This article follows up parallels between Kwasi Wiredu's suggestion of a democracy based on consensus in Africa and similar movements in indigenous America. In view of the processes of transition from traditional communities in pluralist societies and the resulting problems for a form of government based on consensus, some programmatic ideas are sketched out to counter the latter. Thereby, a recognition of all differences proves crucial, as a basis for supplementing representational democracy with participatory elements of direct democracy.

Other Types of Democracy
Problems of Consensual Democracy
The Plural State

Kwasi Wiredu:
"Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics. A Plea for a Non-party Polity".
In this issue.
Article

  The Western model of representative democracy these days appears to be imposing itself on the rest of the world. In many countries it has served as a liberatory mechanism against a totalitarian order; in others, however, it has led to the destruction of collective ways of life in more traditional communities. This has been the case in many regions of Africa. Kwasi Wiredu, in a suggestive article,  1  proposes an alternative. African tradition before colonization developed, in a number of peoples, varieties of democracy different from the Western ideal. In place of the imposition of the majority, dialogue amongst everyone, which would lead to a consensus, assured that, in the final agreement, no one was excluded. Instead of the battle between parties or the predominance of a single one, there was rational dialogue between all members of society.

  These forms of consensual democracy are analogous to similar practices in many indigenous peoples of America, which reminisce an era preceding the European conquest. In many indigenous communities, the ideal of consensus persists – a consensus upon which is arrived by the participation of the whole people in assemblies. These assemblies also designate certain members of the community to assume leading ranks, based on age and wisdom. The rulers are subject to the will of the members of the community, as asserts the popular motto: they should "serve obeyingly." These procedures intend to preserve community relations; therefore, they frequently clash with the regime of political parties that divide the community itself.

»During the assembly everyone takes the stand and discusses; at the end of the discussion, an old man interprets and sums up the decision at which has been arrived. He announces: 'We have thought and now decide that…'.«

Carlos Lenkersdorf
(Note 2)

  An ethnolinguist, Carlos Lenkersdorf, describes as follows the assembly practice of a Tojolabal community (a people of Mayan descent) in Mexico: »During the assembly everyone takes the stand and discusses; at the end of the discussion, an old man interprets and sums up the decision at which has been arrived. He announces: 'We have thought and now decide that…' That is to say – writes Lenkersdorf – being that the old man is wise and of good judgment, he intuits our reasoning and announces it. A consensus has been reached that is expressed by the word 'we.' This type of meeting demonstrates intersubjectivity in action. The community lives on, thanks to the participation of each and of all the people.«  2 

  This traditional spirit reanimates a movement in favor of the rights of the indigenous peoples of various Latin American countries: Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia. By means of defending their autonomy, they aim to preserve and renew the kinds of communal life that are threatened by modern individualistic society.

  It is worth comparing democracy's return to African sources with the revival of similar indigenous traditions in America. Don't these similarities indicate an endeavor of universal scope – as Wiredu himself doesn't merely insinuate – that goes far beyond the borders of a people?

  Representative democracy limits the participation of the elector to specific actions; done with these, the citizen then leaves, losing control of his representatives, who then decide for him. Representative democracy is a procedure that replaces the power of the citizens; it creates a social class linked to parties and public functions, which is where the power is illegitimately retained; this class is comprised of a political bureaucracy and supported by economic power. Representative democracy is founded in the principle of competition, just as the bureaucracy of the triumphant party has ruled out its electors. Once it has attained power, it then pushes to the side the defeated minorities; exclusion is a necessary feature of democratic procedure.

»Frente al individualismo competitivo de la democracia liberal, esta alternativa de democracia consolidaría los lazos que constituyen una comunidad.«

  Consensual democracy, the ideal of many non-Western communities, behaves as a rectification of the faults inherent in representative democracy. It would have the same sense as the proposals of a "radical" or "participative" democracy of other authors. It would emphasize procedures that would secure the participation in decisions that concern all members of a society, as well as their say about who represents those decisions. It would be anchored to the principle of agreement, not to party competition. Its regulative idea would be the avoidance of exclusion. Opposed to the competitive individualism of liberal democracy, this democratic alternative would fortify the bonds that constitute a community.

»In a modern participative democracy, consensus would seek legitimacy in the accord between personal liberties. It would be the product of an autonomous decision involving all citizens.«

  The idea of consensual democracy originated before modern thought. It is peculiar to societies founded upon the need for collective labor; it generally concerns agricultural or stock-breeding societies, where community-based forms of life still remain. Collective work in the countryside demands cooperation, mutual assistance, and shared decisions. Likewise these consensual procedures are never questioned; they are part of a commonly accepted tradition, forming part of the established customs.

  But traditional communities are torn apart when they have to adjust to "modern" forms of life. Democracy in this situation is the result of the agreed-upon will of autonomous individuals; it is no longer founded upon the customs transmitted by tradition but upon the legal system settled on by individual citizens. We should then wonder: Could these concepts from premodern societies traverse into modern individualistic societies? It is not possible to go back in time; we cannot resurrect, within a society, forms of life that are much less complex and belong in agrarian societies. Nevertheless these ways of living could offer us a means by which to overcome individualism and the lack of political participation amongst people, things that typically characterize modern liberal democracies. For this, it may be necessary to lift (in the Hegelian sense of Aufheben: to conserve and to overcome) the principles of liberal democracy to the height of a renovated communitarian democracy.

