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David Peter Lawrence

Aspects of Abhinavagupta's Theory of Scripture


Indian systems of thought can be widely characterized by the deeply intertwined relationship of the two phenomena that Western traditions call philosophy and religion. The Pratyabhijñā philosophical theology of the 10th-11th century thinker Abhinavagupta, one of the most important exponents of Kashmiri Shaivism, represents an illustrative example for the fundamental interrelation between philosophical argumentation and religious revelation. Particularly relevant to this theme is his theory of the expression of supreme speech in concrete scriptural traditions. The focus of this paper will be on Abhinavagupta's discussions of scriptural tradition (āgama) as means of knowledge (pramāṇa). The analisis will be concluded by some general reflections on the inter-cultural relevance of his theory of scripture.



1. Introduction 1

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1 The writings on monistic Trika Śaivism by the 10th-11th century Kashmiri thinker Abhinavagupta offer an excellent illustration of the deeply intertwined relationship of the phenomena we categorize as philosophy and religion. In earlier publications, I have examined this relationship in the Pratyabhijñā philosophical theology of Abhinavagupta as well as his predecessor Utpaladeva. Both attempt to make their discourse universally intelligible by rationalizing it according to the most widely accepted standards for publicly assessable argument in Hinduism. These are the sixteen Nyāya categories pertaining to philosophical discussion, particularly what is called the inference for the sake of others (parārthānumāna). At the same time, they »encompass« or »overcode« their discourse as a gnoseologically internalized form of tantric ritual, which leads students to salvation through reenacting the monistic Śaiva myth. I have characterized the Pratyabhijñā discourse in its religio-philosophical bivalence with the designation »tantric argument«. 2
Śakti Devi

Śakti Devi
(8th century,
Himachal Pradesh)
2 The central intellectual moment of Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's Pratyabhijñā system is their explanation of their cosmogonic myth of Śiva emanating the universe through Śakti as his self-recognition (ahampratyavamarśa). They also identify Śiva's self-recognition (Śakti) with a conception of the metaphysical essence of scripture, »supreme speech« (parāvāk), derived from the linguistic philosopher Bhartṛhari. 3 Śiva emanates through fragmenting his speech or self-recognition, as discrete acts of linguistic judgment or apprehension (vimarśa as the essential nature of prakāśa, »awareness«) which idealistically constitute all states of affairs experienced by all creatures.
3 Further modifying and developing ideas of Bhartṛhari regarding the linguistic nature of experience, the Pratyabhijñā thinkers formulate »transcendental« arguments to demonstrate that Śiva's self-recognition, through its immanent modalities, underlies and constitutes all facts of epistemology and ontology. In my earlier work, I have endeavored dialogically to reconstruct the Pratyabhijñā metaphysics of God's self-recognition in its similarities with, and differences from, the Christian philosophical theology of the Word (logos). I have compared the epistemological arguments regarding vimarśa with the hermeneutic theory of truth as disclosure (aletheia) propounded by Martin Heidegger and elaborated in later hermeneutics, as well as transcendental arguments for interpretive realism by such philosophers as Charles Peirce, Donald Davidson and Karl-Otto Apel.
4 It is the radically transcendental character of the Śaivas' philosophical inquiry which provides for its soteriological value. Through pointing out the necessity and ubiquity of Śiva's self-recognition, the Pratyabhijñā system enables the student to participate fully within it. The Pratyabhijñā discourse ritually reenacts the cosmogony in returning emanated diversity to God. 4
5 Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta elaborate the monistic Śaiva metaphysics of divine self-recognition and supreme speech (parāvāk) in a number of areas of epistemology, ontology and aesthetics. Among such elaborations that are relevant to the theme of the relation of philosophy and religion is Abhinavagupta's theory of the expression of supreme speech in more concrete scriptural traditions. This theory of scriptures is also of interest in the light of the recent upsurge of comparative research on the categories of scripture, canon and revelation. 5 This paper presents and reflects upon some of my recent research on this subject. My focus will be on Abhinavagupta's discussions of āgama (»scriptural tradition«) 6 as a pramāṇa (»means of knowledge«) in his commentaries on Īṣvarapratyabhijñā, and in his texts Tantrāloka and Tantrasāra. 7

2. Scripture in its Original Metaphysical Essence and its Manifestations

K.N. Dhar:
Abhinavagupta – the Philosopher.
Glympses of Kashmiri Culture.
external linkArticle

