In his paper Mall argues for the recognition of plural traditions in philosophy, since these are specifications of the one philosophia perennis. It is the task of intercultural philosophy to mediate between these two ends, i.e. the specific philosophies as they are found in different cultures and the universal philosophy which is not culturally bound itself. Methodically intercultural philosophy therefore is based on comparative studies, and in particular on the comparison of cultures and their philosophical traditions. But just as the one universal philosophy nowhere exists in a pure form, there is an inner plurality within each of the specific culture-bound philosophies. The same questions and translational problems that are raised interculturally also occur intracultural, although at another level of differentiation.
Based on these considerations Mall claims for philosophy to become intercultural the need to change mental attitude, to open its conceptual thinking, to emancipate philosophical traditions which up to date have not been recognized as such, to rewrite the history of philosophy and to pursue unity without uniformity.

1. Introductory remarks
2. On intercultural analogic hermeneutics
3. On a definition of intercultural philosophy
  3.1 What intercultural philosophy is not
  3.2 What intercultural philosophy is
4. The issue of translation
5. Logic and ethics from an intercultural point of view
  5.1 Logic in India and Europe
  5.2 Principal affinities and instructive differences
  5.3 Ethics in cultural comparison
6. The task of intercultural philosophy

»There is no pure own culture just as there is no pure other culture. The same is true for philosophy.«

  There is no pure own culture just as there is no pure other culture. The same is true for philosophy. The ramifications of cultures are intricate and can be traced back into the past almost endlessly. In spite of its often conspicuous ambiguity the concept of culture stands for, both, a theoretical and a practical frame of orientation. An essential property of culture is the formation of a specific lasting way of life within the human interaction with nature and other cultures. Just as all human beings are endowed with human dignity by virtue of being human, all cultures are of equal value, even if undeniable differences exist, which let us differentiate but which must not be treated as discriminatory. Philosophy is a product of culture and every culture carries philosophy within it, be it implicated in the poetic or the mythological. It is just as true that there are different philosophies (both, intra- and interculturally) as it is a fact that these philosophies are the outcome of philosophical thought.

  The intercultural project of doing philosophy does not privilege either the one or the other, but it calls for a mediation between the particularity of the individual philosophies and the generality of the one and universal philosophy. One possible response to the question of philosophy's origin is to see it as a part of cultural heritage. A second response is to see it as a dispositional prerequisite of the condition of the anthropos. Philosophy as a metaphysical need is a part of this disposition. It is true that the differing philosophical schools of thought set different accents and correspondingly come to distinct definitions of philosophy. In itself, this is not unphilosophical. However, what proves detrimental to a philosophical discourse is absolutizing a particular view.

  It was with good reason that the ancillary role of philosophy has been lamented in the Christian Middle Ages, but a merely scientistic liberation, that sees its task in analyzing, explaining and accounting for theories with an origin predominantly in the natural sciences, again renders philosophy the handmaid of the sciences.

»At its most simple, the intercultural perspective is not different from the intracultural view ... It is the intercultural perspective, though, that enlarges and diversifies the range of models.«

  The view that claims philosophy to be a purely theoretical matter is not supported by the history of philosophy. Pierre Hadot, Voelcke, Dománski and others have borne out philosophy's nature as a precept for life in the history of European philosophy. With the emergence of Christianity philosophy was pushed back as an independent way of life, since the Christian religion would not accord another way of life a status as equally beatifying and redeeming.

  The answer to the question as to when two entities (cultures, philosophies, religions) are radically distinct and when they are only different is: They are different in the sense of constituting two instances of a generic concept. In other words, they are differing cultures, philosophies, and religions. However, they would be radically distinct, if they were different even as cultures, philosophies, and religions. In that case, it would be impossible to categorize them in the same generic concept. Such radical differences, if they existed, could not be articulated in the first place. Even counter-arguments are called arguments, however contrary and contradictory they may be. Consequently, what we have here is a general, yet overlapping and analogic concept, which manifests itself concretely in its exemplars just as in the common generic-concept. Thus the justification of the adjectives: European, Indian, Chinese, etc.

  At its most simple, the intercultural perspective is not different from the intracultural view; it is also within a specific culture that various epistemological, ethical, and political models exist. It is the intercultural perspective, though, that enlarges and diversifies the range of models, and it points to principal similarities and enlightening differences. Hence, the intercultural perspective frees us from the constraints of our cultural viewpoint.

»It may come as a surprise to Europe that in our day Europe itself has become interpretable.«

  The present day communication between cultures, philosophies, religions, and political world-views is of a wholly different quality than it was in the past. The renewed call upon Asia, Africa, and Latin America by Europe, and upon Europe by Asia, Africa, and Latin America is characterized by a specific situation, in which the non-European continents take part in a conversation with voices of their own.

