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![]() Kazuo Sato ![]() Chat and Consensus in the Japanese Traditional Meeting ![]() |
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Summary ![]() |
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To reach consensus in democracy, it is necessary to guarantee a free space where even the oppressed can express their opinion without concern for logical consistency and truth. The fact that chats have been neglected as the fundamental element of democracy shows that past democracy has been only for the few who could speak logically and consistently. 1 |
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Content
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1. The contradiction of modern democracy |
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![]() ![]() 1. The contradiction of modern democracy ![]() ![]() |
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»The most fundamental contradiction of democracy in the 20th century is that the citizens are not free in the classical Greek sense of the word.« |
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The most fundamental contradiction of democracy in the 20th century is that the citizens are not free in the classical Greek sense of the word. As is so well known, the word "democracy" meant originally people's rule. But the word "people" did not mean all the common adults in the community. Only those who had property, power and culture were qualified as citizens. Therefore the citizens were only men who controlled the household and were free from the necessities of life. Women and slaves were excluded from the polis. Most male workers did not have the right of suffrage until the end of 19th century. In most countries, women obtained the right of suffrage only in the 20th century. The first right of women's suffrage was acknowledged in 1893 in New Zealand. In many Western countries, it was only after World War II that women obtained the right to vote, like in France and Japan. Most of the so-called democratic theoreticians, such as Montesquieu, Locke and Rousseau, never thought seriously of counting women as citizens. |
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»It was a matter of course that the mastering of the necessities of life in the household was the condition for freedom of the polis.« |
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The central point is the question, why were most of common people deprived of this right so long? Hannah Arendt provides a clear answer: In the Greek polis, »it was a matter of course that the mastering of the necessities of life in the household was the condition for freedom of the polis«. 2 The citizens in the democratic society needed to be exempted from the necessities of human living creatures. This was an essential precondition to being a free citizen. |
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But we, human beings, have to obey fulfill the needs entailed by being living creatures, i.e. we must always think about survival. Today even philosophers and artists are not free, because our society (Japan and Westernized countries) are totally under the control of the market economy. Most workers, including university professors, are always afraid of losing their present work positions. The problems of women are particularly serious. Most of them have no choice but to take care of their family members and cannot avoid burdensome housework. |
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Then how can women be the citizens of democratic society, if they cannot get rid of their household? Or how can democracy of the 20th century function in the Classical Greek sense? If women cannot be exempt from household chores and the labor of birth, what does it mean for women to be citizens in our present "democratic" society? If the activity of the political life (bios politikos) consists of action (praxis) and speech (lexis) under the presupposition of freedom among the citizens, how can women engage in speech or action in spite of being obliged to take care of the household members? |
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As this kind of questions has not been taken into consideration seriously, the present democracy cannot find its way beyond it. |
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![]() ![]() 2. The free realm as the precondition of democracy ![]() ![]() |
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Kwasi Wiredu: |
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What attracted me most in the discussion of Kwasi Wiredu on Democracy and Consensus is that he tried to present an alternative to the Classical Greek model. It is especially important that he stressed the meaning of consensus in the process of democracy. Then he stressed the importance of "free discussion" by citing the words of Tanzania's former president, Nyerere. Of course, free discussion is the first precondition of reaching consensus in the true sense of the word. If it were not for free discussion, the word democracy would be only the mask for the justification of rule under invisible compulsion such as the threat of money, power and violence. Even if some power holder should say to others that they might discuss freely or express their opinion as they think, very few would do so, because they would be afraid of being oppressed or discriminated in other ways. |
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But how can we discuss freely? In the classical Greek democracy, freedom was a matter of course. |
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On the contrary, in our present society, we are not free. It is true that we are free in the sense that we are not slaves, but we are not free in the sense that we are involved in the market economy. The more the market economy develops, the less we can get rid of it. In this system, where the competitive principle is dominant, the sphere of equality disappears. Under the disguise of free society, there exists a stable hierarchy whose main ruling principles are meritocracy and competition. Then the most essential problem in our democracy would be to ask how the non-free and unequal people could be active as citizens and feel free and equal in this hierarchical society. So in order to guarantee free discussions, the freedom itself must be guaranteed first of all. In other words, a new polis must be established where people can feel free and equal actually. |