Deb Platt:
The Triadic Heart of Shiva. Kaula Tantricism of Abhinavagupta in the Non-Dual Shaivism of Kashmir.
external linkWebsite
6 Hindu traditions, like Near Eastern and Western monotheisms, have frequently ascribed what Miriam Levering describes as a »cosmic status« to scripture. 8 Abhinavagupta follows orthodox-Brahmanical ideas—such as are propounded by Mīmāṁsā and Vyākāraṇa—that scripture is without human authorship (apauruṣeya) and without beginning (anādi). 9 However, he understands the cosmic status of scripture chiefly in the terms of monistic Śaiva myth and metaphysics. 10 Scriptural traditions for Abhinavagupta are expressions of Śiva's supreme speech or self-recognition. They are directly accessible as »innate« or »a priori« features of cognition. At the same time, they are manifest in their familiar cultural aspects such as oral and written canon, and the testimonies of authoritative people (āptavākya). 11
7 Abhinavagupta offers two basic definitions of āgama, each of which comprises both innate and external-cultural aspects. First, Abhinavagupta defines scripture directly in terms of the immanent modality of Śiva's self-recognition in human experience—vimarśa, recognitive »judgment« or »apprehension«. Scripture is nothing but such judgment which is firmly believed or sure (dṛḍhīya):
8 That which is called scripture [āgama] is an inner verbalization, and has the nature of very firm judgment [dṛḍhīyastamavimarśa]. It is nothing other than an innate activity of the Lord, whose essential nature is consciousness […] Something is however it is judged [āmṛṣṭa] to be through that [scripture]. 12
9 Such judgment is āgama in the primary sense. An external »collection of words which facilitates and generates that [judgment, is āgama] in the secondary sense«. 13 Such a collection of words is thereby a pramāṇa, »means of knowledge«. 14
10 Abhinavagupta's second definition of āgama expresses a similar meaning of a strong belief while no longer directly adverting to the Pratyabhijñā theory of recognition. This definition equates āgama with prasiddhi. 15 Prasiddhi literally means »being well established«. Focusing on its innate aspect, Rainiero Gnoli translates the term as »una certezza a priori«. 16 Abhinavagupta relates this aspect of prasiddhi to its metaphysical origin:
11 Prasiddhi is a conviction [pratīti], having the nature of verbalization, that arises without discrepancies. It is the essential nature of the cognizer [pramātṛ]. When there is that [prasiddhi], the [cognizer] does not feel doubt, because [prasiddhi] arises by itself [that is, it is self-evident]. For that [prasiddhi] is the omniscient Śiva. 17
12 Another common meaning of the term prasiddhi is »public knowledge«. This significance is also important to Abhinavagupta. The following passage traces this external-cultural form of prasiddhi to its source:
13 Searching for an earlier and earlier animating principle, it is evident, without doubt, that at some ancient time that [prasiddhi] belonged to a single [being] who was omniscient by Himself [that is, not requiring any extrinsic means to know things] […] He is Bhairava, the Supreme Lord, who is adorned with hundreds of prasiddhis, which cause enjoyments and liberations; and who is the essential nature of the recognitive apprehensions [vimarśa] which constitute those [prasiddhis]. Thus prasiddhi has divided into various aspects, and diffused as both oral lineages and written texts. As such, it engenders the various practices of humanity. 18
14 In the thirty-sixth chapter of the Tantrāloka, Abhinava recounts how Śiva as Bhairava originally bestowed scripture on Śakti as Bhairavi, and through her to a long succession of gods, preceptors, lineages and sublineages. 19

3. Scriptural Traditions as Grounds of Intelligibility

»That is called dry reasoning which does not grasp the power of speech but rather is [employed] merely according to whether things have common qualities or do not have common qualities. Because that [reasoning] violates all āgama, it is baseless.«

(Note 29)
15 Abhinavagupta adduces a variety of considerations in order to demonstrate that scriptural traditions are the final justificatory grounds of all cognition. These considerations may be understood as an extension of the Pratyabhijñā arguments about vimarśa, which disclose Śiva's self-recognition and supreme speech as the reality underlying all human experience. For Abhinavagupta, truth claims are not made on the basis of correspondence with an objective world, but rather states of affairs idealistically generated within linguistic judgments.
16 Elsewhere, I have compared the Pratyabhijñā vimarśa arguments with hermeneutic theories of truth as disclosure (aletheia). 20 The Śaivas diverge from Heidegger and the mainstream of hermeneutics in their understanding of disclosure as generated from the subjectivity of God—a view which aligns them more with the Christian philosophical theology of logos. 21 They likewise differ in their emphasis on a priori bases of cognition; in the West, attention to the historical determinants of knowledge has largely superseded speculations about either Platonic or Kantian categories. Abhinavagupta's theory of āgama per se exhibits a greater analogy with hermeneutic thought than the other vimarśa arguments, inasmuch as it complements metaphysical and a priori considerations with an appreciation of the role of oral and written traditions in determining »foreknowledge«. My current treatment of the topic seeks to augment my earlier interpretation of the vimarśa arguments.
17 In the very first verse of the three chapters of the Tantrāloka devoted to āgama, Abhinavagupta announces its importance to human life: »All practices, as inherited from the past, are based upon prasiddhi, which is explained to be āgama 22 No person learns all of his or her basic assumptions about the world through direct perception and inference. Abhinavagupta argues that even those schools of Indian philosophy, such as Buddhists and materialists, which repudiate āgama as a means of cognition (pramāṇa), in actual fact still rely upon it in the form of the testimonies of authoritative people (āptavākya). 23
18 Abhinavagupta does not wish merely to place āgama on a par with the other established means of knowledge. He contends that āgama is the very life (jīvita) of direct perception and inference. 24 According to Abhinava, perception is engendered through a diminution of the perfection (pūrṇatva) of knowledge disclosed by scripture. āgama consists of the recognitive apprehension (vimarśa) of things in their essential nature as one with the same universal, undifferentiated vimarśa. Direct perception is the apprehension of particular objects such as the color blue as contents of the contracted awareness which constitutes an individual subject. 25
19 As with the other arguments about vimarśa, Abhinavagupta conceives of āgama as the subtle linguistic essence of perceptual experience. He adduces this conception in order to explain how ordinary language may refer to the objects of perceptual experience. Abhinava thus explains language learning in terms of āgama as prasiddhi. One may learn the meanings of words through prasiddhis articulated in cultural works such as Purāṇas and Itihāsas. Or one may learn them through definitions. A definition explains the meaning of a particular word through prasiddhis regarding other words. 26 Abhinavagupta also argues for the integrality of prasiddhi to perception on the basis of subtle interpretive processes observable in the behaviors of infants, which would today normally be explained in terms of instincts. It is on the basis of prasiddhi that the infant knows that it must feed on milk. 27
»But Āgama is the inner … activity of the Lord, who is essentially nothing else than pure consciousness … It is the very life of other means of knowledge, such as direct perception.«