  This new kind of communication is characterized by a four-dimensional hermeneutical dialectic. First of all this is about an understanding of Europe by Europe. The inner disparities notwithstanding, Europe has – largely under the influence of factors exterior to philosophy – presented itself to non-Europeans in a unitary image. Secondly, there is a European effort to understand the non-European cultures, religions, and philosophies. The institutionalized scientific fields of oriental studies and cultural anthropology bear witness to that. Thirdly, there are the non-European cultural spheres (Kulturkreise), who now also present the way they see themselves, rather than leaving it to others. Fourthly, there is the understanding of Europe as present in the non-European cultures. This situation raises the question as to who understands whom, why and how in the best way. It may come as a surprise to Europe that in our day Europe itself has become interpretable.

»The willingness to understand and the wish to be understood go together and constitute the two sides of a single hermeneutic coin.«

  In this way, the existing hermeneutic situation calls for a hermeneutic philosophy that is open-minded enough to acknowledge the fact of embedding within a tradition, including that of the own viewpoint. An interculturally oriented hermeneutic philosophy must meet the requirement of being a philosophy for which neither the world that we must come to terms with nor the concepts, methods, conceptions, and systems, which we develop in this course, constitute historically immutable a priori qualities.

  A hermeneutic which promotes the identity model to paradigmatic status merely duplicates the understanding of oneself in the attempt to understand the foreign Other. It attempts to modify the Other in its substance, in order to let it become an echo of itself. Those who define truth in exclusivistic terms of the own tradition and the own tradition in terms of truth are guilty of begging the question and put intercultural communication at risk. According to this model, understanding is always tied to some sort of violence.

  Therefore, the maxim of an intercultural hermeneutic is to be: The willingness to understand and the wish to be understood go together and constitute the two sides of a single hermeneutic coin. Where everything is subordinated to the wish to be understood, the Other is not acknowledged or taken seriously in its own right. In this sense, missionaries and some anthropologists studied foreign languages like Chinese or Sanskrit with much effort, less to understand the foreign people than to be understood by them. Admittedly, in understanding the Other the hermeneutic circle cannot be completely avoided; but then it must not be dogmatized, as if one were but its prisoner.

»The 'analogic hermeneutic' sets out from the existing overlaps. It is only them that enable communication and translation in the first place.«

  Of the three hermeneutical models to follow intercultural philosophy advocates the third. The models are as follows:

  1. The identity model adopts the self-understanding of a culture, philosophy, or religion as exclusive paradigm and lends an overly strict sense to the otherwise correct phenomenological insight that the unknown must be understood within the mode of the known. This hermeneutic is guided by identity-philosophy's fiction of a complete commensurability. In an applied fashion this means that only a Buddhist can understand a Buddhist, only a Christian can understand a Christian, only a Platonist a Platonist, and a Hegelian a Hegelian. Because the Platonist does not exist, this hermeneutic reduces itself to absurdity.

  2. The hermeneutic of the total difference absolutizes the differences and subscribes to a fiction of total incommensurability. While the fiction of complete commensurability leaves intercultural understanding a farce, the fiction of complete incommensurabilty renders mutual understanding impossible.

  3. The "analogic hermeneutic", which is espoused by intercultural philosophy, is not reductionist and steers clear of both outlined fictions. It sets out from the existing overlaps, which are present for numerous reasons. It is only them that enable communication and translation in the first place. These overlaps can range from the anthropological to the political field.

»Interpretation would be impossible, if the life-expressions were of completely foreign nature. It would not be necessary, if nothing were foreign to them.«

Wilhelm Dilthey
(Note 1)

  The otherness of the other is made accessible without reducing or neglecting it. The strong striving toward identity in modernity and the equally strong thesis of difference of postmodernism lose their sting. It is only the overlaps that permit a mutual interpretation. These overlaps are produced, they are not autonomous. They are embedded into life and depend on contexts of origin, methods, insights, values, interests, and interpretations. The overlaps constitute commonalties that can be established and argued on an empirical ground beyond all ontologizing. I am fully in accord with Dilthey when he says: »Interpretation would be impossible, if the life-expressions were of completely foreign nature. It would not be necessary, if nothing were foreign to them.«  1 

  Furthermore, the analogic hermeneutic contends that one understands and can understand what one is not, cannot be, or does not want to be. Understanding, in the spirit of an analogic hermeneutic, does not insist on understanding in the sense of being persuasive and convincing, but also allows us to understand that, which we need not necessarily have in advance. The outer limit of any hermeneutic, including the phenomenological brand, lies at the outer limit of the process of constitution. All intentions of understanding are preceded by the analogic Other as the origin of what has to be understood; the analogic Other, however, cannot be constituted completely. It is only given to a god to create in his own image.

  The hermeneutic subject of the analogic hermeneutic is not a subject apart from the empirical, cultural, historical; instead, it is the same subject, but with the intercultural attitude permitting it to be trans-locally located. Such a hermeneutic subject being a meditative-reflexive agent has no particular language as native tongue. It is perpetually being accompanied by the consciousness that each concrete subject could just as well have been another. The naivete of the merely mundane subject resides in the incapacity to perceive the own vantage point as one among many. The superordinate attitude of the hermeneutic subject enables us to perceive vantage points as such, including our own, thereby testifying to the required openness and tolerance.  2 

»Intercultural philosophy is, in spite of the necessary centers of the various philosophical traditions, located, but trans-locally so.«

  First, intercultural philosophy is not the name of a particular philosophical convention, be it European or non-European. Secondly, intercultural philosophy is, in spite of the necessary centers of the various philosophical traditions (origins of philosophy), located, but trans-locally so. Thirdly, intercultural philosophy is not an eclecticism of various philosophical traditions, as can still be found in such accounts of the history of philosophy that take pride in compiling compendium-volumes.