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»As many feminists point out, it is impossible to separate the public sphere from the private sphere of everyday life. Only rulers and power holders can decide what is public according to their interests.« |
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It should not be overlooked that the polis is not a given fact in the present society. On the contrary, the polis as the space for democracy should be pursued and established consciously, as there is no clear borderline between the political sphere as the realm of freedom and the private as that of necessity in the present society which is under the control of the market economy. |
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As many feminists point out, it is impossible to separate the public sphere from the private sphere of everyday life. Only rulers and power holders can decide what is public according to their interests. For them the pubic means the realm which they want to put under control. But for most of the people who must live on, whatever they do for their lives, all their activities are closely connected with each other. Therefore the public cannot be separated from the private. |
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Take, for instance, the tradition of clitoridectomy as an example. Is clitoridectomy a public tradition or a private one? Whether a young girl can accept this hideous tradition as a private decision or not is very complicated. Even if she does not want it, it would be very difficult to deny it. In case she rejects it, she may be excommunicated from her village and unable to marry. Then she may pretend to be willing to accept it. Can there be a free decision or free speech in such a situation? Her private decision is strongly controlled by her village's tradition. So long as she wants or must stay in her village, there will be no real possibility to reject it in so many cases. |
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So we must be very careful when we speak of free discussion. Only when we put aside our interests, can free discussion begin. Judging from the situations of most women, there have been no sufficient conditions for free speech except in very private conversations among themselves. If they say "No", then they will be excluded. If they say "Yes", the result will be very horrible. What should they do in such a situation? This is a very important question. |
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»If the meaning of democracy does not consist in the majority rule, but in the sovereignty of people, the first problem to be considered is how people can find the place for free discussion.« |
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In reality, most Japanese women have kept quiet in the public sphere. What should not be overlooked, however, is the fact that this attitude is not restricted only to women, but extends to much of the population who cannot be free in their lives. In the present situation, where the competitive principle prevails in the work places and so the danger of losing one's post awaits, freedom and equality is not reality, but only a formal principle. Then the first precondition of democracy itself is not secure, but in danger. |
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If the meaning of democracy does not consist in the majority rule, but in the sovereignty of people, the first problem to be considered is how people can find the place for free discussion. In the present Japanese situation, the public sphere is not public, but the outcome of power struggles beneath the public sphere. As Norbert Elias has pointed out 3 , representative democracy such as a multi-party system in its strict sense can function only in a society where the fundamental interests (especially economic interests) are accepted as common among its people. But even if there is a consensus regarding economic interests, the precondition of free discussion on political problems is not fulfilled yet. |
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![]() ![]() 3. "Forgotten" democracy ![]() ![]() |
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»Then the best way to avoid potential disagreement would be to try to take the opposition's view into account. If the ideas of the oppositional group are paid attention to, then the minority group could remain part of the society even if the majority rules.« |
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In Japan, historically, we have tried to keep "harmony" (Wa) within one community. Of course under the disguise of harmony, the oppression of alternative opinions can always happen. Harmony is often used to justify control and oppression. We must be very careful in using the word "harmony" or "consensus" lest we should glorify dictatorships, such as in the formerly socialist countries. |
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But when we examine our past society carefully and in detail, we find also so many devices even among the ruled people themselves to keep their communication in harmony. The word "harmony" may conceal the oppression of alternative opinions when it is addressed from the rulers; yet it is worth considering as a means for communication, when it has been passed on from generation to generation among the general populace. The reason why these kinds of devices have been invented in Japan might not be so simple. It may due to the following: Japan is a small country isolated from other countries. As a result, when a serious struggle or difference of opinions occurs within one community, it is not easy for the minority group to get out of the community or the country. Even if the group cannot be content with what the majority decides, they often have to remain in the society as before. Then the best way to avoid potential disagreement would be to try to take the opposition's view into account. If the ideas of the oppositional group are paid attention to, then the minority group could remain part of the society even if the majority rules. |