(IPV 2.3.1-2)
20 Abhinavagupta again closely follows Bhartṛhari in affirming the dependence of reasoning (tarka, nyāya, anumāna) upon scriptural traditions. One of the main points of both of these thinkers is the need to rely on āgama in formulating reliable inductions. 28 One might roughly analogize their conception with Thomas Kuhn's theory of the paradigm, as model for research and theorization. Because Abhinava's remarks on this point are brief, I will first discuss Bhartṛhari.
21 Bhartṛhari criticizes reasoning employed independently of scripture as »dry« (śuṣka) reasoning:
22 That is called dry reasoning which does not grasp the power of speech but rather is [employed] merely according to whether things have common qualities or do not have common qualities. Because that [reasoning] violates all āgama, it is baseless. 29
23 The problem with such reasoning is that the various properties and causal relations of things change in different contexts. Sometimes water is cold and sometimes it is hot. Sometimes fire burns particular substances and sometimes it does not. 30 One relying on reasoning without āgama,
24 is like a blind man quickly rushing about on a mountain path without a guide who possesses eyes. Having comprehended a particular part of the path by touching it with his hands, he crosses over it. From confidence about that, he believes other [parts of the path] to be similar. Thus he arrives at his demise. 31
25 Abhinavagupta draws attention to the two types of observations which are involved in the formulation of inductions—those of anvaya (»co-presence«) and vyatireka (»exclusion«). Take the example of the induction that wherever there is smoke there is fire: The observation of the anvaya is that fire is always present where smoke is present. That of the vyatireka is that smoke is absent wherever fire is absent. 32 Abhinavagupta contends that one must rely on prasiddhi to grasp the anvaya and vyatireka. Without prasiddhi, there would be no restrictions on how to associate the particulars. 33 In inductions, even those as simple as that regarding the concomitance of smoke and fire, we heavily rely on data and basic ways of organizing that data which have been received from the collective wisdom of cultural traditions. In the light of Abhinava's general explanations of prasiddhi discussed above, I think that we should also understand that he intends by the term in this context some kind of innate facility for »knowing that one knows« a concomitance. 34
26 Abhinavagupta continues to follow Bhartṛhari in pointing to the notorious interminability of philosophical debates as evidence of the insufficiency of reasoning which does not rely on āgama:
27 [Rational argument] is strong in its own house [that is, for the one who proposes it] but, in the perspective of another argument proposed by another thinker, it is proved to be weaker. Thus even today there is no end to arguments […] which flow throughout the whole of saṁsāra. 35
28 In order to illustrate the non-finality of reasoning, Abhinava summarizes a complex debate between Naiyayikas and Buddhists about causality and succession. 36
29 Abhinavagupta's subordination of reason along with perception to scripture should not be understood as a species of »fundamentalism« or »irrationalism« which precludes the value of philosophical discourse. 37 As observed above, the Pratyabhijñā philosophical theology endeavors to justify its claims following classic Nyāya standards for scholastic debate such as the inference for the sake of others. It is only in Trika self-understanding that reason is overcoded by āgamic soteriological categories. Within Abhinavagupta's schema of spiritual praxis, the Pratyabhijñā is an exercise in »pure reasoning« (sattarka). Sattarka gets its potency through embodying Śiva's »pure wisdom« (śuddhavidyā)—a cosmic principle which mediates between his self-recognition or supreme speech and its fragmentation in ordinary cognition. As engendering a »purification of conceptualization« (vikalpasaṁskāra) which leads the student to realize identity with Śiva, rigorously philosophical discourse becomes in essence identical with āgama. 38

4. The Plurality of Scriptural Traditions


(12th century,
South India)
30 Abhinavagupta's ascription of what Levering calls a »cosmic status« to scriptures does not preclude his having a remarkable appreciation of their polar-opposite characteristic, »contingency«, as well as an »openness« about the plurality of canon. 39 In this regard, Abhinavagupta is yet again elaborating features of Bhartrhari's theory of scripture. Bhartrhari had already endeavored to accommodate a measure of plurality within the category of āgama. He explains how the Word Absolute (śabdabrahman) became expressed in the numerous books and interpretive branches of the Veda, Smṛtis, subsidiary sciences, conflicting brahmanical philosophies, 40 and even some kind of āgama by which Caṇḍalas discriminate virtue from sin. 41 From a related linguistic perspective, he explains in detail the polysemy of words, 42 and the emergence of incorrect Sanskrit as well as the »corrupt« languages other than Sanskrit. 43
31 In keeping with his legendary polymathy, Abhinavagupta articulates a much broader vision of the plurality of scriptural traditions. While basing his own theology on monistic Śaiva scriptures, he grants the status of āgama pramāṇa to the canons of competing Hindu and even non-Hindu traditions—including the Veda, dualistic Śaiva-Siddhanta, Vaiṣṇava, Śāstras such as Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa; and Buddhism and Jainism. 44 Citing the authority of the Svacchanda Tantra, he asserts that such diverse scriptural traditions have been transmitted from the five mouths of Sadāśivas through a group of five Brahmas. 45 Their common heritage makes them all worthy of respect: »Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra and the Veda should not be reviled. For, as it has been stated in the Svacchanda Tantra, they all originated from Śiva.« 46
32 As mentioned earlier, Abhinavagupta characterizes the scriptural traditions transmitted by Śiva with the brahmanical models of revelation as without beginning (anādi) and without human authorship (apauruṣeya). In a fascinating discussion, Abhinava attempts to demonstrate that even the teachings of the great individuals who founded religious and philosophical schools—such as the Buddha and Kapila, the founder of Sāṁkhya—derive from the same eternal and authorless transmission:
33 There is no specific person who is called the Buddha. Rather he was a person who had a firm apprehension [dṛdhavimarśa, of teachings such as] momentariness, and so on, which he obtained through the strength of his meditation [bhāvāna]. The guru who taught him meditation on emptiness, and so on, was the previous Buddha. Another [earlier Buddha taught meditation on the same teachings] to that one. Since in such a succession there is no specific person who propounded [the Buddhist teachings, those teachings] really consist of nothing but the recognitive apprehension [vimarśa] which belongs to the Supreme Lord. Kapila, who realized through meditation the twenty-four cosmic principles [tattva, one of the central teachings of Sāṁkhya], should be understood in the same way. Therefore all the āgamas are without beginning […] Thus, although the Buddha clearly stated his teachings, he did not create their status as a means of knowledge [pramāṇya]. Would what he said be authoritative [pramāṇaka] without prasiddhi? Only prasiddhi is the pramāṇa. It is due to the will of the Supreme Lord that even the Buddha, Kapila, and others have been brought into accordance with this prasiddhi. As such, they are recipients of grace and bestow it to others. 47
»The faith each man has, Arjuna, follows his degree of lucidity; a man consists of his faith, and as his faith is, so is he. Men of lucidity sacrifice to the gods; men of passion, to spirits and demons; the others, men of dark inertia, sacrifice to corpses and ghosts.«

