It is claimed that an encounter with between philosophy and multiculturalism is not peculiar to South Africa but one of the major challenges of philosophy as such today. African Philosophy, understood as a family name for all the diverse articulations of philosophy from within and for the cultural contexts of Africa, is significant in this regard as it exemplifies in a paradigmatic way the historical and cultural contingency or contextual particularity of philosophy. It is argued that a similar, though more complicated self-reflective contextualisation of philosophy is what is called for in present-day societies. By analyzing the logic of modernity it is argued that modernization and the increasing globalisation of modern culture does not mean the realization of cultural homogeneity, but the extension of cultural differences and multiculturalism to a common feature of societies. In conclusion a few preliminary remarks are made about the impact of multiculturalism on philosophy and how philosophy may contribute towards the selfunderstanding and well-being of multicultural societies.  1 

1. Introduction
2. Contextualisation and African Philosophy
   2.1 The African Philosophy Debate
   2.2 The significance of the heterogeneity of African Philosophy
3. The meaning of multiculturalism
   3.1 A descriptive use of multiculturalism
   3.2 The dialectical logic of modernity
4. The appropriation of multiculturalism
   4.1 Self-reflective multicultural contextualisation of philosophy
   4.2 Multiculturalism, cultural relativism, ethnocentrism and universalism
   4.3 Ethnicity, culture and non-ethnic cultural differences
   4.4 Possibilities and limitations of intercultural dialogue and
Intercultural Philosophy
Bibliography

»In this contribution I want to relate African Philosophy to the need for a self-reflective contextualisation of philosophy in multicultural societies.«

  In this contribution I want to relate African Philosophy to the need for a self-reflective contextualisation of philosophy in multicultural societies. Being a South African, I am obviously writing from and of such a need with regard to the practise of philosophy in my own country. But few – I hope! – would disagree that such a need and the encounter with multiculturalism it entails is not peculiar to South Africa but a major present and future challenge to philosophy in many other, increasingly multicultural societies. The South African experience may be exemplary of the issues at stake in other multicultural societies where the cultural particularity of the type(s) of philosophy taught and practised is increasingly challenged.

»Little attempt has been made over the years to engage in constructive dialogue with forms of African thought and wisdom or to participate in and assess the relevance of African Philosophy.«

  As elsewhere in the West, the practise and teaching of philosophy in South Africa is characterised by a rich diversity of approaches, representative of the whole range of well-established traditions and recent developments within what is generally referred to as "Western Philosophy". In many cases South African philosophers also applied these approaches in their analyses of problems and critiques of practises peculiar to or at least prevalent in the South African context similar to the way in which, for example continental approaches are applied elsewhere in other cultural contexts.

  This may be one way of understanding the contextualisation of philosophy. The need for contextualisation that I am referring to means something different and far more challenging though. It is not only about reflection and application, but about appropriation and interpretation. For example: although the presence of other non-European cultures is one of the prevalent features of the South African context it had little impact, at least until recently, on the ways in which philosophy was taught and practised. Little attempt has been made over the years to engage in constructive dialogue with forms of African thought and wisdom or to participate in and assess the relevance of African Philosophy.  2  In other multicultural societies a similar absence of any real impact of other minority cultures may indicate the same need for a self-reflective contextualisation.

  In substantiating this claim and exploring some of its implications, I will first give an assessment of the significance of the development of and debate about African Philosophy. The intention is certainly not to proclaim that a self-reflective contextualisation of philosophy in a multicultural context like South Africa amounts to doing only African Philosophy, neither to elevate African Philosophy to a position of privilege or superiority. Rather, the debate about African Philosophy is discussed in order to show how a proper engagement with it, neglected in the past, could have contributed to a self-reflective contextualisation of philosophy in a multicultural society like ours, but also – as a second step – to show that the quest for a distinctive African Philosophy is surpassed by the multicultural contexts of present-day societies in Africa and elsewhere. Subsequently the meaning of multiculturalism will be explained before I will venture, in conclusion, some preliminary remarks on the philosophical appropriation of multiculturalism.