  This proposal fosters theoretical problems. I will point out the two that appear to be most important:

  1. The procedures for arriving at a consensus in the afore-mentioned communities found their legitimacy in inherit collective wisdom, which is often expressed in secular myths; these procedures form a part of the moral conventions that are observed in the society. Their acceptance expresses an attitude that reiterates traditional ideals and ways of life. Dissent from a group or individual falls outside of this social moral code; it is disruptive to the community and cannot be considered legitimate. In a modern participative democracy, on the other hand, consensus would seek legitimacy in the accord between personal liberties. It would be the product of an autonomous decision involving all citizens. Dissent, therefore, would have to be accepted as legitimate in front of a tradition or custom earlier agreed upon. It supposes a norm prior to the acceptance of the collective tradition: respect for the autonomy of all the members of the community and, therefore, for their right to dissent.

»Human beings have the ability eventually to cut trough their differences to the rock bottom identity of interests.«

Kwasi Wiredu
(Note 3)

  2. As Wiredu accurately indicates, consensual democracy presumes that all the members of the society are able to arrive, by way of communication, at a substantive common good: »Human beings have the ability eventually to cut trough their differences to the rock bottom identity of interests.«  3  In effect, in premodern communities, the people may coincide with the best goals and values that are accepted by tradition, which tend to maintain unity within the community. On the other hand, modern, multifaceted democratic societies do not necessarily behave this way. Rather the liberal idea of democracy is grounded upon the opposite supposition; it is a way of responding to the multiplicity of conceptions about the common good that spring from divergent interests. If the state were to accept a basic idea of the common good, it would be because of the imposition of one social sector above the rest. In fact, this is what could happen in reality if the principle of majority rules continues to be rigidly adhered to.

  ¿Could this practice be modified in order to promote the principle of consensus? To me it appears that the response would be different depending on the types of decisions being dealt with. Within local spaces, communities, municipalities and even aotonomous peoples, where citizens are able to maintain personal contact and where, when discrepancies arise, there is still a consciousness of common necessities, it is possible to employ procedures that would lead to a general consensus. These procedures would involve the solution of local problems, those that affect all members of the particular community.

»All that is suitable in this situation is a basic consensus that reflects an identity of interests: respect for the plurality of points of view regarding the common good and recognition of the differences.«

  In geographically larger countries, interpersonal communication, along with an extensive knowledge of common problems, is rare. At this level, there actually exists a plurality of groups, each with different points of view and different interests that are generally not communicated between groups. All that is suitable in this situation, therefore, is a basic consensus that reflects an identity of interests: respect for the plurality of points of view regarding the common good and recognition of the differences. This is a value of second order, for to say so; it consists in the equal consideration and importance of the fundamental values that choose the different groups of the society. It is not innocuous, however. Recognition of differences implies giving to each person what is his or her, that is the classical definition of justice. Justice is equity in dealing with all the differences.

  Given the absence of an all-encompassing definition of the common good in modern democracies – which was previously attained by reaching an autonomous consensus –, an agreement can only be realized considering those different ideas and goals that at least partially coincide, in the way of an overlapping consensus that John Rawls introduced in the debate. To accomplish this it would be necessary that rational dialogue is accompanied by willful cooperation. Applying the principle of equality to the recognition of differences would lead to the obtention of this at least partial rational consensus.

  Consensual democracy, I believe, would tend to provide institutional solutions to both of these problems.

»Places in which people are able to intercommunicate in order to arrive at consensual decisions would foster a renovation of the community.«

  I would propose the following programmatic ideas in order to face the afore-mentioned problems; perhaps they will overlap with those Wiredu might also propose.

  In actuality the proposal of a radical or participative democracy could only be realized if we were to go from a homogenous nation state to a plural state, one that is founded upon the recognition of differences. The procedures involved in a representative democracy would have to harmonize with institutional forms that would assure the development of a participative democracy. Places in which people are able to intercommunicate in order to arrive at consensual decisions would foster a renovation of the community. This renovation would be founded upon the state's pacts of autonomy with its distinct peoples (nationalities, ethnic groups, tribes) that constitute the plural state. Each autonomous region would delegate a large share of administrative and political power to local spheres, where the real people live and work: communities, municipalities and delegations; but also places of work: cooperatives, universities, industries. Consensual decisions can be arrived at in these types of places.

Luis Villoro
has been professor of philosophy at National Autonomous University of Mexico and at Autonomous Metropolitan University (both Mexico City) during almost 50 years. He lives and works in Mexico City.

  On another level, intercommunity relations would have to be established. They would be directed by the regulative idea of equitable recognition of all the autonomous regions and of the individual communities that comprise those regions. On this level, a federal power would have to be maintained, following the procedures of representative democracy. However, in dealing with issues of particular importance and with reference to the common good of the citizens, a participation of all could be assured by means of the established figures of public opinion poll, referendum and plebiscite.

  All of this does not imply the dissolution of representative democracy, but rather its accompaniment with forms of direct democracy which permit arriving at a consensus. Nor does it imply an elimination of political parties, but instead, the restriction of their faculties. In regional or local spheres, parties would not be useful in reaching a consensus; they would not be present. In the national sphere, on the other hand, they would be necessary but their function would be limited to intercommunity issues.

  It seems to me that the rebirth of consensual democratic forms, particular to important movements of Africa and indigenous America, may unlock an alternative that would prevail over the limitations of Western-style liberal democracy. Above all, it could be the beginning of a never-before seen type of reborn community.

Translation from the Spanish by Jesse Carmichael.

polylog. Forum for Intercultural Philosophy 2 (2000).
Online: http://them.polylog.org/2/fvl-en.htm
ISSN 1616-2943

Kwasi Wiredu: Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics: A Plea for a Non-party Polity. In this issue. 

Carlos Lenkersdorf: Los hombres verdaderos. Voces y testimonios tojolabales. México: Siglo XXI, 1997, 80. 

Kwasi Wiredu, 12. 

Author: Luis Villoro
© 2000 Luis Villoro & polylog e.V.