Bhagavad Gītā
34 With such an open conception of āgamas, Abhinavagupta is faced with the problem of reconciling their apparently contradictory teachings. This he attempts by adverting to cognitive perspectivalism and prescriptive situatedness. The perception of the color blue by one person does not entail its perception by another. Nor does one person's inference of fire from smoke give the same knowledge to others. Only particular people in particular contexts are eligible to attain a treasure by particular injunctions, to get to heaven by the jyotiṣṭoma, and so on. 48 According to Abhinava, every scripture »produces a [sure] judgment as restricted only to those who are eligible, at a particular place and time, with cooperating factors, and so on«. 49
35 While cognitive perspectivalism and prescriptive situatedness will be readily comprehensible, Abhinavagupta's understanding of the important Hindu category of eligibility (adhikāra) deserves further consideration. Abhinava recurs to his basic explanations of the nature of āgama in defining eligibility as nothing other than a firm vimarśa, conviction (prasiddhi, nirūḍhi, pratīti), or faith (āśvāsa, śraddhā):
36 The primary defining characteristic of one who is qualified for this or that is nothing other than firm conviction. 50 That [āgama] for which firm conviction arises in one's heart is his [āgama]. 51
37 It is because a Śūdra does not have the firm vimarśa of the twice-born regarding the statement enjoining the jyotiṣṭoma that this statement is not a pramāṇa for him. 52 Only an āgama about which a person is certain (prasiddha) is a means of knowledge for that person. An āgama about which a person does not have a conviction is like »the eye of one who does not have any eyes«. 53
38 According to Abhinavagupta, the teachings of the diverse scriptural traditions, as facets of one larger tradition, diverge only by enabling their faithful to attain a variety of worldly and spiritual objectives:
39 Only one āgama has been revealed by the omniscient Lord, which pertains to the paths of both action and inaction. 54 This āgama, which comes from Śambhu, is the only means for [the attainment of] diverse fruits, such as duty, wealth, pleasure and liberations, which are distinguished as perfect [pūrṇa] and imperfect [apūrṇa]. 55 Because there is a diversity of situations, it produces a variety of fruits. Although it contains instructions regarding diverse means [to achieve the various fruits], it cannot contain any contradictions. 56
40 Śiva actually destines different people to achieve different kinds of liberation:
41 A particular person is created by the Lord such that he recognitively apprehends [vimarśan] himself in union with that apprehension [vimarśa] which is understood to be engendered by this or that God or siddha. Another [person is created who apprehends himself in union with] another [apprehension of some other God or siddha]. 57
42 Among the texts which Abhinava cites to support this view is the famous verse, Bhagavad Gītā 17.3: »The faith each man has, Arjuna, follows his degree of lucidity; a man consists of his faith, and as his faith is, so is he.« 58
43 Abhinavagupta contends that the plethora of āgamas which he mentions all have validity. Elsewhere, I have analyzed Abhinava's criteria for the evaluation of truth claims. Within this system, there is no question of correspondence with an objective reality. A truth claim is a disclosure or recognition (pratyavamarśa, vimarśa, ābhāsa, etc.) of some state of affairs. Each claim must be tested as to non-contradiction or coherence (abādha) in the realization of its anticipated practical value (arthakriyā). 59 According to Abhinavagupta, the followers of the diverse āgamas do achieve their anticipated results. One person is cured of poison by the Vedic poison-removal mantra: »This poison will not kill me. I am Garuda.« 60 Another gets his treasure by a particular ritual. Another gets to heaven by the jyotiṣṭoma. A compassionate one becomes a Buddha, and one practicing ascesis becomes a Jaina arhant. 61 Because the followers of the respective scriptural traditions each attain their wishes, there is a broad consistency of meaning (ekavākyatā) among them. 62

5. The Hierarchy of Scriptural Traditions

»One cognizes that which is to be abandoned and that which is to be pursued, that is, his essential nature. He becomes one with his own Self, which has the essential nature of Śiva, and is the supreme thing to be pursued; and becomes liberated while living.«

(IPV 3.2)
44 Although Abhinavagupta grants validity to disparate scriptural traditions, he is not a relativist. To use Levering's terms again, the »openness« in Abhinavagupta's theory regarding scriptural canon is complemented by a »boundedness.« 63 To appreciate this boundedness, it is necessary to understand the philosopher's conception of ignorance. For Abhinava, ignorance is not a lack of knowledge but rather imperfect knowledge (apūrṇakhyāti). 64 The »boundedness« of āgamas is a matter of their hierarchical ranking. Scriptural traditions are graded according to their approximation to the metacoherent perfection (pūrṇatā) of Śiva's self-recognition—disclosed in the āgamas of monistic Śaivism.
45 Abhinavagupta contends that the Trika or Kula comprises the essence of all other scriptures, and that the others are arranged below it like the higher and lower parts of the body. 65 While inferior traditions realize aspects of the reality known by the superior ones, they neglect others. 66 The monistic Śaiva experience of liberation is perfect (pūrṇa). This recognition of oneself as the Lord includes all of the fruits of lower salvations but not vice versa. 67 Abhinavagupta compares the followers of other traditions to those who disparage the enjoyment of a king in favor of lesser enjoyments. 68 In various places Abhinava actually maps the realizations attained by other systems according to the principles found at different levels of the monistic Śaiva cosmology. For example, the Buddhists realize the buddhi tattva and the Pāñcarātrikas realize prakṛti. 69
46 Abhinavagupta's tolerance seems to reach its limit with the āgamas of the mlecchas, »barbarians«, mainly foreigners. He acknowledges that the mlecchas have scriptures which are pramāṇas for them. However, because of contamination by what is non-Aryan, these are only pseudo-scriptures (āgamābhāsa). 70
47 Although it is not possible to consider this topic at length, I note that Abhinavagupta discusses rites of conversion from lower scriptural traditions to that of the Śaivas. 71 He conceives this conversion as a process of purification (saṁskāra). Abhinava explains that just as the Veda has its rites of purification by which practitioners attain successively higher levels, so the Śaivas require rites of purification after one has converted from another tradition. 72 However, he describes this purification as the subversion of that of the Veda. Just as the Veda may cure one of poison by the conviction of being Garuda—so the monistic Śaiva scriptures purify one from the poisonous karman of the Veda by the conviction of being Bhairava. 73