»This integral link between "Philosophy" and Europe was reinforced during the Enlightenment and the European belief in an all encompassing vision of a society as rationally ordered.«

  It may be common knowledge today that an intensifying and increasingly complicated debate has developed over the last fifty years amongst African philosophers, their European counterparts and anthropologists with a special interest in indigenous African cultures, "systems of thought" and oral traditions of wisdom, with regard to the question of the "identity" and even the possibility of an "African Philosophy".  3  Taking stock of the historical development and all the issues at stake in this debate – the only way to trace the différance, the differences and deferal of the meaning(s) of African Philosophy – cannot be done extensively here, but the following observations may suffice.

  The controversiality of the notion of an "African Philosophy" from an European as well as an African perspective is not surprising or unwarranted, given the presumed historical origin of the concept, activity and discipline of "Philosophy" in Ancient Greece and its crucial foundational function in the (intellectual) histories and cultures of Europe.  4  This integral link between "Philosophy" and Europe was reinforced during the Enlightenment, the development of the "new sciences" since the eighteenth century and the European belief in – what Stephen Toulmin (1990) aptly named a »Cosmopolis« – an all encompassing vision of a society as rationally ordered as the Newtonian view of nature in terms of which human nature and society could and should be understood and structured according to exact rational categories.

  This vision and its philosophical legitimation accompanied the colonising of other parts of the world, like Africa, in the wake of the supposed superiority and universality of European modernity. Accordingly, the question from the outset in the debate about African Philosophy was whether the description of "Philosophy" as such, is not irrevocably eurocentric and imperialistic. Thus, whilst seeking to establish its own identity – at least initially – the debate itself contributed towards the exposure of some of the universalist claims of Western Philosophy as masquerading forms of eurocentric particularism.

»Following mainly on the political liberation and decolonization of Africa, African philosophers began to analyse the strategies and discursive power/knowledge formations in terms of which "Africa" was marginalised as the inferior "Other" of European culture.«

  Three developments in the recent history of Western discourses on Africa and the African responses to it need to be mentioned in this regard. Firstly, the ethnographical studies published since the late forties, which attempted to articulate the implied worldviews, moral values and conceptual systems embedded in the cultural codes and customs of indigenous African peoples. The debate about their viability which took a decisive turn during the sixties with the publication of Peter Winch's article "Understanding a Primitive Society" (1964) is not primarily important with regard to the identity of African Philosophy. It's importance may instead be located in the shift it brought about towards the questioning of the formerly uncritically assumed neutrality of the conceptual schemes and categories of anthropology and philosophy, and thus the questioning of the claims of »objectivity« and »universality« of (Western) rationality and the methodologies of the sciences (Masolo 1994, 124-146).

  Secondly, the contributions of African intellectuals who went abroad for a professional training in Continental philosophical trends, but returned to Africa and began to articulate in various ways, by the application and adaptation of these trends within the context of African experience, what one could call Philosophies for Africa, for example Panafricanism, Black Consciousness, African Socialism and the conceptualisation of negritude (and its different interpretations) in the writings of Cesaire, Senghor and Fanon (Clifford 1988, 177). In a dialectical way their existential and social analyses utilised the conceptual schemes and integral ideas of Continental philosophies for a critique on the universalistic claims and supposed superiority of Western philosophy, science and culture.

  Thirdly, following mainly on the political liberation and decolonization of Africa, the contributions of European trained African philosophers like Crahay (1965) and more recently Mudimbe (1988 and 1994) – inspired mainly by structuralist and poststructuralist approaches – who began to analyse the strategies and discursive power/knowledge formations in terms of which "Africa" was marginalised as the inferior "Other" of European culture in the philosophical and scientific discourse(s) of modernity. This approach made it possible to deconstruct certain ethnophilosophical accounts of African thought in as far as they are merely constructs of Western power/knowledge discursive practises and opened the possibility of an authentic reappropriation of African traditions of wisdom in an African discourse on and of philosophy. The important work done presently on the documentation of African sagacity and the recording and further development of "Sage Philosophy" serves as primary example in this regard.

