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Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze

Democracy or Consensus?

Response to Wiredu

 
Summary

Drawing from various examples of contemporary African and global politics, Emmanuel Eze discusses and critically assesses Kwasi Wiredu's recent plea for a 'non-party democracy' following the principle of consensus, which Wiredu understood to be shaped according to the features of the 'traditional' political system of the Asante in Ghana. Eze voices skepticism against consensus politics as a 'democratic' solution to current problems of political theory in Africa, as he exposes some points where the consensus system is likely to be utilized undemocratically by the central authorities. Moreover, Eze is doubtful as to whether one can speak of an ultimately converging will of the people in any given political union, an assumption that seems central to Wiredu's argument. For Eze, a recommendable path for democracy in Africa has yet to be formulated.


Content

deutsch  

Introduction
Wiredu's presentation of tradition
On the nature of political interests
Democracy



 Introduction

Kwasi Wiredu:
"Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics. A Plea for a Non-party Polity".
In this Issue.
Article

1

  In his article "Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics", Kwasi Wiredu undertakes an important and necessary task: the search for a conceptual political paradigm that would end the chronic conflicts and destruction that plague numerous African societies – from Rwanda and Somalia to Sudan and Nigeria. Wiredu's particular angle on this problem, as he states it here, may be classified along with those African thinkers who advocated a "return" to the "tradition"; or a "return to the source" as Amilcar Cabral would call it. It is an attempt to (re)discover in the African precolonial past resilient forms of social and political organisation that, with proper reworking, would lead some African countries out of their current self-destructive patterns of political existence. In addition to Cabral's "return to the source", efforts similar to Wiredu's thought include the "African socialism" of Senghor, Nyerere's "Ujamaa", and, with strong qualifications, Ousmane Sembene's dialectical constructions of "the people" as the source of political salvation in his movies (Xala, for example).

»If we label the first search for African democracy as an 'esoteric' movement, then we can call the second type 'exoteric'. In Wiredu's formulation, the first route would lead to an indigenously inspired African form of 'consensual democracy'. The second, however, would lead to a Western-style 'adversarial democracy'.«

2

  The "return to the source" model is quite different from the route taken today by many African countries that seek democratic ideals through movements whose historical examples are rooted in the modern European traditions. The most recent examples include the movement that led to the overthrow of Kenneth Kaunda's government through the ballot. The African demand for a Western-style democratic process is also evident in the varied forms of Moshood Abiola's campaign for "democracy" in Nigeria. When the military regime of Ibrahim Babangida arbitrarily suspended the 1993 elections and paved the way for Nigeria's dictatorship, Abiola, as the frontrunner in the quashed election, initiated his campaign against the military by flying out of the country to London, Paris, and then Washington, and by establishing in each place with backing from the governments – effective pressure on Abacha to restore "democracy". So "democracy" here is understood and articulated in the multiparty language of the political traditions of the West, a democracy that the West also sometimes requires of African states as a precondition for economic and military aid.

3

  If we label the first ("return to the source") search for African democracy as an "esoteric" movement, then we can call the second type "exoteric". In Wiredu's formulation, and with reference to the Ashanti tradition, the first route would lead to an indigenously inspired African form of "consensual democracy". The second, however, would lead to a Western-style "adversarial democracy".

4

  I should point out that Wiredu's terminology is sometimes different from the one I would choose: for example, according to him, consensual democracy belongs to the African "traditional", precolonial past, while "adversarial" democracy is a Western import to "modern", postcolonial Africa. I do not favor the characterisations of one model as automatically "Western" and therefore "modern" and "postcolonial", while the other is automatically "African" and therefore "traditional" and "precolonial". (These are the sort of not-always-accurate conceptual dichotomies within which anthropologists love to reify African existence.) If we were to look at the way many "modern" African dictators have manipulated the traditional ideals of consensus politics to centralize power in their arbitrary hands, we would know that political practices in Africa today are a more flexible and often highly eclectic or syncretic melange of the African and the Western, the old and the new, the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial, and so forth.