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This kind of culture has been held in great esteem in our society. Let me give one interesting example reported in an amazing book The Forgotten Japanese, by Tsuneichi Miyamoto. This book is very significant, because since the end of World War II most of our democracy-oriented scholars and intellectuals have been apt to consider all kinds of traditional ways of thinking or life as feudal or patriarchal. As a result, they were unwilling to find democratic elements in our past culture. Although their ideological intentions were towards democracy, it never meant that they actually tried to find democratic traditions in the lives of the Japanese common people. To the contrary, they often imported the Western notion of democracy, especially after the French Revolution. Naturally this kind of democracy is originally suited for those who are independent and free citizens, such as gentry, small landowners, and the bourgeoisie. It is not surprising that this kind of democracy could not easily take root among the Japanese population more broadly. Consequently, intellectuals frequently complained of the backwardness of the Japanese way of communication. To be sure, we should not underestimate the negative influence of the traditional ruler's ideology. It is entirely anti-democratic and this ideology always watches for a revival in a renewed form. |
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»The illusion that all the progress is in itself good leads us to misunderstand what is degenerating as progress, and to annihilate not only human being but also all kinds of living beings.« |
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In our society, the intellectuals were inclined to discuss the political problems of democracy as the choice between modern Western and indigenous traditional. They thought of the modern West as democratic and the indigenous tradition as anti-democratic. But the more fundamental alternative would be that of democracy between the governmental form and the way of reaching consensus among people. 4 |
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On this point, the Miyamoto's contribution is great: He uncovered the forgotten forms of consensus in the traditional human relationship. Miyamoto clearly announced what is the "forgotten". The "forgotten" refers to what has been neglected in the process of Westernization or under the name of "progress". »The illusion that all the progress is in itself good leads us to misunderstand what is degenerating as progress, and to annihilate not only human being but also all kinds of living beings.« 5 From this standpoint, Miyamoto tried to interview the old men and women, who mainly talked about how they supported and encouraged each other in their everyday life. |
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In one chapter, he describes how people discuss and come to the consensus in village meetings. When a problem is raised and becomes a matter of controversy, what is considered most important is to discuss the matter long enough that all members feel that they have expressed their opinions fully. Consequently, it was not out of the ordinary for it to take several days to come to a consensus about one problem. |
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»The main goal of the discussion is not focused on finding the truth, so that logical consistency does not play any essential role.« |
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The most distinctive characteristic of the discussion is that it is by no means a concentrated one. Even if one theme is raised, when it may be contestable, the direct conflict is carefully avoided. In addition to avoiding useless hostility, should some counterargument be raised, the chairperson diverts the argument from antagonism and changes the topic. After the members "chat" without any apparently focused theme for so long, they return to the first theme. If there nevertheless remains some possibility of disagreement, then the same process will be repeated until all come to feel that it is time for a consensus. |
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In this kind of meeting, there are some remarkable points that we rarely find in modern European forms of democracy. First, the main goal of the discussion is not focused on finding the truth, so that logical consistency does not play any essential role. In the above-mentioned cases, the members are not always required to stay in the meeting room. If some of them need to go home, they can leave their seats and can have the opportunity to consider the opposite opinion calmly. They think it as a matter of course that the issue cannot be treated and decided from the criterion of logical consistency. Not the discussion in search of the truth, but the conversation for mutual communication is the main concern. Therefore the "chat" (zatsudan) itself is more important. |
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»Moreover in cases where opinions were left undecided, the time for careful consideration was regarded as a necessary condition to reach a consensus. Only after a long time for careful and deliberate communication could the chairman propose the final decision.« |
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In this kind of zatsudan, the members can talk about anything they want to with others. »The conversation in such a situation [a village meeting] may not have been like one that we experience now where logical consistency prevails. Various kinds of anecdotes must have played an essential role as the main method for communication. In other words, when one talks in connection with what one has experienced, then the other members can understand him more clearly and it is easier for the speaker himself. Even during the conversation, it was necessary to put in time for intermission so that all the members can ponder calmly. Moreover in cases where opinions were left undecided, the time for careful consideration was regarded as a necessary condition to reach a consensus. Only after a long time for careful and deliberate communication could the chairman propose the final decision. Then no one in the village would feel that his opinion was neglected. This made the communication within a small village very smooth. At the same time, this kind of process gave authority to the meeting.« 6 |