»But the fact remains that there simply is not an African Philosophy, reducible to a singular identity, a normative method, or a shared set of premisses.«

  Consequently, what one encounters in scanning through the major developments within the debate about African Philosophy is a rich tapestry of diverse and disparate forms and modes of philosophising and indeed a variety of philosophies often engaged in critique of one another. Discerning some pattern in the tapestry, may be useful – as for example in the late Odera Oruka's distinction between four varieties of African Philosophy: ethnophilosophy, professional philosophy with little or no reference to ethnographic data, Africa's modern political and ideological thought which focuses on the production of a postcolonial discourse, and African philosophic sagacity.  5 

  But the fact remains that there simply is not an African Philosophy, reducible to a singular identity, a normative method, or a shared set of premisses. And still there is African Philosophy – but then only in the Wittgensteinian sense of referring to a range of family resemblances pertaining to all the articulations of philosophy of and for Africa. The whole historical and polemical discourse about the identity of African Philosophy is thus in itself examplary of the heterogeneous traditions of philosophical reflection and the conversation referred to by the common name of African Philosophy.

»African Philosophy succeeded in making philosophy a heterogeneous family of philosophical discourses particular to Africa, and in doing so set an example of how a self-reflective contextualisation of philosophy may look like, what it may be able to achieve and where it may meet its limitations.«

  The significance of African Philosophy should thus not be sought in a distinct identity on par with, parallel to or as an alternative to a supposed distinct identity of "Western Philosophy". As postmodern critiques from within "Western Philosophy" have shown philosophy may have been primarily associated with the histories and cultures of Europe until the twentieth century, but is in fact also a family name for various and extremely divergent attempts to come to grips with the demands of life in specific historic and cultural circumstances. From this perspective "Philosophy" is not an all-encompassing, unified, universal, meta-narrative of the ultimate meaning of human existence in spite of the pretensions to the contrary in the writings of some classical, medieval or especially modernist European philosophers. In many respects African Philosophy pictures synchronically what has been the case diachronically through the history of so-called "Western Philosophy".

  To my mind this is the prime significance of African Philosophy. It exemplifies in a paradigmatic way the historical and cultural contingency, the contextual particularity, of philosophy – the reciprocity between reflection and the pre-reflective conditions of thinking which constitute our Lebenswelt or the "forms of life" of our everyday existence.  6  This reciprocity, due to which any claim to universality in philosophy can only be the universalisation of a particularity, belongs to the forgetfullness of Western metaphysics.

  Perhaps the same forgetfulness accounts for the neglect of South African philosophy under apartheid to appropriate the cultural diversity in its immediate social context, because exactly in this neglect it reflected the devisions within that societal context. In African Philosophy the silence of this forgetfulness has been broken in the conscious attempt to make this reciprocity explicit in the inevitable diversity of discourses particular to the cultural, historical and social conditions of Africa. This was done by seeking to articulate and reappropriate the conceptions of meaning and value embedded in the cultural practices and languages within the immediate contexts of African societies, by forging conceptual tools more appropriate to the interpretation, critique and transformation of Africa's own cultures, and by utilizing various discourses of Western philosophy and traditions of indigenous thought as vehicles for the theoretical articulation of the "identities" of African peoples or to contest alienating "identities" imposed upon them.

  In this way African Philosophy succeeded in making philosophy a heterogeneous family of philosophical discourses particular to Africa, and in doing so set an example of how a self-reflective contextualisation of philosophy may look like, what it may be able to achieve and where it may meet its limitations. Such a self-reflective contextualisation – only in a much more complicated way – is what is called for in the challenge of multiculturalism, i.e. in the need to come to terms with the sociocultural diversity or multiculturality of contemporary societies.

»What multiculturalism refers to, or should refer to, is in itself a source of dispute in philosophy and the human sciences.«

  What multiculturalism refers to, or should refer to, is in itself a source of dispute in philosophy and the human sciences.  7  In political philosophy it may mean the claim that a political society should recognise the equal standing of all stable and viable communities belonging to it (Raz 1994, 69) with all the difficult questions pertaining to the granting of culture-specific rights and the protection of minorities (Kymlicka 1995). With regard to education and science it may mean the demand to revise methodologies and syllabuses in order to make them more representative of the cultural goods, histories, achievements and values of other than Western cultures with all the questions pertaining to the epistemic status of scientific practises and canonisation (Bak 1993).