  Fourthly, intercultural philosophy is not a mere abstraction that is self-defining and pinned down by means of formal logic. Neither is it, fifthly, a mere reaction or auxiliary construct in view of the de facto pluralism of the philosophical arena in the modern word-context of cultures. In other words, intercultural philosophy must not be reduced to a political construct born of mere necessity.

»Intercultural philosophy is no trans-cultural philosophy, as far as this term is meant to refer to a fixed pivotal point, an entity exterior to or above the manifold philosophical traditions.«

  Sixthly, the intent of intercultural philosophy is also not to aestheticize in a romantically enthusiastic and amateurishly-exotic fascination with the extra-European. The aim of intercommunication between cultures is too crucial for this. Seventhly, intercultural philosophy is not the locus of compensation, i.e. an attempt to find in the other that of which you are deficient. With such intent, prejudice and ignorance have given rise to the contrastive designations of European philosophy vs. Asian wisdom (philosophia and philousia). Eighthly, intercultural philosophy is no offshoot of postmodernity, even if it endorses and supports it.

  Ninthly, intercultural philosophy is no trans-cultural philosophy, as far as this term is meant to refer to a fixed pivotal point, an entity exterior to or above the manifold philosophical traditions. That is one of the reasons for which we prefer the prefix "inter" to the prefix "trans". Moreover, the prefix "trans" is already semantically overloaded and has been frequently exploited in philosophy and theology. The prefix "inter" points to an interstitial space that can be observed and experienced, and that is analogically extended almost in the sense of Wittgenstein's family resemblance. In my view, the only meaning of the prefix "trans" that corresponds and does justice to the orientation of intercultural philosophy is that of an attitude not positioned outside cultures or philosophies, but within these and going along with these. One could almost speak of a family resemblance between this and the transcendental reduction in Husserl's philosophy, which is an attitude equaling religious conversion.

  It is perplexing that, while European philosophers accuse Indian philosophy of being too religious, theologians consider Indian religion as being too philosophic. It remains to be hoped for that a conceptual clarification in the spirit of intercultural philosophy will resolve this seeming contradiction. Those who stand at the intersection of different cultures and live from translating and transposing life-forms and language games, experience under the skin how pressing, difficult, and necessary a conversation between cultures is.

»Methodologically it proceeds in such a manner that it does not privilege any conceptual system without cause, and that it aims at harmonizing concepts.«

  First, intercultural philosophy identifies a mental and philosophic attitude, which accompanies all specific cultural configurations of the philosophia perennis like a shadow and prevents these from absolutizing themselves. Methodologically it proceeds in such a manner that it does not privilege any conceptual system without cause, and that it aims at harmonizing concepts. In this way it can contribute substantially to a liberating discourse. It is a home-made misgiving to believe that intercultural philosophy would deconstruct the concepts of truth, culture, religion, and philosophy. What this misgiving makes evident, though, is the extremely relativistic and totalizing use that was made and is in part still being made of these terms.

  Thirdly and consequently, intercultural philosophy indicates a conflict in tandem with a claim. It is a conflict because the long-neglected cultures of philosophy, that have been misunderstood and oppressed due to ignorance, arrogance, and various factors external to philosophy, sue for equal rights in today's world-context of philosophy. It sets a claim because the non-European philosophies and cultures want to offer solutions by reflecting problem-settings that are particular to them. Fourthly, it follows that intercultural philosophy constitutes an emancipative process. With regard to this process we must bear in mind that it is not about emancipation in the sense of the intra-European Age of Enlightenment, but about an act of emancipation of non- and extra-European thought from its one-sided images that came into being in Europe centuries and even millennia ago.

»The uniformity of the hardware of the European technological formation must not be allowed to incorporate the healthy plurality of cultural softwares.«

  Fifthly, intercultural philosophy means accepting the necessity to conceptualize and shape the history of philosophy anew from the foundations upwards. The universality of philosophical rationality emerges in various philosophical traditions, while at the same time transcending these. Sixthly, intercultural philosophy means a conception of philosophy, which makes heard the omnipresent aspect within philosophia perennis in many races, cultures and tongues. Thereby intercultural philosophy forestalls the tendency of several philosophies, cultures, religions, and political outlooks to spread globally. The uniformity of the hardware of the European technological formation must not be allowed to incorporate the healthy plurality of cultural softwares. "Westernization" is not automatically equivalent to "Europeanization". One is almost tempted to speak of a myth of "Europeanizing humanity".

  Seventhly, intercultural philosophy advocates unity without uniformity. The transcultural nature of the formal, technological, and scientific conceptual apparatus should not be mistaken for the spirit of interculturality. Eighthly, it is part of the nature inherent in intercultural philosophy to promote a sense of modesty with regard to the own epistemological, methodological, metaphysical, ethico-moral, political, and religious access to the regulative One of many names.