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According to Miyamoto, the topics are not restricted to what the chair proposed at the beginning. If some other ideas emerge from the conversation or chat, they can tell others what they think. Then it is important that they should speak in connection with what they have experienced. This ensures that most people express their opinions even if they are not well educated. Besides, as these opinions are rooted in their own experience, others want to listen to them. If an opinion is expressed only as a result of abstract reasoning, it would not always be necessary to listen to it, because then it would not be the speaker's opinion based on his own experiences, but only the result of logical reasoning. When it matters whose opinion is the most consistent and logical, most of common people will stop expressing their opinion and follow what the most intellectual person asserts. Then it will not be the place (topos) for mutual communication based on equality and freedom, but for hierarchical rule. |
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To sum up, there are at least four important features of this kind of democracy in the traditional Japanese meeting. First, mutual communication is the most important objective for the meeting. A political decision can be made only after the members have had enough mutual exchange of opinions without deciding which opinion is the best. Second, it is especially important that the members can talk about anything that they found to be related to the theme. Much attention is paid to the contributions of the members who speak based on their own experiences. This makes it possible that all the opinions can be respected as the unique expression of one's life experience. |
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Third, it is absolutely necessary to guarantee enough time for deliberate consideration to reach the final decision. This is necessary to avoid useless conflicts among the members who are present in the same meeting. It is natural that no one wants his opinion to be neglected or refuted in the meeting. So the best way to reach the agreement is that everyone's opinion should be respected as unique, as it is rooted in one's own experience. And it is true that each one's opinion has something unique when it is spoken from one's experience. |
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Hidetoshi Kato: |
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Fourth, therefore the decision-making and the deeper mutual communication are closely related with one another. Even if one opinion is adopted as the decision of the meeting, other opinions should not be denied or negated but carefully discussed and considered. The meeting is the place where each member can elaborate his opinion by listening to others and taking their views into consideration. By paying attention to others, one can improve one's opinion until all the members can accept the decision. The key to the decision is that all the members' opinions should be duly respected and not so instantly excluded or by-passed. When the members' opinions are made light of, they feel as if their existence itself were not accepted. |
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![]() ![]() 4. Communication and truth ![]() ![]() |
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»Truth carries within itself an element of coercion.« |
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In Japan we have long sought to guarantee various opportunities for communication by members of a community, lest they should be neglected or ignored. So in democracy-oriented meetings, even if some members do not express their opinions, we try to pay attention to them. We even try to understand why they do not say anything. In our society, if someone keeps silent during the meeting, we do not consider him to be uninterested or incapable of understanding the discussion. We view the silence as a way of expressing an attitude toward the discussion. |
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When we interpret this culture from the philosophical standpoint, the problem of truth comes out. As is typical in Plato's notion of the truth, truth is separated from the common people's conversation in the European tradition. Truth (aletheia) has nothing in common with the people's opinion (doxa). Therefore in order to reach the truth, philosophers must be isolated from other common people. |
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First of all, for what do we hold a meeting? If to find the truth is the main aim, then it would be better to stay at home and contemplate in quest of the truth in solitude. It is worth considering the very reason why in a political meeting we focus ourselves on finding the truth or deciding who is right. If one opinion is decided as the truth, all other members are obliged to follow it just because it is the truth. As Arendt stressed, »Truth carries within itself an element of coercion«. 7 The importance of truth is due to its power in the political or social context. Once someone's opinion is regarded as the most persuasive or nearest to truth in a meeting, then he or she will have some power in the group or community. In this sense, truth and power has close relationship in society. »The trouble is that factual truth, like all other truth, peremptorily claims to be acknowledged and preclude debate, and debate constitutes the very essence of political life. The modes of thought and communication that deal with truth, if seen from the political perspective, are necessarily domineering; they don't take into account other people's opinions, and taking these into account is the hallmark of all strictly political thinking.« 8 |