  However, when used in a more general normative sense multiculturalism may express quite diverse ideals and imperatives. On the one hand it may refer to the advocation of a fusion of different cultures into one syncretistic, cosmopolitan world-culture through intercultural understanding and cross-cultural assimilation. On the other hand it may refer to the advocation of an appreciation for cultural differences and the positive affirmation of diversity as a necessary condition of human existence as such.  8 

»I will use multiculturalism in a descriptive sense to refer to the presence of distinct cultural differences within a society and to emphasise that such differences are not trivial, but real and should be recognised as such.«

  To avoid being sidetracked by this dispute, I will use multiculturalism in a fairly neutral, encompassing and descriptive sense to refer to the presence of distinct cultural differences within a society and to emphasise that such differences are not trivial, but real and should be recognised as such. Multiculturalism in this sense refers to the paradoxical nature of the present, globalising late-modern or "postmodern" culture.

  On the one hand there can be no doubt that the cultural "forms of life" of modernity which developed out of the European Enligtenment – for example democracy, market economy, science and technology – have expanded and will continue to expand globally. The result of this globalisation of modernity is the transformation and equalisation of the everyday existence – the Lebenswelt – of all peoples of all cultures.  9  But, perhaps contrary to what might have been expected, this globalisation of modernity is accompanied by a hightened awareness of and attachment to particular cultures and culture-specific values. The process of globalisation is not a process of cultural homogenisation, but of increasing fragmentation and pluralisation (Welsch 1987).

»Its innovative power made modernity, which began as a local Western phenomenon, a universal project capable of forcing its theoretical and practical principles on all but the most isolated civilizations.«

L. Dupré
(1993, 249)

  This paradoxical coincidence of the de facto realisation of a modern world culture and a simultaneous diversification of culture may seem enigmatic but is fully explainable in terms of the logic of modernity. Modernity developed out of the Enlightenment on the basis of ideas and values which were understood to be universal. For example: the freedom of the individual to act autonomously and the authority of reason over traditional sources of meaning and morality like cultural conventions, religion or collective history. The historical evolution of democracy, the articulation of basic human rights, the development of science and technology and the concomitant technologisation of the human lifeworld and the expansion of capitalist economy, can be traced back at least to these two ideas: the primacy of the autonomous individual above the particular cultural community, and the primacy of a supposedly "universal" human reason above culture-specific codes and beliefs.

  The logic of modernity thus presupposed a detachment of or emancipation from a particular cultural community or collectively shared horizon of significance. For this reason modernity could expand transculturally and develop into a global world culture. But for this very same reason - and this is the resolution of the paradox – it cannot provide people with an attachment to those specific meanings and values for which they are dependent on cultural forms of life.

  Thus as a global world culture modernity does not eradicate cultural differences, but creates an existential vacuum which can only be covered by a falling back onto specific forms of collective identity and cultural attachment. The expansion of the cultural "forms of life" of modernity is therefore not a process of transcultural unification, but the global extension of the conditions which make it possible to affirm cultural differences and claim public recognition for and protection of culture-specific values. Accordingly, the revival on a worldwide scale of ethnicity, nationalisms and other forms of cultural particularism, or the emergence of new ones, should not be understood as the last convulsions of almost bygone premodern attitudes and tendencies, nor as shortlived counter-reactions to the globalisation of modernity. It is simply the vital supplement of modernity, the inevitable shadows of the universalised values of the Enlightenment.

  This ironic logic of modernity in terms of which it realises a radical pluralisation of society and culture in the same movement in which it achieves global expansion, is also what "postmodernity" as a description of the distinctive cultural conditions of our present existence refers to (Welsch 1987, 53-85). The distinctive differences of the past between the cultural contexts within which Western Philosophy as opposed to African Philosophy were practised may fade with the inevitable modernisation of African societies and the globalisation of modernity. But the commonality of sharing increasingly the same postmodern societal context is not the sharing of a homogeneous culture but a common encounter with multiculturalism as a universal feature of postmodern societies.

  What the impact on philosophy of this encounter with multiculturalism will be and to what extent philosophy may be able to contribute towards the self-understanding and well-being of multicultural societies are complex and wide-ranging questions. It is beyond the scope of this contribution - and beyond my competence - to explore them in a satisfactory way. Nevertheless it is extremely important to put these questions on the agenda for collective reflection and philosophical debate and I hope the following preliminary remarks will serve this purpose.