  In the absence of a universally acceptable Archimedean-point intercultural philosophy ninthly treats the various philosophies as different, but not radically distinct pointers to the True Philosophy. In intercultural philosophy the nature of philosophy is determined more with regard to the philosophers' questions than to their answers. This applies both intra- and interculturally. Speaking of the one European, Indian, or Chinese philosophy in a singularizing way idealizes in a reductionist fashion and takes a part for the whole.

»Intercultural philosophy aims at a transformation of philosophy to take it beyond its mono-cultural centeredness.«

  Tenth, intercultural philosophy thereby aims at a transformation of philosophy to take it beyond its mono-cultural centeredness. Eleventh, intercultural philosophy is the condition for making a discipline of comparative philosophy possible, since the latter remains in a state of isolated parallelism without the former. Twelfth, intercultural philosophy thus frames a model of philosophy that accepts that the concept of philosophy is generally applicable, while it gives the plurality of philosophical centers and origins their legitimate due. Thirteenth, intercultural philosophy brings to the fore?reveals the historically contingent nature of a practice in philosophical historiography to the effect that an inquiry into all non-European philosophies is undertaken only from the perspective of European philosophy. To show that the converse is just as possible and legitimate is one of the objectives of intercultural philosophy.

  It is a historical contingency that there exists an Orientalism but no Occidentalism. Fourteenth, intercultural philosophy is aware of the eurocentrism in Western Orientalism and highly appreciates the merits of Said, but it does not wish to throw out the baby with the bathwater. It aims at an intercultural discourse that leaves the old constellation of the Orient-Occident dichotomy behind, that speaks in favor of centers, but opposes centrism.

»Inter-religiousness is no religion of its own that one could belong to. It is a sensibility that makes us open and tolerant.«

  Intercultural philosophy knows a four-fold perspective: one philosophical, one theological, one political, and one pedagogical. From a philosophical viewpoint intercultural philosophy indicates that it is wrong to define philosophical truth exclusively through a particular tradition and a particular tradition through philosophical truth. From a religious viewpoint inter-religiousness is another name for interculturality. The one religio perennis (sanatana dharma) also comes in various theological guises. Inter-religiousness is no religion of its own that one could belong to. It is a sensibility that makes us open and tolerant. In addition to that, it helps us prevail over the temptations of fundamentalism.

  From the political viewpoint interculturality is another name for a pluralist-democratic and republican conviction, that does not exclusively accord political truth to any particular group, class, or party. The pedagogical perspective, which in a respect is the most crucial, amounts to the practical attempt to learn and teach, meaning in thought and action, from kindergarten to university the views of the other three perspectives. Only in this way it is possible to provide against fundamentalisms, where-ever they may arise; as soon as they dominate the arena of political practice pedagogy comes too late. Ernst Cassirer's analysis of symbolic forms endows the philosophy of intercultural orientation with the indispensable flexibility to safeguard against the dangerous sway over the dynamic ideas and structures of philosophies, cultures, and religions in an artificial and uniform fashion.

»The European history of thought testifies to the fact that there has been translation and comparison in the European sphere of culture and thought from the beginning onwards.«

  It can be felt under the skin by whoever lives in more than one language and is forced to find orientation in more than one culture and philosophy that philosophical truth, despite the metonymical exchange of names, shifts back and forth and releases us from the overly narrow constraints of the purely philological. Linguistic proficiency is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for the mastery of everyday matters.

  It is undisputed that the process of transposing is a troublesome thing and never succeeds in producing total congruence, be it on the inter- or intracultural level. Nevertheless, this is generally the case, irrespective of whether we translate the Greek logos as the Latin ratio, as the Christian God-Father, as the German Vernunft, as the English term reason, or in expressions of other languages. To be sure, a similar translation is even more difficult and problematic in the intercultural field because of the greater differences of the language- and culture-spheres. Yet, the differences between the three towns of Athens, Rome, and Jerusalem were no less considerable in the beginning.

  The European history of thought testifies to the fact that there has been translation and comparison in the European sphere of culture and thought from the beginning onwards. And this was well justified and conducive to living. The conceptual apparatus of Greek philosophy was put into the service of Christian philosophy.

  In the Asian area the Sanskrit term dhyana (meditation, concentration, contemplation) has completed a similar journey – resulting in the Chinese chan and the Japanese zenna or zen. Both examples show that translations and transpositions were practiced in both cultural spheres. This practice seems to be based on the theoretical conviction that things and concepts need to be named by language, but do not completely collapse in them in a way that leaves no remainder.

»In the absence of the interculturally oriented attitude one cannot possess the necessary distance to ones own tradition, no matter how well informed about a foreign culture one is.«

  In his Conversation with a Japanese Heidegger writes that »the name and that which it names come from European thought, from philosophy«.  3  Thereby Heidegger conveys the view that not only the name of philosophy (which is correct), but also its subject-matter is Greek and European (which is wrong). Heidegger, who is said to have read Laozi (Lao Tse) over and over again, should have perceived that Dao does not exhaust itself in the name "Dao". Making philosophy a European destiny constricts its universality in an uncalled-for fashion. In this respect Loewith believed Heidegger's basic conviction to have been that Sein (Being) has a predilection for the Graeco-European spirit.  4  Such a belief, regardless if it is European or not, is detrimental to the impartiality of philosophical truth.