6. Conclusion: Scriptural Traditions, Philosophy and the Mediation of Hierarchies

»… this particular kind of the strongest determinate thought, āgama, which is so called because it makes the object known in every way …«

(IPV 2.3.1-2)
48 In this essay I have emphasized aspects of Abhinavagupta's theory of āgama which have affinities with some of the broad trends of Western philosophy since Kant, particularly hermeneutic thought. Eschewing any notion of truth as correspondence, Abhinava conceives scriptural traditions as the most basic recognitions, judgments, or convictions which give meaning to experience and provide assumptions for reasoning. Such convictions may be either a priori or culturally transmitted. Particularly remarkable is Abhinavagupta's appreciation of the plurality of scriptural traditions—which succeed without contradiction in achieving their respective practical values. All of these conceptions give us a perspective on expressions of philosophical discourse, such as the Pratyabhijñā, as enterprises deeply contextualized within divergent faiths.
49 Abhinavagupta seems decidedly non-contemporary in his postulation of a metaphysical origin (i.e. God) for all scriptural traditions; and in his hierarchical arrangement of the truths embodied in these traditions. Here again Śaiva thought finds a closer analogue in the classic Christian philosophical theology of the logos. The analogy is evinced in Justin the Martyr's and other early apologists' theory of the logos spermatikos. This principle was conceived as inspiring partial knowledge among pagans who have not accepted the incarnation of the logos as Jesus. Such a metaphysical strategy underlies the later morphological hierarchies of religious symbols of much of formative history of religions, for example, of thinkers such as Rudolf Otto, Gerardus van der Leeuw, and Mircea Eliade. Today such hierarchization is routinely condemned in the academy as a blatant legitimation of cultural, political and/or economic hegemony.
50 Though it is not possible here to engage in an elaborate argument about the relation of power and culture, I will say that I do believe that the legitimation of hegemony, though extremely common, is nevertheless a contingent effect of the kind of epistemological hierarchization being considered here. There is more at issue than any possibility that Abhinavagupta's appraisals of various scriptures reflect a tantric transformation of caste ranking. Pace Michel Foucault, I believe that the very observation of the effect of power on discourse demonstrates that we may strive to base our claims on something other than power.
51 What I wish to affirm in the present context is that some kind of hierarchization of alternative viewpoints is as unavoidable—or transcendental—as the hermeneutic circle. In the effort to understand others, however much one's ideas change, one cannot avoid beginning and ending in one's own views. A historicist or relativist hierarchically subordinates non-historicist or non-relativist viewpoints. An anti-hierarchicist implicitly or explicitly subordinates hierarchicism. His or her distinctive understanding likewise subordinates the views of other anti-hierarchicists, and even his or her own thought in ongoing reinterpretations.
52 While Abhinavagupta subordinates other scriptural traditions to the Śaiva, he is aware that those pursuing other goals will do the same thing in return:
53 It is compulsory that texts which teach only aspects of oneself and [consequently] yield limited fruits be taken up by that one [who desires such fruits]. 74 Inasmuch as one has not attained identity with Śiva, he does not doubt such a prasiddhi as accords with his own nature [as a limited being]. He will be doubtful about other [prasiddhis] and regard [his own] as much better. 75
While dialogue itself is bound by traditions, there may nevertheless be a cognitive advance towards the disclosure of more adequate ones. 54 Abhinavagupta's description of conversion to the Trika as the opposite of the Vedic saṁskāra likewise evinces his appreciation of widely divergent understandings of the process of »purification«.
55 I believe that such insights point toward a way in which we may »think with Abhinavagupta against Abhinavagupta and beyond Abhinavagupta«. 76 For the assessment of divergent truth claims, Abhinava propounds non-objectivist criteria of coherence in the attainment of practical values. It is in the Pratyabhijñā philosophical theology that he applies such criteria in a rigorous and systematic manner, in debate with other schools of South Asian philosophy, in order to demonstrate the greater perfection (pūrṇatā) of his tradition's spiritual realization. Abhinavagupta's scholastic apologetics is much more ambitiously metaphysical than the conceptions of dialogue and conversation of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer or Paul Ricoeur. It is this polemics which ostensibly justifies Abhinava's hierarchical »morphology« of imperfect (apūrṇatā) rival āgamas. Regardless of whether readers agree with Abhinavagupta, what is important is that the Pratyabhijñā is formulated in such a manner—in a philosophical discourse—that it is open to further questioning and dispute.
56 Those following other prasiddhis, whether religious or secular, liberal-open or conservative-bounded, will inevitably view their judgments as the most adequate. I believe that tolerant yet critical philosophical dialogue, directly endeavoring to mediate claims in all of their metaphysical, epistemological and ethical ramifications, provides an alternative to arbitrary symbolic morphologies and unreflexive historicist reductionism. 77 While dialogue itself is bound by traditions, there may nevertheless be a cognitive advance towards the disclosure of more adequate ones. I also believe that it is reasonable to follow Abhinavagupta in viewing our aspiration for such an advance as an asymptotic pursuit of greater perfection (pūrṇatā), in the sense of coherence in practice.
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I am grateful to Pt. Hemendra Nath Chakravarty of Varanasi and Prof. Srinarayan Mishra of Banaras Hindu University for their help in untangling some of the difficulties in Abhinavagupta's Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī during my research trip to Varanasi in June 2000. I also wish to acknowledge the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology for a Direct Allocation Grant which financed that trip. go back
See (1996) "Tantric Argument: The Transfiguration of Philosophical Discourse in the Pratyabhijñā System of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta". In: Philosophy East and West 46, 165-204, and the more elaborate treatment in (1999) Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument: A Contemporary Interpretation of Monistic Kashmiri Śaiva Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press (SUNY Series Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religions), particularly 35-65 and 85-106. go back
Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's theories here build upon an earlier identification of Śakti with Supreme Speech by Utpaladeva's teacher Somananda. See Lawrence 1999, 88-89 and 210, nn. 15-16. The Śaivas understand parāvāk as the highest level of language, above Bhartṛhari's paśyantī, and homologous to one of the planes in their Trika cosmology. Bhartṛhari may not have intended to indicate a para level, and usually refers to the highest level of speech as śabdabrahman, »the World Absolute«. See Gaurināth Śastrī (1959): The Philosophy of Word and Meaning: Some Indian Approaches with Special Reference to the Philosophy of Bhartṛhari. Calcutta: Sanskrit College (Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series 5). go back
The Pratyabhijñā system articulates the very narrative »syntax« of monistic Śaiva myth and ritual. See Lawrence 1999, 133-154. go back
Miriam Levering (ed.) (1989): Rethinking Scripture: Essays from a Comparative Perspective. Albany: State University of New York Press. Levering's volume includes the seminal articles of Wilfred Cantwell Smith: "The Study of Religion and the Study of the Bible", 18-28, and "Scripture as Form and Concept: Their Emergence for the Western World", 29-57, and Thomas B. Coburn: "'Scripture' in India: Towards a Typology of the Word in Hindu Life", 102-128. Other important studies include Jonathan Z. Smith (1982): "Sacred Persistence: Toward a Redescription of Canon". In: Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 36-52; Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty (ed.) (1979): The Critical Study of Sacred Texts. Berkeley: Graduate Theological Union; Jeffrey R. Timm (ed.) (1992): Texts in Context: Traditional Hermeneutics in South Asia. Albany: State University of New York Press; Laurie L. Patton (ed.) (1994): Authority, Anxiety, and Canon: Essays in Vedic Interpretation. Albany: State University of New York Press (SUNY Series in Hindu Studies); and David Carpenter (1995): Revelation, History, and the Dialogue of Religions: A Study of Bhartṛhari and Bonaventure. Maryknoll – New York: Orbis Books.go back
The term āgama exhibits great semantic fluidity. It may signify particular works of Śaiva and Śakta scripture, any other collection of written or oral scripture, including the Veda, and even a broad conception of »tradition«. I often use the gloss »scriptural tradition« to capture the meanings of tradition of scripture and tradition as scripture. Miriam Levering, in her introduction to Rethinking Scripture (1989, 11-13), has formulated six polarities observable in the diversity of the scriptures of the world's religions: Form/Fluidity, Orality/Writtenness, Boundedness/Openness, ›Vectoring‹/›Being Vectored‹, Cosmic Status/Contingency, and Normativity/Selection and Repetition. I think that each of these polarities are observable in the meanings of the word āgama in the Hindu traditions. This is not to say that every individual intends all these polarities in using the term. Nevertheless, Abhinavagupta's understanding is remarkably broad. Of course, the specificities and scope of āgama for Abhinavagupta are the subject of this paper. Other relevant categories for scripture in Hinduism include Veda, Śruti, Smṛti, Purāṇa and Tantra. See Thomas B. Coburn (1989): "'Scripture' in India: Towards a Tyopology of the Word in Hindu Life". In: Levering 1989, 102-128, and the other works cited above. go back
I will focus particularly on selections of Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī of Abhinavagupta. Doctrine of Divine Recognition: Sanskrit text with Bhaskari. (2 vols.) Ed. by K.A. Subramania Iyer / K.C. Pandey. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986 (Reprint), 2.3.1-2, 2:68-91; The Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī by Abhinavagupta. (3 vols.) Ed. by Madhusudan Kaul Shastri. Delhi: Akay Book Corporation, 1987 (Reprint) (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies), 2.3.1-2, 3:71-107; The Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta with the Commentary of Jayaratha. (8 vols.) Ed. by Madhusudan Kaul Shastri / Mukunda Ram Shastri. (Republication, ed. by R.C. Dwivedi / Navjivan Rastogi). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987 (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies), 35-37, 8:3645-3718; and The Tantrasāra of Abhinavagupta. Ed. by Mukunda Ram Shastri. (Delhi: Bani Prakashan, 1982 (Reprint) (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 17), 21, 193-197.
The Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, a commentary on Utpaladeva's Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā, will henceforth be referred to as IPV. The Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī, a commentary on Utpaladeva's lost Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti, will be referred to as IPVV. The Tantrāloka will be referred to as TA, and Jayaratha's commentary on this work, Tantrālokaviveka, will be abbreviated as TAV. The Tantrasāra will be abbreviated as TS. go back
Levering 1989, 13. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:92, 97-99. go back
He also of course views the Trika or Kula āgamas rather than the Veda as the prototypical expressions of scripture. Abhinavagupta's understanding of the plurality of scriptural traditions will be treated later in the paper. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:102. go back
IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:84-85. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:84. go back
IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:86. go back
TA, 35.1-2, 8:3645-3646. go back
Abhinavagupta: Luce delle Sacre Scritture (Tantrāloka). Trad. by Raniero Gnoli. Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1980, 35.1-2, 762. go back
TA, 35.19-20, 8:3657. go back
TA, 35.11-12, 14-15, 8:3652-3654. go back
See TA, 36, 8:3671-3680. At TA, 36.1, 8:3671, Abhinava states that he gives this account according to sources such as the Siddhayogeśvarīmata and his guru—presumably Śambunātha. go back
See the discussion of the vimarśa arguments in Lawrence 1999, 115-122. There I also discuss the backgrounds to these arguments in Bhartṛhari. A useful recent study of the conception of truth as disclosure is James J. DiCenso (1990): Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth: A Study in the Work of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. Also notable are David Tracy (1975): The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism. New York: Crossroad Publishing, and (1989): "The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic Theological Method, Modernity, and Post-Modernity". In: Theological Studies 50, 548-570. Tracy interprets disclosure as »manifestation«, and the response to it as faith, which he equates with recognition. Somewhat analogous to Abhinavagupta's understanding of scripture in its broad cultural aspects is Tracy's conception of the classic, which may take religious and nonreligious, elite and popular forms, and even the form of exemplary persons. Cf. David Carpenter 1995, 194-199, for an alternative discussion of Bhartṛhari and Bonaventure vis-a-vis the disclosure theory. go back