5

  However, these sorts of flexibility, eclecticism, and overlap between the workings of "modern" and "traditional" political formations in Africa do not obscure Wiredu's basic distinctions between the two forms of "democratic" impulse competing with each other on the continent. According to Wiredu:

 

»[In traditional Akan political system, for example,] there is never an act of formal voting. Indeed, there is no longstanding word for voting in the language of the Ashantis. The expression which is currently used for that process (aba to) is an obvious modern coinage for the modern cultural import or, shall we say, imposition.«  1 

»A major strength of Wiredu's analysis of 'consensual' democracy is precisely this: he exposes how the many dictatorial practices in Africa that flourish under the name of 'national unity' or 'consensus', one-party governments are indeed not democratic at all, and very repressive of opposition.«

6

  Working within these distinctions, it is clear that – to stick with our Nigerian examples – Abiola's campaign derives from the exercise of a democratic political tradition which Wiredu, in the quote given, describes as a »modern cultural import«, or »imposition«. On the other hand, the African dictators I refer to above – such as Abacha – exploit the traditional resources of "consensual" democracy to build up national support for their regimes.

7

  I do not wish to give the impression that there is something inherent in "consensual" politics that makes it any more susceptible to dictatorial abuse than any other form of political practice. A major strength of Wiredu's analysis of "consensual" democracy is precisely this: he exposes how the many dictatorial practices in Africa that flourish under the name of "national unity" or "consensus", one-party governments are indeed not democratic at all, and very repressive of opposition. For Wiredu, the disappearance of these "one–party" forms of government, even by means of the exoteric forms of democratic pressure, should be most welcome. The consensual democracy advocated by Wiredu is not that of one party exercising all the power and – to use Wiredu's word – »murdering« opponents; it is, rather, a framework for sharing with every party the exercise of governing power.

8

  It is the context of political realities such as in Nigeria, the Sudan, Liberia, Rwanda, and Zaire that leads Wiredu, I think, to say that if "imported" or "imposed" forms of democracy succeed in saving Africans from political repression, all the better. But we know that African dictators have invented "tricks" to resist such external pressures: they put up mock multiparty elections that deceive the Western governments (who, we all know, need lots of convincing!) into continuing the supply of military weapons, while keeping intact and untransformed the mechanisms of autocratic, dictatorial, and terroristic exercise of state power. Hence, the need to explore other models of, or models for, African democracy. Wiredu sees the idea of "consensus", or consensual democracy, as "an alternative" to both one-party dictatorship and multiparty, winner-takes-all, adversarial political practices.

»Majority opinion is not in itself a good enough basis for decision making, for it deprives the minority of the right to have their will reflected in the given decision.«

Kwasi Wiredu
(In this issue, 13)

9

  The appeal of Wiredu's conception of consensus politics lies primarily in the fact that it promises not just formal, but substantive representation. In a classical, multiparty democracy – in the USA or current South Africa, for example, where majority rule is the principle of governance – the issue is how to safeguard the rights of the minority parties who did not "win" elections. In a consensual democracy, however, there is no "winner" (and therefore no "loser"): every party is a government party, and the principle of governance is the reconciliation of competing social interests. Reconciliation, agreement, consensus – not the rule of the majority party – would make up the political axiom. Hence, Wiredu's statements: »consensus was ... the order of the day in African [political] deliberations, and on principle«; »the elders sit under the big trees, and talk until they agree«; »majority opinion is not in itself a good enough basis for decision making, for it deprives the minority of the right to have their will reflected in the given decision«; and so forth.  2 

10

  In what follows I will examine more critically and closely the quite appealing idea of consensus presented to us by Wiredu as a possible way forward. I have some remarks and questions, and will organize them into three, related, themes. First, I will examine Wiredu's presentation of the origins of Ashanti political authority. Second, I will raise some questions about Wiredu's (or the traditional Ashanti's) understanding of the nature of political interests. Finally, I will conclude by looking closely at the numerous meanings that the word democracy would have assumed (or shed) through Wiredu's reconstruction of the traditional Ashanti consensual political culture.