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»The first step is that all the members should be accepted as members of the community. Only after this step is fulfilled can the problem of consensus be raised.« |
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When plurality is the first condition of the political life, as Arendt says, and if the meaning of the political consists in promoting mutual understanding and acting in concert, truth cannot get priority in a meeting. In this sense, there are two processes for reaching a consensus in democracy. |
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The first step is that all the members should be accepted as members of the community. Only after this step is fulfilled can the problem of consensus be raised. Were it not for the first step, the politics for consensus would be quite deceptive. If some are free and the others are not free, all kinds of "free discussions" will be only a ceremony for the justification of rule. |
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Therefore the first step true democracy requires for its realization is that non-free people should become free from any kind of oppression. Their opinion (doxa) should be heard and accepted so that they may be able to feel that their existence as a member is meaningful in the community. This step was unnecessary in the Classic Greek democracy, as its members were free from the start. And it is well known that Plato distinguished truth from opinion and disregarded the latter. But in the present democracy, this step is especially important. Although legally our society is free, most of the people know very well that that they are neither free nor equal, if they have neither money nor power. To overcome this kind of invisible inequality, it is absolutely necessary that they feel encouraged and acknowledged to be active. |
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From this point of view, the conversation women hold among themselves is something different from that of men. Dale Spender characterizes this difference clearly. Compared with the conversation or discussion men hold, where »competitive verbal strategy« prevails, that of women is »cooperatively« oriented. 9 In this cooperative strategy, the discussion which aims to decide whose speech is the best or whose speech is the nearest to the truth, does not play an essential part. |
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»If co-operation rather than competition and domination were to be highly valued in discussion, if 'talk' were seen as an opportunity for understanding the views of others and not just for airing one's own, we would witness profound changes.« |
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In this kind of communication, what is most important is not to attain the truth, but to prompt mutual understanding. So, according to Spender's book, »there is rotation of the speaker in female single-sex groups-a more co-operative and egalitarian structure for talk«. By contrast, »a stable hierarchy establishes itself in male single-sex groups, where someone becomes dominant and retains that position until there is a successful change«. 10 If truth is isolated from communication, we do not need to discuss it. All we have to do is ask the most excellent and intelligent person for the right answer. This is so far from the principle of democracy. Besides, »when these styles are brought together the opportunities for males are extended while those for females are reduced«. |
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Although women have attained suffrage and can participate in public meetings, this does not guarantee that they can be free and equal there. To change this situation, Spender proposes »perhaps instead of being concerned with making women talk more like men, it would be more productive to modify our male-as-norm line of reasoning and work towards helping men to listen more like women, because it seems to me that at the core of women's co-operative strategies for talking is a respect for, and competence in, listening. If co-operation (which implies being a willing listener as well as a willing talker) rather than competition and domination were to be highly valued in discussion, if 'talk' were seen as an opportunity for understanding the views of others and not just for airing one's own, we would witness profound changes«. 11 |
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»For men, living in company, the inexhaustible richness of human discourse is infinitely more significant and meaningful than One Truth could ever be.« |
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Of course this kind of improvement is necessary not only from the feminist's point of view, but also for democracy in this unequal society. If democracy can function only under freedom and equality, the first step we should take into account will be that of a »co-operative verbal strategy«. In this strategy, not consensus, but mutual communication is the first and most important aim. |
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This strategy reminds me of the meaning of the "political". Why did Aristotle define the human being as zoon politikon (political animal)? Does this "political" mean only the suffrage of modern political decision-making? If the meaning of human being consists in this kind of the right to vote, why is the voting rate of national elections often less than 50% in so many countries, such as Japan and the USA? |
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The meaning of the "political" for human being lies, according to Arendt, in »the sight that for men, living in company, the inexhaustible richness of human discourse is infinitely more significant and meaningful than One Truth could ever be«. 12 Therefore in the "political" life, the first step we cannot omit is that they can enjoy their discourses or conversations among their equals. Equality means in this context that each opinion (doxa) is respected because it is based on one's own experience or uniqueness. The reason why zatsudan or chat is important for "political" life is that the members can express anything that is on their mind. Moreover other members can develop this idea in an unexpected direction, which can again be extended into another dimension. Although this kind of conversation cannot be as logical as typical philosophical arguments, it must be very interesting for the members. |