While Heidegger was aware of backgrounds to his theory in the Christian theology of logos (along with Presocratic thought and Platonism), he repudiated the metaphysical postulation, and was indeed notoriously ambivalent about the contingency versus noncontingency of disclosed being. The heirs to Heidegger within philosophical theology, from Karl Rahner through Paul Tillich, John Macquarrie and David Tracy have in sophisticated ways recovered the logos. go back
TA, 35.1-2, 8:3645-3646. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:84. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:84; IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:84-85. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:92. This discussion is related to the Pratyabhijñā subversion of the Buddhist logic theory of the relation of the cognitions of universals (sāmānya) and particulars (svalakśaṇa). The Buddhists hold that uninterpreted perceptions of particulars come first, and that universals are synthesised later through verbal interpretation. Developing some ideas from Vyākaraṇa, the Śaivas maintain that our original perceptions are intrinsically verbal cognitions of universals, and that particulars are synthesised later as combinations of universals. The former more closely reflect the higher level of vimarśa. See Lawrence 1999, 119-120. Also relevant are the Śaivas' discussions of relation (sambandha) as a characterisation of the primitive ontological objects of recognition, ibid., 127-138. Cf. Pātañjalayogadarśanam. Ed. by Srinarayan Mishra. Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1981, 1.7, 28-35, and 1.49, 127-129. According to Yoga, perception knows objects as particulars (viśeṣa) whereas āgama and inference know them as universals (sāmānya). go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:104. Cf. the discussion of child language learning according to the vimarśa arguments in Lawrence 1999, 118. go back
TA, 35.3-11, 8:3647-3652. Abhinava makes a similar argument about an adult's attraction towards food at TA, 35.18-19, 8:3656. The Buddhist logician Dharmottara also talks about the child's recognition of the mother's breast on the basis of latent mnemonic impressions in Nyāyabindu of Acharya Dharmakīrti: With the Commentaries by Arya Vinitadeva and Dharmottara, and Dharmottara-Tika-Tippani. Ed. by Dwarika Das Shastri. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1985, 1.5, 27. Bhartṛhari went so far as describing the instinctive behaviors of animals as due to the semantic intuition (pratibhā) of scriptural tradition (āgama). See Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari. Kāṇḍa 2. Ed. by K.A. Subramania Iyer. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983, 2:146-151, 66-67. The Vākyapadīya will henceforth be abbreviated as VP. Bhartṛhari's own Vṛtti on the text will be referred to as VPV. go back
Induction is integral to Sanskritic understandings of the syllogism. Most such syllogisms involve a deductive application of a predicate (sādhya) to a subject (pakṣa) on the basis of a reason (hetu). The standard example is the inference that there is fire on the hill for the reason that there is smoke there. The reason identifies a quality in the subject—that is, smoke—which is known inductively to be invariably concomitant with the predicate. The induction is that wherever there is smoke there is fire. go back
Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari. Kāṇḍa 1. Ed. by K.A. Subramania Iyer. Pune: Deccan College, 1966, 1.129, 209. go back
Cf. VP and VPV, 1.32, 88-90. At VPV 1.129, 209, Bhartṛhari illustrates the futility of dry reasoning with a quotation from Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya. This describes a confusion about the fact that wine employed in the sacrifice will perform the unusual role of assisting in the attainment of heaven. go back
VPV, 1.42, 98-99. go back
Note that the induction being considered does not require that it be established that fire is absent where smoke is absent. In fact, in classic Indian philosophies it was generally believed that fire does occur without smoke, for example in a red hot iron ball. go back
TA und TAV, 35.2-3, 8:3646-3647. I am grateful to Dr. Navjivan Rastogi, Professor Emeritus, Lucknow University, for discussing these verses with me on the telephone. go back
This accords with the broader Pratyabhijñā philosophy. Within the Pratyabhijñā there are different ways for explaining how Śiva generates concomitances between the manifestations of things within his self-recognition. Such concomitances may take the form of either a relation between a cause and effect or the relation between something and its intrinsic characteristics. As such they respectively ground syllogisms invoking the reasons of origination (utpattihetu) and essential nature (svabhāvahetu). According to one framework, Śiva generates both types of concomitance through his integral Niyati, »Fixed Regularity« Śakti. For example, see IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:84, and IPV, 2.3.8, 2:108. The Śaivas' broader ontological framework explains the Lord's self-recognitive emanation of things and their relations as a mythico-ritual action (kriyā). According to the Pratyabhijñā syntactic theory, the Lord's agency (kartṛtā) contains within itself the entire action of creation as well as its effects (kārya). (See Lawrence 1999, 133-154). One of the themes of the various texts of Īśvarapratyabhijñā 2.4 is the reduction of the svabhāva hetu to the utpatti hetu and the final identification of the latter with Śiva's kartṛtā. Although this takes us beyond the immediate discussion of scripture as a means of knowledge, it is nevertheless clear that āgama as innate vimarśa/prasiddhi is ultimately a modality of the supreme speech, self-recognition or agency which generates all concomitances. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:95. Abhinavagupta here quotes for support VP, 1.34, 90. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:95. Similarly, at VPV, 1.34, 90-92, Bhartṛhari summarises debates about the Nyāya theory that a substance is different from its qualities. On Bhartṛhari's subordination of reasoning to tradition, see Carpenter 1995, 52-57. Note that similar arguments regarding the interminability of philosophical arguments are made by Śāṅkara in The Brahmasutra Śāṅkara Bhasya: With the Commentaries Bhamati, Kalpataru and Parimala. 2 vols. Ed. by K.L. Joshi. Delhi: Parimal Publications, 1987, 2.1.11, 2:448-449. On Śāṅkara's indebtedness to Bhartṛhari on this point, see Wilhelm Halbfass (1983): "Human Reason and Vedic Revelation in the Philosophy of Śāṅkara". In: Studies in Kumārila and Śāṅkara. Reinbek: Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublikationen, 41-42. go back