  In the absence of the interculturally oriented attitude one cannot possess the necessary distance to ones own tradition, no matter how well informed about a foreign culture one is. Max Müller, the world-famous Indologist to whom India owes a great deal of gratitude, in a sense applies the Hegelian metaphor of age-levels in an effort to depict the philosophy and religion of India as not yet fully mature. This evolutionistic schema attributes an almost a priori and ab ovo status to cultures. The following words of Max Müller presuppose the old Euro-centric view: »People do not yet see the full importance of the Veda in an historical study of religion. The bridge of thoughts [...] that spans the whole history of the Aryan world has the first arch in the Veda, its last in Kant's Critique. While in the Veda we may study the childhood, we may study in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason the perfect manhood of Aryan mind.«  5 

  As exemplification of intercultural philosophy I would like to venture a brief cultural comparison of philosophy in the fields of logic and ethics.

»In what does the shared and overlapping aspect of the superordinate concept of logic consist?«

  Adjectives like Indian, Chinese, European, etc. are justified because their designatum may also be designated by other adjectives. The universality of logic is not lost on us if we speak of, say, Indian logic, just as the art of cuisine admits of various adjectives without becoming devoid of its generic meaning.

  Wittgenstein answered his self-addressed inquiry into the common denominator of different language games by stating that they all follow rules. In what – we may ask – does the shared and overlapping aspect of the superordinate concept of logic consist? The theory of inference lies at the heart of logical thought. Therefore, logic from an intercultural point of view is the endeavor to provide arguments for inferences. These patterns of argument can diverge, both interculturally and intraculturally.

»In a discussion among wise men, o great king, there is winding motion that rises and descends by way of convincing and conceding; distinctions and counter-distinctions are made. Yet, the wise men are not befallen by anger ...«

  In his authoritative work Formale Logik Bochenski writes: »Formal logic was, as far as we know, created in two and only in two cultural spheres: in the Occidental and the Indian.«  6  My arguments with respect to logic in an intercultural perspective attempt to show a few principal similarities and remarkable differences, for example as regards syllogism, the principle of contradiction, the question of validity, etc.

  In India logic has also developed from the methodology of discussion and disputation (sambhasa, jalpa, vitanda, tarka). A good example for a methodology of discussion (tarka-sastra) can be found in a discussion to become famous in world literature between the monk Nagasana and the Graeco-Bactrian King Menandros, reigning around 150 B.C. in Afghanistan and the North of India, who professed philosophical and religious interests and had received training in the art of discussion and debate. The text in question called The Questions of Milinda goes as follows:

  The king spoke: "Venerable Nagasana, wilt thou continue to discuss with me?"
"If thou, great king, wilt discuss in the language of the scholarly man, I will discuss with thou. But if thou mean'st to discuss in the language of the king, then I will not discuss with thou."
"How, venerable Nagasana, do wise men discuss?"
"In a discussion among wise men, o great king, there is winding motion that rises and descends by way of convincing and conceding; distinctions and counter-distinctions are made. Yet, the wise men are not befallen by anger."
"But how, then, do kings discuss?"
"If kings assert a claim in a discussion and somebody refutes the claim they order punishment to be inflicted on this person."  7 

  These statements and arguments of the Buddhist monk-philosopher apparently exhibit a number of similarities with Socratic-Platonic dialogues and thinkers. In Menon 75 c-d Socrates expounds the characteristics of a discussion among friends or men of wisdom and integrity, who are not only intent on gaining a victory. Openness and self-moderation are the same virtues that Nagasana attaches importance to. In addition to that, Nagasana, in his way, puts forward the conditions of the possibility of a "domination-free discussion" and of "communicative action" (Habermas).

  The Indian theory of syllogism (anu-mana-sastra) can be traced back to various models of discussion that are present in the Indian tradition of philosophy. Indian epistemology differentiates between two main types of knowledge: the direct type (pratyaksa/aparoksa) and the indirect type (paroksa). Among the six means of knowledge, which are perception (pratyaksa), inference (anu-mana), reliable word (sabda), analogy (upamana), hypothesis (arthapatti), and the not-realization of the source of knowledge (anupalabdhi), perception is the only direct means to acquire knowledge.

»The object of an inferred idea is not given to the sense organs. We see the smoke, but not the fire; we perceive a smile, but not the joy.«

  Inference stands for a recognition that follows another. If you see smoke you infer that there is fire. This step of inference is firstly a source of knowledge and secondly a way of argumentation. Thus, two functions, one epistemological, the other logical, are conceptually fused into one here.

  The object of an inferred idea is not given to the sense organs. We see the smoke, but not the fire; we perceive a smile, but not the joy. The Indian theory of syllogism keeps two forms of inference apart: inference for a subject (svarthanu-mana) and inference for the others (pararthanumana). The first form principally amounts to a process of epistemogenesis with a more psychological bent. This syllogism generally contains three propositions (which are comparable to the Aristotelian):

  Wherever there is smoke, there is also fire.
  There is smoke on that mountain.
  Hence, there is fire there.