»Multiculturalism does not confront us with a problem to be solved through reflection, but rather with a postmodern condition of thinking which has to be appropriated in our reflection.«

  Many contributions to the growing discourse on multiculturalism amount to reflections about sociocultural diversity as if it is but another problem to be solved, a problem towards which neutral ground can be assumed. However, this is not what a proper philosophical encounter with multiculturalism demands. It should be clear from the preceding explanation that multiculturalism does not confront us with a problem to be solved through reflection, but rather with a postmodern condition of thinking which has to be appropriated in our reflection. It demands a philosophical reflection from within the criss-crossing of and breaches between the various particular histories, traditions and modes of thinking intermingled in the multicultural context of present-day societies. Such a self-reflective multicultural contextualisation of philosophy entails, to my mind, at least the following.

»Not only societies, but people are multicultural.«

Amy Gutman
(1993, 183)

  Firstly, the realisation that there is no neutral ground, no "view from nowhere" in philosophy with regard to cultural differences, because of the cultural contingency of every philosophical viewpoint, and the histories and traditions of philosophy – Western or African – as such. This realisation impels one to enter into dialogue with the traditions of wisdom and thinking of other cultures – not so much in the hope that one will reach a transcultural, metaphilosophical consensus, but as a way of acknowledging the particularity of one's own viewpoint and discovering the cultural contingency of one's own philosophical presuppositions and allegiances.  10 

  Secondly, the realisation that the particularity and cultural contingency of one's own viewpoint, indeed one's identity as a person and a philosopher, is itself heterogeneous and much more "multicultural" than one would have thought. To quote Amy Gutman (1993, 183): »Not only societies, but people are multicultural.« - meaning not "cosmopolitan" in the sense of sharing a similar mixture of cultures, but that one's identity is a continuous reweaving of various patterns of the cultures one is exposed to. Thus, there needn't be a contradiction between acknowledging the cultural contingency of one's own philosophical viewpoint and the self-reflective appropriation of multiculturalism as a condition of thinking. It is simply the flipside of the coin. Every philosophical viewpoint is already inscribed or embedded in the multiculturality of our existence. With this I do not only mean the empirical fact that our existence is increasingly marked by a daily encounter with cultural differences. Rather, as I have argued, that the experience of cultural diversity has become the postmodern condition of philosophical reflection. But it can be so either with an awareness of the fact or without. Having an awareness of the fact, is to take multiculturalism as a starting point; thinking from within it not only in a first mode of reflection as is always the case, but also in a second mode of self-reflectivity.

  Thirdly, the realisation that the understanding of multiculturalism in terms of different cultures co-existing as it were alongside one another in one society is a misconstrual of the matter at stake; »a bewitchment of our intelligence« by the noun "culture" – to paraphrase Wittgenstein (1988a, §109). It presupposes that cultures are monolithic, transparent and neatly demarcated wholes, whilst this is not the case. Obviously, it cannot be denied that there are different, distinctive cultures. But to conceptualise multiculturalism or the distinctive sociocultural diversity of present-day societies in this way, forces one into acceptance of an essensialistic, substantive and static understanding of culture and cultural diversity.

»Not only are such claims of cultural relativism conceptually and empiricially false, they are also politically dangerous – as we experienced under apartheid.«

  This is where the demands of multiculturalism eclipse various forms of cultural relativism, ethnocentrism and universalism which all presuppose such an essencesialistic understanding of culture.  11  The minimalist claim common to cultural relativism and sophisticated forms of ethnocentrism, namely that there is no culture-transcendent Archimedean point from where different cultures can be studied, understood and judged; or in Rorty's (1991, 2) words no »skyhook with which to escape from the ethnocentrism produced by acculturation«, need not presuppose such an understanding of culture. But cultural relativism normally involves more substantial claims which do presuppose such an understanding of culture, for example the claim that different cultures are incommensurable or that cross-cultural understanding and translation is not possible or that different cultures are of equal value.

  Not only are such claims conceptually and empiricially false, they are also politically dangerous – as we experienced under apartheid. It should not be forgotten that the cultural-anthropological justification or rationalisation that was given for apartheid, at least initially, was that different cultures are incommensurable, that the integrity of each culture should be respected and its survival safeguarded, and that the only way to do so in a multicultural society is by political and geographical separation, i.e. by creating a homeland for each ethnically defined cultural group. To a large extent apartheid became a "self-fulfilling prophecy" in this regard. The social engineering program of separation and the very real way in which it isolated communities from one another effected misunderstanding, bigotry and animosity. But even in spite of this massive and violent institutionalization of separation, cross-cultural assimilation still took place.