 Wiredu's presentation of tradition

»Ohene aniwa«

In the king's eye

Ashanti symbol




Adinkra
Ashanti symbolism
external linkWebsite

11

  It is easy to notice that, in a number of places, Wiredu points out – although he does not develop, or scrutinize – the Akan conception of several possible sources of legitimate political power. We read, for example, that qualification for the political office of the head of an Ashanti lineage involves moral considerations: »moral degeneration« is an impediment for this office.  3  Wiredu does not, however, spell out to us what sorts of behavior or conditions qualify as »moral degeneration«. (How widely acceptable would the ancient Ashanti moral codes be in today's African worlds?) Moreover, when he approvingly quotes Willy Abraham, Wiredu states that among the Akan »kingship was more a sacred office than a political one«.  4  Wiredu's observation on this statement is as follows: »The office was 'sacred' because a chief was supposed to be the link between the living population and their departed ancestors, who were supposed to supervise human interests from their postmortem vantage paint.«  5 

12

  The quote from Abraham and Wiredu's comments point directly to notions of "sacred" and "ancestral" sources of legitimation of political power and authority among the Akan. But Wiredu, in his continued commentary, is quick to assure us that, unlike the European monarchs of old, who ruled through »divine« right, the Akan chief exercised »legitimate« influence »by virtue, not of any supposed divine inspiration, but rather of whatever intrinsic persuasiveness his ideas may have had«.  6 

13

  Thus, of the several possible sources of legitimation of political authority presented here – the "divine" and the "sacred", the "ancestral", and the "virtue of persuasive ideas", Wiredu leads us to believe that the Ashanti relied not on the supposed sacred, ancestral, or divine origins of authority, but solely on the »intrinsic persuasiveness [of the king's] ideas«. However, Wiredu does not provide clarification of the relations – distinctions, similarities, and, especially, overlaps – that may exist or occur between the enunciated sources of moral legitimation and the normative justification of the exercise of political power.

»The office was 'sacred' because a chief was supposed to be the link between the living population and their departed ancestors, who were supposed to supervise human interests from their postmortem vantage point ... The chief was the symbol of the unity of his kingdom.«

Kwasi Wiredu
(In this issue, 10)

14

  My hypothesis is as follows. First, it is rarely, and perhaps never, the case that one of the sources of legitimation of authority listed by Wiredu exists solely and cleanly independent of the others. Second, I do not understand why we should believe that not only the Akan leader but also his subjects – the distinction is important – thought or believed that the king's or a chief's only legitimate source of exercise of political influence was "the intrinsic persuasiveness of his ideas", and that the gods and the dead are merely supposed players in the game.

15

  I think that Wiredu might need further evidence to make a successful case that the king and the chiefs actually ruled, and believed, along with their subjects, that authority could be legitimized only through the secular "virtue of persuasiveness of ideas" (rather than through religious and sometimes clearly superstitious – appeal to the "sacred", "god", or "ancestors"); although such a case is yet to be made, I must however commend Wiredu's attempt to perform a careful incision between the Akan's beliefs about supposed sacred / divine / ancestral sources of power on the one hand, and, I presume, the Akan actual political practices on the basis of the virtue of good, rational, and convincing ideas on the other. This incision is needed because, if the aim of this exercise is to recover, re-establish, or simply inspire our current political practices by means of some viable aspects of the ancient political systems, then it is important to identify what would or would not be workable in the now largely secular states and, certainly, religiously pluralistic African countries.

16

  But here is a problem: I wonder whether Wiredu does not – in his rationalistic position and method of separating the "divine", the "sacred", and the "ancestral" on the one hand, and the secular, intrinsically persuasive ideas on the other – undermine the very belief systems that made possible the "consensual" politics of the past – a political framework he now admires. Certainly, one easily notices that when he characterizes "consensus", Wiredu uses terms such as "faith", "belief", "reconciliation", "restoration of goodwill", "moral opinions", and so forth. To what extent, we should ask, do these ideas and notions make sense for the vast majority of African peoples without appeal to mythological, ancestral, and religious scaffoldings?