Nor should Bhartṛhari's arguments for the primacy of scripture be understood in such a way. go back
See the discussion of the Pratyabhijñā methodology within the framework of Abhinavagupta's śakta upāya in Lawrence 1999, 57-65. go back
Levering 1989, 12-13. In this section and the following, I further develop aspects of the discussion of scripture in "The Plurality and Contingency of Knowledge, and its Rectification according to the Pratyabhijñā". In: Navjivan Rastogi / Meera Rastogi (eds.): Perspectives on Abhinavagupta. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (forthcoming). go back
VP and VPV, 1.5-10, 22-39. go back
VP, 1.40, 97. This verse is cited by Abhinavagupta at IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:102. go back
VP, 2.134-139, 63-64. go back
VP and VPV, 1.139-147, 228-235. On the diversification of traditions of Vyākaraṇa itself, see VP and VPV, 1.135, 221-223. go back
The chief theme of TA, 35, 8:3645-3670, is in fact the »meeting« or »association« (melana) of the different āgamas. Abhinava concludes this chapter by stating that he has explained the topic as it was taught to him by his teacher Śambhunātha. See TA, 35.44, 8:3670. go back
TA, 35.26-27, 8:3660. go back
TA, 35.36, 8:3665. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:97-98. This discussion may also be understood more generally as situating āptavākya within the beginningless transmission of prasiddhi. go back
IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:86-87, and IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:84-85. go back
IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:88-89. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:85. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:96. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:85. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:96. go back
Jayaratha in his commentary on this verse (TAV, 35.23, 8:3659) interprets pravṛtta (»action«) as referring to karman and nivṛtta (»inaction«) as referring to jñāna (»knowledge«). go back
The perfection and imperfection of scriptural traditions and their fruits will be discussed below. go back
TA, 35.23-25, 3659-3660. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:85. go back
The Bhagavad Gītā: Krishna's Council in Time of War. Trans. by Barbara Stoller Miller. New York: Bantam Books, 1986, 17.3, 137. Abhinava cites this verse at IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:85. The immediately following verse from the Bhagavad Gītā is also interesting: »Men of lucidity sacrifice to the gods; men of passion, to spirits and demons; the others, men of dark inertia, sacrifice to corpses and ghosts.« (Ibid., 17.4, 137.) This discussion reminds me of Paul Tillich's conception of God as one's »ultimate concern«, as well as Schubert Ogden's conception of God as that on which one bases one's confidence in the final worth of his or her existence. go back
I give this subject a brief treatment in Lawrence 1999, 122-123; and a more complete and precise one in "The Plurality and Contingency of Knowledge, and its Rectification according to the Pratyabhijñā". In: Rastogi / Rastogi (forthcoming). go back
IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:85-86. Bhartṛhari also uses the example of the removal of poison as an illustration of the power of the words of āgamas. See VP and VPV, 1.130, 210-211. go back
IPV, 2.3.1-2, 2:84-86. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:98. Ekavākyatā is a term from Vedic exegesis for the principle of the consistency or uniformity of meaning in the Vedic corpus. go back.
Levering 1989, 12. Cf. the study of Vallabha's combination of fundamentalism with contextualism in Jeffrey R. Timm: "Scriptural Realism in Pure Nondualistic Vedānta". In: Timm 1992, 127-146. go back
See Navjivan Rastogi (1986): "Theory of Error According to Abhinavagupta". In: Journal of Indian Philosophy 14, 1-33, and my "The Plurality and Contingency of Knowledge, and its Rectification according to the Pratyabhijñā". In: Rastogi / Rastogi (forthcoming). go back
TA, 35.30-31, 8:3663. go back
TA, 37.9, 8:3684. go back
IPVV, 2.3.12, 3:101. go back
TA, 4.18-19, 3:636-637; 4.22-24, 3:641-642. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:98. go back
IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:96. go back
This involves the removal of the emblems of other traditions (liṅgoddhāra). TA, 22, 6:2970-2987. Also see IPVV, 2.3.1-2, 3:97, 101. go back
TA, 35.28-29, 8:3662. go back
TA, 37.10-14, 8:3685-3686. The classic study of how the monistic Śaivas' tantric siddhis subvert orthodox conceptions of purity is Alexis Sanderson (1985): "Purity and Power Among the Brahmans of Kashmir". In: Michael Carrithers / Steven Collins / Steven Lukes (eds.): The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 190-216. Elsewhere, Abhinavagupta does speak with some respect for the Veda. go back
TA, 37.3, 8:3682. go back
TA, 35.21-22, 8:3658. go back
I here reword Karl-Otto Apel's pithy rhetoric describing his reformulation of Wittgenstein's ideas about private language games, in order to postulate a »transcendental language game« which permits the understanding of all other language games. Apel describes the significance of his argument as to »think with Wittgenstein against Wittgenstein and beyond Wittgenstein«. See Karl-Otto Apel (1994): "The Transcendental Conception of Language-Communication and the Idea of First Philosophy". In: Karl-Otto Apel: Selected Essays. Vol. I: Towards a Transcendental Semiotics. Ed. by Eduardo Mendieta. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 102. go back
Cf. my earlier discussion of the methodology of comparative philosophy in Lawrence 1999, 1-16. go back


David Peter Lawrence is Visiting Associate Professor of Religion at the University of Manitoba. He received his BA from George Washington University, and his MA and PhD from the University of Chicago (1992). He is most broadly concerned with developing the discipline of comparative philosophy as a mode of inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue. He specializes in Sanskrit, and Hindu and Buddhist philosophy. His research interests include comparative philosophy and philosophy of religion, problems of cross-cultural interpretation and relativism, monistic Kashmiri Shaivism, Indian linguistic theory and Buddhist logic.
Prof. Dr. David Peter Lawrence
University of Manitoba
Department of Religion
Fletcher Argue Building
Winnipeg, Man. R3T 2N2
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