  Inference as a way of argument to convince others, on the other hand, contains five propositions. This five-part syllogism looks as follows:

  1. Thesis (pratijña): On that mountain there is fire.
  2. Reason (hetu): Because there is smoke.
  3. Evidence (udaharana): Whenever there is smoke there is fire, as for example in the kitchen.
  4. Application (upanaya): There is smoke over that mountain and smoke is always accompanied by fire.
  5. Conclusion (nigamana): Consequently, there is fire on that mountain.

»In the act of perceiving a cow there is a simultaneous perception of the general quality of cow-ness.«

  This five-part syllogism may seem unnecessarily lengthy, logically cumbersome, and not formal enough when compared to the three-part one. Yet, in didactic or pedagogic respect it makes good sense. These two forms of the syllogism may be transposed into one another. The three-part Aristotelian syllogism is amenable to a reformulation in five parts:

  1. Thesis: Socrates is mortal.
  2. Reason: Because he is human.
  3. Example: Whoever is a human being is mortal, for example Pythagoras.
  4. Application: Socrates is a human being, and being human invariably goes with being mortal.
  5. Conclusion: Therefore Socrates is mortal.

  In addition to the empirical and inductive reasoning, which results from the repeated observation that where there is smoke there is fire, where there is none there is no fire, and where fire is absent smoke is absent as well, the invariant relation (vyapti) between the mediating concept of smoke and the topical concept of fire is assumed to be constitutive and permanent. There is even mention of the perception of general properties and relations. In the act of perceiving a cow there is a simultaneous perception of the general quality of cow-ness. The technical term for this is samanya-laksana-pratyaksa. Here a comparison with Aristotelian intuitive perception may be launched.

  The Indian theories of negation (abhava), of dialectic thought, and of doubt are further topics from the field of logic that are amenable to presentation from an intercultural perspective. The category of doubt, for example, stands for a recognition (samxaya-jñana) occurring when there are two contradictory opinions with regard to one subject-matter. Doubt is neither true nor false. Contrary to most European views, doubt in Indian thought is not necessarily an impeding force to action. It is possible that philosophical doubt does not constrain our actions. Yet, doubt leads to action if the risk incurred in the action is not overly great.

»The primacy of perception in Indian thought may the reason why this thought shows limited interest in purely formal matters.«

  The differences may seem to be of purely terminological or superficial nature. Yet, this is not the case. Even in logical thought the intercultural perspective can suggest lines of inquiry that pertain to the anthropological status of human beings as such. However, while these differences continue to exist, they must not be seen as deficiencies.

  While the Aristotelian syllogism is, as a rule, of deductive and formal nature, the Indian syllogism remains in active contact with epistemological and psychological factors. The notion of formal validity is also important for Indian logical thought, but not at the expense of the material aspect of our inferences. The presence of the step of evidence in the Indian syllogism makes this clear. We may surmise that this is the reason why Indian logic has, despite its existing dispositions, never developed a purely formal logic. From an intercultural point of view we may raise the question what is understood, realized, and given due appreciation once the formal validity is recognized. Is it not the if-then structure of inferences that makes Europeans immortal, given that all men are immortal and that Europeans are human beings? Is this a matter of inference (anumana) in the sense of a realization or a matter of formal argumentation (tarka) without any material insights? All these are questions of interest.

  The primacy of perception in Indian thought may the reason why this thought shows limited interest in purely formal matters. In the metaphysical and logical thought of Europe we quite often find the idea of pure possibility. Empirical matters cannot be the reason for this. It may have been modeled on the Judeo-Christian tradition with its notion of creation from the nothingness. Even in Leibnizian thought innumerable possible worlds precede the one real (best?) world. Such a thought is, on the whole, alien to Indian thought, since potential states (yogata) can be envisaged after realities have been given to us. The two modes of potentiality and impossibility presuppose our encountering reality. Thus, Indian logic remains more intensionalistic than a class-logic.

»Indian logic does not consider psychologism to lead us astray. Instead it attempts a rapprochement of logic, psychology, and epistemology. Logic is embedded into the greater context of life.«

  Furthermore, Indian logic does not consider psychologism to lead us astray. Instead it attempts a rapprochement of logic, psychology, and epistemology. Logic is embedded into the greater context of life.  8  Thereby Indian logic avoids mere formalism and Platonism of forms.

  In the West Asian thought has frequently been accused of not accepting the principle of contradiction. However, the actual state of affairs is considerably more intricate. A cannot be, at the same time, be A and not-A. This is being accepted by Aristotle and Buddhist logic alike. However, it is justified differently. For Aristotle the self-identity of A was at peril. For the Buddhists there is no such thing as an identical A.

  The logic of Jainism does not challenge the validity of the principle of contradiction, but its unconditional validity. The principle is valid only if the same place, the same time, and the same respect are presupposed. The seven-step predicate-logic (saptabhangi-naya) of the Jainas makes it equally evident that a multivalent logic is more in accordance with Indian thought.

