectual non-violence, as has been done by many modern thinkers. This attitude has far-reaching consequences for the inter-cultural dialogue that has now become a significant feature of our day and age. Even during Mahāvīra's time there were different views of reality which he sought to reconcile on the basis of their validity from a particular point of view, without discarding them outright. Such an attitude presupposes learning about other views which not only brings about mutual understanding, but a deeper insight into one's own perspective. Through intellectual non-violence one can advance the cause of peaceful, mutual respect in our strife-ridden day and age. It is the cure for extremism, dogmatism and fanaticism which are largely responsible for the despair and disaster that arise out of a misunderstanding and lack of tolerance. |
Conclusion |
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»The willingness to understand and the wish to be understood go together and constitute the two sides of a single hermeneutic coin.« Ram Adhar Mall |
35 | What inter-cultural significance can be extracted from what has been said, including the theory of manifoldness briefly mentioned above? Some points can be summarized as follows. | ||
| 36 | 1. In the context of debate, the attitude to discuss a system of thought on the basis of its own presuppositions, when employed constructively, can be immensely fruitful in inter-cultural dialogue. This attitude presupposes an earnest attempt to try and understand the other position and to discuss it ›from within‹ as far as is possible. Such an attempt creates the possibility then of seeing one's own position ›from outside‹, objectively, as far as is possible. | |||
| 37 | 2. The theory of manifoldness teaches a positive, basic attitude towards any object of investigation that may be undertaken in a debate. An attempt should be made to understand another position from its particular standpoint and to accept is as valid from that particular point of view. Non-violence, even in its intellectual form, serves as the guiding principle in trying to clear differences of opinions or points of view in inter-cultural dialogue. | |||
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3. An implicit rule that applies in inter-cultural dialogue and philosophy among the participants is that of providing sufficient room for »a mutual desire to understand and to be understood«11. Here again, the pluralistic attitude of manifoldness can help to prepare this atmosphere. Jainism has an age-old tradition in trying to avoid one-sided positions and its theoretical, i.e., philosophical, justification can serve as a guide towards a practical implementation for inter-cultural understanding, adapted to our present situation. It can serve as a cure for the extremism, dogmatism and fanaticism just mentioned above. |
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| 39 | 4. The religious and even ›mystical‹ aspect of Indian philosophy is contained in the means for realizing, i.e., having an intuitive experience of, the essential nature of the subject of cognition, the being who really knows. The means involved here include a training in yogic or ascetic practices in which meditation and self-study play a vital role in the attempt to realize the consciousness described as the characteristic feature of the self, the true subject. The training involved in self-study may be seen as an attempt to strive towards authenticity and authentic existence. Such a training would have a direct influence on authentic inter-cultural dialogue with all the positive and constructive intra-personal relationship one would expect in authentic dialogue. | |||
| 40 | 5. Aspects of Indian philosophy can serve as a good starting point for a theoretical basis in actual inter- and intra-cultural dialogue, because such ideas were in fact implicit in the debates which took place among the different schools of Indian philosophy in ancient times. These ideas can be useful in setting up a philosophical basis that can be adapted to apply to our day and age. |
»Although Indian thought developed in an intellectual climate which in many ways was different from, and most certainly not influenced by, the ancient Greek world, abundant and often striking similarities with Western philosophical thought justify the application of the term ›philosophy‹ to it. The nature of the world-view taken for granted by the majority of schools and, in the course of time, an increasingly religious preoccupation nevertheless led Indian philosophy in a somewhat different direction from the occidental. But the great variety of approaches even during the medieval period disproves the myth that all Indian philosophy is ›mystical‹ or ›theological‹ or that … Vedânta is its sole, or most typical, representative.«(Flew 1979, s.v. Indian philosophy)
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