»If the traditional mythological origins and justifications of consensual politics can no longer hold today, and it is determined that what we need today is a form of consensual politics, then we may have to (re)invent usable – even as we discard unusable – mythologies.«

17

  By treating such scaffolds as merely "supposed", and the "rational" ideas as alone having "real" or "actual" legitimate power and influence, Wiredu seems to suggest that consensual democracy was simply based upon Akan understanding that »human beings have the ability eventually to cut through their differences to the rock bottom identity of interest« through »rational discussion«.  7  But which is the fundamental belief; one might ask: is it the belief in the power of reason that led the Ashantis to believe that »ultimately the interests of all members of society are the same«, or is it the power of their belief in a shared and common past and future (carried forward in the myths of origins) that leads them to the employment of reason and rational discussion as a means of achieving and sustaining this shared life-form?

18

  In this connection, we cannot fail to consider the following: what makes one political idea more persuasive than the other? Wiredu seems to suggest that it is the logical power of the ideas presented. Any observation of successful political formation or governance, however, will show that exercise of public power relies heavily on mythologies and symbols: the flag, the patrie, the Motherland, "the Party", "God", "freedom", "liberation", "progress", etc. Many of these notions invite, and often demand, allegiance and assent from those subjected to them. Yet most of them are simply well-formed ancestral, social, religious, or mythological fantasies that succeed in achieving their effects quite often with little or no "reason". These fantasies frequently enable and persuade peoples to participate, to collaborate, and to "see reason" with each other and act together.

19

  To conclude: if my suspicions here are correct, then what we need from Wiredu is a more adequate reconstruction of the origins and the basis of traditional consensual democracy. If the traditional mythological origins and justifications of consensual politics can no longer hold today (due to secularisation and religious pluralisms, for example), and it is determined that what we need today is a form of consensual politics, then we may have to (re)invent usable – even as we discard unusable – mythologies. For, even – and especially – a secular political institution, if it renounces brute force as a mode of mobilisation, needs some sort of mythology – Plato's "truthful lies", or various forms of utopia – in order to endure.  8 



 On the nature of political interests

»This adherence to the principle of consensus was a premeditated option. It was based on the belief that ultimately the interests of all members of society are the same, although their immediate perceptions of those interests may be different.«

Kwasi Wiredu
(In this issue, 12)

20

  It seems to me, then, that Wiredu would not just reconstruct an abstract normative basis for Ashanti political practices, but do so taking adequate account of actually existing social conditions and competing interests. Such a reconstruction would go hand in hand with a re–examination of Wiredu's controversial claim that »ultimately the interests of all members of society are the same, although their immediate perceptions of those interests may be different«.  9  If we isolate the first part of this statement: »the interests of all members of society are the same«, why would one accept it as true – even if we added the qualification »ultimately«? The interests of some members or a member of a society may be to dominate the rest, for the sheer morbid enjoyment of power. Now, how is such psychological "interest" of the dictator reconcilable with that of the dominated?

21

  Here is another example. Consider some "conflicts of interests" that might develop out of the nature of international capitalism. How do the commercial interests of a Texan oil company, or the Anglo-Dutch Shell oil company, in Nigeria simply to get oil out of the soil as quickly and as safely as possible, coincide with the political and survival interests of, comparatively speaking, a few thousand people called the Ogonis? Or yet another example: how do the interests of some 95 percent of Americans who share only as much wealth as another one percent of the same population coincide? How are the social and political interests of such groups in a society »ultimately ... the same« – unless the word "ultimate" here simply means in eternity (for example, "In heaven everyone will be equal")?