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Because all the members' opinions are treated equally and heard by each other, they can enjoy their chat. In zatsudan or chats, the topics cannot be restricted and regulated by the theme in search of truth, but by the members' interests. The chat is interesting (inter + esse) 13 because it is held among (inter) equals. Something interesting comes into being only where they talk in concert. It can happen only from and within their chat. There one member's talk can be succeeded and developed by other members' talk. Even the original idea can be elaborated into a new one, through which one's solitary idea can be shared in common or reach quite a new meaning. This is inter-est-ing because this action in concert can give this joy. |
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Probably the original meaning of the "political" in the Greek polis was not in the process of reaching the consensus, but in this kind of acting and chatting in concert. Judging from this point of view, Wiredu's idea of consensus is insufficient. According to Wiredu, the process to the consensus can be expressed by the metaphor of a two-headed crocodile with one stomach. If the two heads could see each other, they would notice the meaninglessness of the struggle for food between them, for their stomach is one and the same. In such a situation, the difference can be considered illusory. The critical comments of Eze and Presbey are persuasive on this point. 14 Wiredu's description may overlook some irreconcilable oppositional conflicts, such as the discussion of clitoridectomy. For those women who hate this tradition, there could me no compromise on this point. Therefore the consensus can be one element of democracy, but cannot be its aim. 15 |
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So the first condition of democracy would be that each member should be accepted and recognized as unique and different. Only after this recognition can the members try to reach a consensus. The consensus is important, because the opinions of the members are different. If consensus be the first requirement, the differences could be superfluous. |
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Therefore the first condition of democracy must be the recognition of the differences among the members. Then the second would be not the consensus, but the will to consensus. It is true that the agreement is meaningful and precious, if it is acquired after sufficient discussion without oppressing any member. But the consensus should not be the first aim. In this sense, not the direct process to the consensus, but the guarantee of free and equal conversation for the recognition of each member's uniqueness must be considered most important. |
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Kazuo Sato ![]() |
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In past discussions of democracy, the importance of the effort to guarantee free and equal conversation was made light of, because the idea of democracy had been based on the classical idea of democracy, where equality and freedom had been supposed to be already given from the beginning. Besides in the modern democracy, instead of the guarantee of freedom and equality (because it is considered to be already given), only the decision-making process has been considered to be the core. The free and equal experience is put outside the political sphere and transferred to the non-political activities like festivals or rock music concerts. In some countries, this kind of free discussions can be found only in the coffee shop or salon chats, which are considered to have no relationship with democracy and the "political". 16 But when we consider the original meaning of democracy, this process must be reevaluated. Only this can make the Wiredu's idea of consensus meaningful. |
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![]() Notes |
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1 |
This paper is based on a conversation with my friend Yoshie Iwaya. |
2 |
Hannah Arendt (1958): The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 31-32. |
3 |
Norbert Elias / Eric Dunning (1986): The quest for excitement. Sport and leisure in the civilizing process. Oxford – New York: Blackwell, 27. |
4 |
Chomin Nakae, one of the most representative thinkers on democracy in 19th century, distinguished grassroots democracy (Kaifuku Democracy) from democracy given by the ruler or the intellectuals (Onshi Democracy) and considered the former as the foundation of democracy. |
5 |
Tsuneichi Miyamoto (1984): The forgotten Japanese. Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 323. |
6 | |
7 |
Hannah Arendt (1954): Between Past and Future. New York: Viking Press, 239. |
8 | |
9 |
Dale Spender (1985): Man Made Language. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 127. |
10 | |
11 | |
12 | |
13 |
Sadayoshi Fukuta, an original Japanese philosopher, stresses the meaning of interestingness in the Japanese women's chat (zatsudan). See his (1981) Philosophy of Interestingness, Tokyo: Heibonsha, and (1985) Buddhism as Chat, Tokyo: Hosei University Press. |
14 |
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (1998): "Demokratie und Konsensus?". In: polylog. Zeitschrift für interkulturelles Philosophieren 2, 41-42; and Gail M. Presbey (1998): "Akan-Chiefs und Koenigsmütter im heutigen Ghana". In: polylog. Zeitschrift für interkulturelles Philosophieren 2, 51-52. |
15 | |
16 |
In some of the Mediterranean countries, such as southern Italy, Greece and Adriatic Croatia, I found a very interesting custom of gathering together and chatting on the main street of the town in the evening, which is called corso in Italian. In corso, they enjoy chats just because they want to enjoy this kind of conversation. Naturally they also discuss on the political issues, but the main purpose is the conversation itself, which must be the real fundament of democracy. |
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