  The principles of causality and contradiction as well as the categories of order and chaos are subject to a reappraisal if we accept that in Chinese thought Dao stands for a principle of order, which relativizes the weight of the generic notion of these principles. The Chinese can sidestep the principle of contradiction by referring to the principle of harmonious unification (ho) pertaining to the balance of the greater nature. The renowned sinologist Granet advances a highly interesting explanation why the Chinese lack a sense of formal syllogism.

  »Of what value would a syllogistic inference be for a way of thinking that refuses to deprive space and time of their concrete nature? How can one claim that Socrates, being human, also is mortal? Is it to be taken for granted that in future times and in other locations humans will die? What can be claimed, however, is that Confucius is dead and consequently I will also die, since there is little hope that somebody deserves a longer life than the greatest of sages.«  9 

  This may strike some of us as peculiar. The principal question from an intercultural point of view is this: What is logical consistency and how do we comprehend it? May it not be the case that we have two kinds of consistency, one of formal-logic orientation and one of ethico-moral orientation? Being formally valid is more culture-independent than being semantically true.  10 

  Epistemological modesty and philosophical restraint are therefore further ethically and politically relevant consequences of philosophical thinking from an intercultural point of view.

»We value tolerance and pluralism, but we are disturbed by epistemological skepticism which came with this tolerance and pluralism.«

Hilary Putnam
(Note 11)

  Ethics makes every effort to approximate the state of things as they are to the state as they should be. In this respect there is neither complete agreement about how things are nor about how they should be. Even the ideas about how to perfect the self and the world diverge, both inter- and intraculturally. In his book Pragmatism – An Open Question Hilary Putnam posits that philosophy's central concern is how one should live. »We value tolerance and pluralism, but we are disturbed by epistemological skepticism which came with this tolerance and pluralism.«  11 

»Heaven does not weep, heaven does not laugh.«

Laozi

  One of the central questions in ethics is that how values by which we are led are anchored. The moorings can be of humanist or theological nature. In opposition to theocentric and anthropocentric models Chinese "Universism" propounds that man is embedded in his way into the greater balance of nature and should not expect any privileged position. Heaven does not weep, heaven does not laugh, as Laozi says. The supporting structure of the whole cosmos is more primeval, powerful, and encompassing than that of the history of mankind. In this context the question of man's privileged position gets another meaning.

  Ethico-moral thought frequently starts from the assumption that the good should be rewarded. The various religions and philosophies provide different rationales for this. Kant for example posits the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, in order to guarantee that this connection of goodness and reward is established. In Indian thought, e.g. in Buddhism, the Karma-principle is invoked to achieve this connection. In theologically oriented ethical thought it is God's will that is responsible for this. It is difficult to draw a demarcating line between theology and philosophy here.

  We can see that overlapping ethico-moral beliefs receive different philosophical rationales. Principles of universal ethics must neither be formally nor power-politically legitimized if they are to be interculturally effective. It is not the idea to find a universally valid ethical standard that is unreasonable, but the view that this has been found in a particular philosophy, religion, or culture is fundamentalist. The idea of human rights is also not proper to a single culture. Today we know that the numerous inscriptions of the Buddhist king Ashoka of the 3rd century B.C. contain human rights in spirit and in letter. The human being as such must be – at least in principle – capable of recognizing and acknowledging the universal validity of human rights, even if he has been deluded by various ideologies into violating these rights.

  Windelband, who speaks very highly of Chinese culture, denies that it has discovered the universal ethical principle. According to him Chinese thought also lacks the revealed religious truth. Almost in an Hegelian euphoria, Windelband goes so far as to approve of the European conquest and mission with all its negative consequences for the following reason: »With this approval we would only sanction a brutal right-makes-might, if we were not of the conviction that the victorious society represents the higher values.«  12 

»It is not the idea to find a universally valid ethical standard that is unreasonable, but the view that this has been found in a particular philosophy, religion, or culture is fundamentalist.«

  The intercultural view has made evident that there is no such thing as an absolute claim of the One, if one does not privilege one place, time, language, religion, or philosophy out of prejudice or ignorance. The conceptual and substantive clarification of intercultural philosophy has furthermore shown that the history of philosophy is itself an inexhaustible reservoir of diverging interpretations. In this way the history of philosophy is a hermeneutic location. What follows is that there cannot be a merely a priori determination of philosophy and culture that is ascertained per definitionem.

  Those who would consider the term "intercultural philosophy" vague for lack of accurate criteria forget that in identifying cultures, philosophies, religions, and political Weltanschaungen a certain amount of embedding in tradition and personal decision cannot be denied. If one expects general acceptance and unanimity, one puts excessive demands on them. In the competition of philosophical arguments the philosophical dispositions and ways of socialization also play a role that is partly even decisive.  13 

»Comparative philosophy goes blind without the intercultural philosophical orientation; intercultural philosophy goes lame without comparative philosophy. They both belong together.«

  All ethico-moral and political models revolve around the improvement of relations between man and fellow man, respectively between man and nature. The question keeps emerging whether the external changes do not merely constitute the necessary, but not the sufficient conditions for the intended improvements.