»Wiredu is correct to recognize that dialogue can make possible 'agreed actions without ... agreed notions'; in his systematics of consensual democracy, however, there is no recognition of the equal truth of the reverse: agreed notions do not necessarily produce agreed actions!«

22

  Wiredu's answer – and he tells us it is also the traditional Akan's – is that it is ignorance that precludes these various groups (and us, I suppose) from seeing that these groups at bottom "really" desire or want the same things. According to Wiredu, it is »their [and our?] immediate perceptions of those interests [that] may be different«.  10  So it is the misperceptions of the actors that make them see and pursue divergent interests! Our »immediate perceptions« render them unaware that »ultimately« our own interests are the same as those of others. What I want to highlight here, in the second part of Wiredu's statement, is the suggestion that it is all about »perception«. If only we would "see" better, "understand" better, "think" better, "know" better, or "reason" better – if only this, we will know how "irrational" it is to defend our sectarian, class, or ethnic interests in opposition to others. Furthermore, we will abandon this irrational behavior in favor of consensual and mutually beneficial actions upon attainment of such knowledge; hence the statement: »human beings have the [rational] ability eventually to cut through their differences to the rock bottom identity of interests«.  11  The truth of this statement can easily be challenged.

23

  Although Wiredu does not elaborate on the meaning of qualifying terms such as »eventually« or »ultimately« as they are deployed in these contexts, he nevertheless presents two main ideas in the statement: (1) there exists human »rock bottom identity of interests«, and (2) good knowledge – long-term instead of »immediate« perceptions, to be precise might be all we need to become convinced of the need to act harmoniously in function of the »rock bottom identity of interests«. In this second claim, one can easily notice the additional problem of conflation of right knowledge (or understanding or perception) and right action: if we "perceive" better, we will somehow act better morally (a classic problem of Plato's Socrates, too, in knowledge is virtue?)  12 

»Funtumfunafu denkyemfunafu, won afuru bom, nso woredidi a na woreko.«

Sharing one stomach yet they fight over food.

Ashanti symbol

24

  To remain with the logic of the Ashanti political tradition which Wiredu presents to us, however, we must follow the original and unique metaphors. Wiredu speaks of a two-headed crocodile. »If they [the two heads of the lone crocodile] could see that the food before them was, in any case, destined for the same stomach, the irrationality of the heads' fight [over who masticates the food] would be manifest to them.« On the other hand, if they "saw" (i.e., perceived or understood) the common destination of the food, the heads would change their behavior from the "irrational" (conflictual) to the "rational" (consensual). This conclusion, drawn by Wiredu, however, assumes two pieces of information which were not given, or self-evident, in the art motif described. Wiredu's conclusion, it seems to me, assumes that there is no "rational" basis for each of the crocodile heads to fight for passage of food: the more food that passes through my mouth (teeth, jaws, tongue, etc.) rather than through yours, the better.

25

  In order to declare "irrational" such struggles and conflicts over the privilege of food passage through mouth A rather than B, one would have to rule out any possibility that, first, there may exist, strictum dictu, extranutritional reasons – such as aesthetic pleasure, the sheer joy of chewing food; in fact, the joy of eating! – which could accrue to one head independently of the other. Second, if there is no possibility of such head-specific primal masticatory enjoyment, then why would either of the heads fight to masticate the food – it would be irrational indeed to engage in such fight. If however, there are head-specific masticatory benefits of whatever sort that would make either or both of the heads want to chew food, then the only way to justifiably declare "irrational" the struggles and conflicts over food is to guarantee that, no matter what quantity of food each head chewed, both would equally (quantitatively and qualitatively) share the enjoyment.

»This thought is given expression in an art motif depicting a crocodile with one stomach and two heads locked in struggle over food. If they could but see that the food was, in any case, destined for the same stomach, the irrationality of the conflict would be manifest to them. But is there a chance of it?«

Kwasi Wiredu
(In this issue, 12)

26

  Now, what if the heads cannot want, individually, because the two-headed beast knows itself as one, instead of many? Well, then, of course, there would be no struggles or conflict about food, or about power as we know it in polities. Thus, finally, the ultimate guarantee that would ensure the possibility of identical interests at »rock bottom« is that neither of the heads could develop an individuated structure of desire – the absolute guarantee against (inclination to, or suspicion of) greed and (infliction of, or fear of) domination.