»Multiculturalism should rather be understood as the condition of "cultural differences", running across various cultures and being inherent in any distinct culture.«

  Universalist approaches to cultural diversity however also presuppose an essensialistic conception of culture, for example by postulating some universal cultural constants, a single core of "human culture", present in all the different cultures, or only manifested differently in different cultures, or still to be discovered and realized through the merging or forging of different cultures into one. Such a universal "human culture" is of course an abstraction without real content, or a regulative idea which only appeals to those who share a particular, culture-specific teleological understanding of history.

  Fourthly, as the decisive albeit simplified conclusion, the realization that multiculturalism should rather be understood or approached not as the problem of "different cultures" co-existing alongside one another, but rather as the condition of "cultural differences", running across various cultures and being inherent in any distinct culture, because of the cultural heterogeneity of present-day societies. Such cultural differences can be as real between members of the same culture as between members of different cultures (Caws 1994, 375).

»Intercultural communication and cross-cultural assimilation are possible and do take place in daily life.«

  The relevance of this viewpoint with regard to most multi-ethnic societies is that the congruence of "ethnicity" and "culture" needn't be considered on the one hand negatively as an evil to be extinguished where and whenever possible. But neither should it be understood on the other hand as a convergence which corresponds to some essential, homogenous identity. Although ethnic culture cannot be negated as a real social and cultural phenomenon, it should not be absolutised theoretically.

  More and more people participate in and encounter more than one of the various, distinguishable diverse ethnic and sociocultural forms of life prevalent in their society. Intercultural communication and cross-cultural assimilation are possible and do take place in their daily lives in spite of the embeddedness of their existence in different ethnic and sociocultural forms of life. Part of this intermingling of cultures is the reality of cultural differences with regard to certain beliefs, values and practises. And in cases of conflict, no culture-transcendent set of criteria can be applied to judge the conflicting positions or legitimate the objective validity of any one position.

»You cannot lead people to what is good, you can only lead them to some place or other. The good is outside the space of facts.«

Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1988b, §3e)

  Certainly this impels philosophers, educators and intellectuals in general, to engage in intercultural dialogue, and on a more theoretical level to explore the possibilities of intercultural philosophy. Through such a dialogue and discourse it may be possible to develop what Charles Taylor (1985) calls »a language of perspicuous contrast«, a public discourse through which the divergent communities could develop a mutual understanding of their cultural differences and commonalities.  12  In and through this process, it might become evident that certain aspects of the other's culture are inadequate and/or that aspects of the one's own are – in which case the understanding of the other may lead to a transformation of one's own.  13  Without doubt one of the implications of multiculturalism for philosophers, educators and intellectuals in general is to be or become such transversal crosscultural interpreters of the divergent experiences, values and practises in their societies (Bauman 1987).

  But this view also accounts for the reality that there will always be misunderstandings and conflicts that cannot be resolved through dialogue and deliberation, i.e for the realisation that a "merging of horizons" is not always possible or desirable in the case of certain cultural differences people attach too. However promising and of vital importance the exploration of intercultural philosophy may be, the same will hold true for it. In such extreme cases – whether of philosophical dissensus or societal conflict – one reaches those cultural differences which refer to what people value ultimately, as for example in differences of religious belief. Such differences concern what people belief to be of ultimate significance, "the good". And as Wittgenstein (1988b, §3e) observed: »You cannot lead people to what is good, you can only lead them to some place or other. The good is outside the space of facts.« People's beliefs about the good, are not beliefs that people hold, but rather beliefs that have them in their hold.

W.L. van der Merwe
is full professor of Philosophy at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

  Consequently, there will always be a point, both in our intercultural philosophical endeavours and in our societal life where we will stumble upon the incommensurable – not because of a supposed mutual exclusion of our cultures or the impossibility of intercultural communication and understanding, but because our culturally embedded values defy even our own understanding, justification and explanation.

  At this point even an intercultural philosophy encounters its limitations and the only way to minimize potential conflict will be the political negotiation of a modus vivendi. But the continuous negotiation of a modus vivendi in our societal life will not be possible if people are told that their cultures are incommensurable; only if they are reminded of their finitude in their attachment to culturally contingent values. And in this regard a self-reflective contextualised philosophy can play an important role in multicultural societies.