  The current globalization of technical formations admittedly manifests itself as a process of universalizing in the hardware aspects of the human condition, yet the ethico-moral software aspects of cultures lag behind and get stuck in their tracks. This may be the reason for the tremendous bustle going on to establish a link between ethics and other sciences.

  The intercultural orientation, which believes in on the reciprocity of the inner core and outer skin of human nature, escapes any kind of evanescence and one-sidedness in creating an image of man. Such an attitude makes an intercultural discourse possible without any fear of losing one's self in the other and without any attempt to incorporate the other. Levinas writes: »Occidental philosophy coincides with the disclosure of the Other. The Other, which manifests itself as Being, loses its otherness in that process. From the beginning on philosophy is spellbound by the horror of the Other that remains an Other in an insurmountable allergy.«  14 

  Mircea Eliade has raised the interesting question relevant to the present day why the Asian spirit did not to gain a foothold in Europe as opposed to the Graeco-Latin culture. With reference to Europe's discovery of the Sanskrit language, the Upanishads, and Buddhism at the end of the 18th and in the 19th century Eliade speaks of a second and unsuccessful Renaissance. For Eliade the main reason for the abortive attempt is to be seen in the fact that the second Renaissance, unlike the first, remained a matter for the Orientalists, while being scarcely noticed by the philosophers, theologians, men of letters, artists, and historians, unless in a romantic idealization of the Asian spirit.

  If it is the case that we stand at the threshold to a "third Renaissance" in the present day "world-eon" (Scheler) of technological formation and renewed encounter of cultures, and there is considerable evidence for this, this is not the Orientalists' merit, but rather a result of the non-European cultures being historically present in the present global situation. If this third Renaissance is granted success we are all called upon to make the necessary contribution of our own position in the spirit of interculturality. It is to be desired that the intercultural outlook will help us in that.

  The intercultural view does not reject the existence of centers, it only rejects centrisms of all brands. No culture, whether Asian, European, African, or Latin-American can remain wholly confined in its own tradition without seeming provincial.

Ram Adhar Mall is professor of philosophy at the Universities of Bremen and Munich. He is president of the international Society of Intercultural Philosophy (SIP).

  Intercultural philosophy is a fundamentally novel orientation and, at the same time, a constitutive element and the aim of doing philosophy from an intercultural point of view. The theory of intercultural philosophy that has been laid out here posits an overlapping and universal, but a-locally located rationality of the philosophia perennis. This amounts to a change of paradigm, which lets, both, the theoretical and the practical branches of philosophy see, teach, and do research from an intercultural viewpoint. It is a matter of a new historiography of philosophy. In his article The Human Being in the Eon of Conciliation Scheler speaks of a "Cosmopolitan philosophy" and writes »that the national spirits are called upon to complement each other in all cultural matters, and to complement each other irreplaceably«.  15 

  Prior to any kind of comparativist approach, regardless in whichever discipline it is situated, it is therefore imperative to adopt the culture of interculturality, in order to create the conditions for a possible philosophical conversation conducted in mutual respect and tolerance. Comparative philosophy goes blind without the intercultural philosophical orientation; intercultural philosophy goes lame without comparative philosophy. They both belong together.

Translation from the German by Michael Kimmel.

polylog: Forum for Intercultural Philosophy 1 (2000).
Online: http://them.polylog.org/1/fmr-en.htm.
ISSN 1616-2943

W. Dilthey: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 7. Göttingen 1973, 225.  

Cf. R. A. Mall: Philosophie im Vergleich der Kulturen. Interkulturelle Philosophie – eine neue Orientierung. Darmstadt 1995, 91ff.  

M. Heidegger: Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen 1960, 86.  

Cf. K. Löwith: Geschichtliche Abhandlungen. Stuttgart 1960, 175.  

Quoted in: K. Roy: Hermeneutics. East and West. Calcutta 1993, 67.  

J. M. Bochenski: Formale Logik. Freiburg/Br. 1956, 13.  

J. Mehlig (Hg.): Weisheit des alten Indien. Bd. 2. Leipzig 1987, 347f.  

In his lectures of Göttingen on logic, Misch tries to anchor the logical in the general context of life. Cf. G. Misch: Der Aufbau der Logik auf dem Boden der Philosophie des Lebens. Freiburg/Br. 1994.  

M. Granet: Das chinesische Denken. Frankfurt/M. 1985, 255.  

Vgl. R. A. Mall: Was konstituiert philosophische Argumente? Bremen 1996 (Bremer Philosophica 1996/1).  

H. Putnam: Pragmatismus – eine offene Frage. Frankfurt/M. 1995, 10.  

W. Windelband: "Vom Prinzip der Moral" (1883). In: ders.: Präludien. Aufsätze und Reden zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte. 2 Bde. Tübingen 1919, 176.  

Vgl. R. A. Mall: Was konstituiert philosophische Argumente? Bremen 1996 (Bremer Philosophica 1996/1).  

E. Levinas: Die Spur des Anderen. Freiburg/Br. 1983, 211.  

M. Scheler: Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 5. Bern 1954, 386. Hervorhebung durch den Verfasser.  

Author: Ram Adhar Mall
© 2000 Ram Adhar Mall & polylog e.V.