27

  Unless such absolute guarantee can be obtained, we may never justly prohibit or condemn a priori "struggles" or "conflicts" among the crocodile heads over resources for satisfaction of needs or privileges; nor could we declare such struggles and conflicts, following Wiredu, as behaviors whose »irrationality« is »manifest«.  13  If the human condition, in principle, cannot guarantee, or is denied, the possibility of absolute justice, then struggles and conflicts – i.e., the agonistics of competitive (and, hopefully, democratic) politics – would always be manifestly rational. I will return to this point at the end.

28

  There is not much self-evident truth in the assertion that, at »rock bottom«, all interests of members of a given society are "identical".  14  This »rock bottom« level at which all "human" interests may be same, I would argue, could not possibly be a human bottom, or at least not in the ordinary human world, where humans experience themselves as individuals. I am also hard put to discover incontrovertible truth in Wiredu's suggestion that it is misperception that prevents one from seeing the supposed »rock bottom identity of interests«. What if it is this belief about a »rock bottom« identity of human interests that is a misperception? An illusion? What if, in addition, such illusions are cultivated – precisely by those who benefit most from specific social and political arrangements – as a way of convincing the rest that "we are all the same"?



 Democracy

»It seems obvious to me that a 'democracy' is one of the several sorts of social framework that a people adopt in order to mediate the struggles and the conflicts that necessarily arise from the necessarily competitive nature of individuated identities and desires.«

29

  Now let me indicate some of the characteristics which I believe that a "democracy", by whatever name, would have. When I spoke above about an impossible guarantee of conditions for absolute justice, I chose the word absolute in contradistinction to perfect justice. The former, as I use the term, should suggest an arguably conceivable condition of "justice" guaranteed by, or in, pre-"human", pre-social nature. The latter I use to mark off humanly socially achieved, achievable (or, as the case may be, unachieved or unachievable) justice. It seems obvious to me that a "democracy" is one of the several sorts of social framework that a people adopt in order to mediate the struggles and the conflicts that necessarily arise from the necessarily competitive nature of individuated identities and desires. A democracy's raison d'être is the legitimation – and "management" – of this always already competitive (i.e., inherently political) condition of relativized desires. In this sense, "consensus" or "unanimity" of substantive decisions cannot be the ultimate goal of democracy, but only one of its moments.

30

  Democracy, as a political institution, I think, has its own end within itself: it is a social compact that says, "We will agree or agree to disagree, and here are the established mechanisms or rules according to which we shall secure and maintain as long as necessary each of these possibilities." It seems to me that this is the spirit of democracy by any name, not the elevation of the moment of substantive "agreement", "reconciliation", or "consensus" to the axiomatic. A democratic process is defined not by achievement of ideological or practical / pragmatic consensus on specific decisions (or decisional representation), but simply by the orderly securing of a means or a framework for initiating, cultivating, and sustaining disagreement and oppositional political activities which are nurtured and cherished for their sake and benefits as much as agreement and consensus are nurtured and cherished for their sake and benefits.

»Political wisdom comes in many forms, and democracy becomes, indeed, a market place of competing – not just consenting or consensing – ideas.«

31

  It seems to me that a society opts for this form or "frame" for political life for the reasons Wiredu tells us the Ashantis had: »Two heads are better than one«, or, as the Igbos say, Onwe gi onye bu Omada Omachara: No one individual is Mother Wisdom. Political wisdom comes in many forms, and democracy becomes, indeed, a market place of competing – not just consenting or consensing – ideas. The only "consensus" primary to democracy – democracy's most privileged moment, if any – is the initial, formal, agreement to play by a set of rules that allows the institutions and respect of dissent as much as its opposite. Thus we cannot reduce democracy to one moment of its outcomes: decisional representation or consensus. The most distinguishing mark of it seems to me to be in the processes itself: in the debates, and the refrain from the use of force, not in a specific type or nature of outcome.