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Philosophical Investigations (3rd rev. ed. transl. by G.E.M. Anscombe). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

L. Wittgenstein (1988b):
Culture and Value (repr. and transl. by Peter Winch). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

R.W. Wright (ed.) (1984):
African Philosophy. An introduction (3rd ed.). Maryland: University Press of America.

This article first appeared in its present form in G. Katsiaficas / T. Kiros (ed.) (1998): The Promise of Multiculturalism. London: Routledge. An earlier, more extended and differently focused version of this article was presented as a paper "The Contextuality of Philosophy: From African Philosophy to Multiculturalism" at the Second Pan-African Symposium on the Problematics of an African Philosophy, Addis Ababa. Another version was published as the leading article in a special issue on multiculturalism, entitled "Identity, Difference and Community", of the South African Journal of Philosophy 16.3 (1997), 73-78. The financial assistance of the Centre for Science Development (Human Sciences Research Council, South Africa) towards this research, as well as a Senior Research Fellowship of the Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium) is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the Centre for Science Development. 

Notable exceptions are Rauche (1992) and Shutte (1993). 

There are many introductions to and surveys of the historical development of and current positions in this debate, but Wright (1984) and Floistad (1987) can be taken as authoritative. Wright also provides an extensive bibliography, as does Neugebauer (in Nagl-Docekal / Wimmer 1992). My own knowledge and interpretation of this debate relies to a considerable extent on the recent critical exposition by Masolo (1994). 

Locating the historical origin of philosophy in Ancient Greece is of course contested by some African philosophers and scholars. See for example Diop's (1974) reconstruction of the crucial role of Africa in the genesis of civilization, followed on and strengthened by Olela (1980 and 1984) and culminating in Martin Bernal's controversial Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization (1987). See also for references on the controversy, criticisms and defenses, footnote 8 in Blok (1996). 

For an excellent critical appraisal of this conceptual schematisation of Odera Oruka, see Deacon (1996). 

For a comparison of the Husserlian notion of the Lebenswelt and the Wittgensteinian notion of "forms of life" and a discussion of the dialectic of reflection (language) and the prereflective conditions of thinking (experience) see van der Merwe (1993). 

Goldberg (1994, 429-441) provides an extensive bibliography of literature on multiculturalism and a useful selection of articles for the purpose of an introduction to the issues. For a proper introduction to the current philosophical reflection, see Gutman (1994) with contributions by major philosophers like Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas, Michael Walzer and K. Anthony Appiah. 

The opposites referred to here is in the first case approaches, mainly inspired by Habermas, such as "communicative ethics" or "deliberative democracy" and in the second case approaches inspired by French philosophers like Derrida and Lyotard. 

This is forcefully and convincingly argued by Dupré (1993) who concludes: »Its innovative power made modernity, which began as a local Western phenomenon, a universal project capable of forcing its theoretical and practical principles on all but the most isolated civilizations.« (249). However, although this is true, it is not correct to state – as Dupré does – that "modern" has become the predicate of a unified world culture. Modernity or "modern culture" is accompanied by an increasing awareness of and attachment to cultural differences. 

I appreciate the theoretical justification of and the pioneering intercultural philosophical writings of Kimmerle (1991 and 1995) as an examplary model in this regard. 

For a short overview of some forms of cultural relativism, ethnocentrism and universalism, see Procee (1991, 11-63). 

See also the exposition of the importance of Taylor's proposal by van Niekerk (1993). 

To expect though as Taylor (1985, 125) does that this will be »a language in which we could formulate their way of life and ours as alternative possibilities in relation to some human constants at work in both« (my italics) is again to hope for a teleological resolution of all cultural differences. As in the case of other similar proposals with regard to the resolution of conflict caused by multiculturalism, for example Habermasian models of deliberative or communicative ethics, such a hope is based on an overestimation of rationality and an underestimition of the extent to which some cultural differences are not of such a nature that people can be persuaded to exchange them or leave them behind. Why defending this position is not an endorsement of relativism, see the excellent study by Nicholas Rescher (1995). 

Author: W. L. van der Merwe
© 2000 W. L. van der Merwe, Routledge & polylog e.V.