32

  Should we find another name to describe what Wiredu tells us the ancient Ashantis did? Or should we question the veracity or accuracy of Wiredu's report? It seems to me that we could do either, or both. The ancient Akan political practices, if Wiredu's description is accurate, may not be democracy as it is practiced in the West. It may not also fit the description of democracy as I have it in mind and have stated it here. If this is the case, the question then becomes: which one is best suited for Africa? Democracy as a formal framework for agreement and disagreement (which does not, in principle, privilege "consensus" or decisional representation), or democracy, according to Wiredu, as the African past practiced it: a "democracy" that holds as axiomatic and elevates to the level of principle the moment of "consensus" and unanimity?

Emmanuel
Chukwudi Eze

is Assistant Professor at Bucknell University, Lewisburg/Penn.

33

  If the appeal of the former is in the greater sense of freedom – the invitation to inventiveness without demand or requirement for decision of a specific nature, and the pluralism, inherent to competing (as well as cooperating) forces – the appeal of the latter is in its promise of greater political stability – a "stability" which, nevertheless, offers no guarantee that its bases are founded upon ideal pursuits of the public good. It seems to me that neither of these tendencies of "democracy" is intrinsically "Western" or "African", and that the best form of democracy is one that culturally reconciles both centripetal and centrifugal political forces of its constituents – while preserving each current in its most vital élan. In fact, only such a political culture may be called truly democratic.


Notes


 1   

Kwasi Wiredu: "Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics: A Plea for a Non-party Polity". In this issue, 7

 2   

Wiredu continues: »Formal representation without substance is apt to induce disaffection. If the system in use is such as to cause some groups periodically to be in substantively underrepresented minorities, then seasonal disaffection becomes institutionalized. The results are well-known inclemencies of adversarial politics.« (15)
This statement made me think of Lani Guinier's critique of the American political system: that in order for minorities in the United States to have substantive and not just formal representation in government, the current system may have to be redesigned. Interestingly, Wiredu says that »there is nothing peculiarly African about the idea [of consensual democracy] itself«, and expresses the outlook that it could universally be adopted by any society. (31)
(See Lani Guinier (1994): The Tyranny of Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy. New York: Free Press.) 

 3   

Kwasi Wiredu, 8

 4   

Ibid., 10

 5   

Ibid., 10, my emphases. 

 6   

Ibid., 10

 7   

Ibid., 12

 8   

There is a sense in which we might, quite generously, interpret Wiredu as indeed proposing the idea of consensus as precisely such a "truthful lie" or utopia. If this is the case, we may need to ask: why is this "lie" better than others? Why, for example, is consensus a better framework for achieving "unanimous" decisions or compromises than, say, more laissez-faire political ideals? A more important critique of the Ashanti "ideal" of "consensus", however, would be to ask to what extent it is not a cloak, a pretext, for all the formal and informal "cola-nut" systems of compromises, deal-makings, and favor-swapping which, when practiced on a massive scale, organize sociopolitical and economic activities around norms and expectations that have little or nothing to do with a genuine ideal of public or general good?
Hountondji, in an essay called "Everyday life in Black Africa" provides a vignette of the sort of stabilizing but, idealistically speaking, unpublic minded social and political environment I have in mind: »the whole gamut of worldly artfulness, the complete panoply of cat-and-mouse games, from the friendly slap on the back to angry scenes (real or mimed), while going through the visits to the house, the stuffed envelopes and other gratuities, the touching allusion to mutual friends, indeed, to some distant relative – through the aunt-in-law of the uncle of the grandmother. This is also called a 'dialogue'« and, of course, "consensus".
(See Paulin J. Hountondji: "Daily life in Black Africa". In: V.Y. Mudimbe (ed.): The Surreptitious Speech: Présence Africaine and the Politics of Otherness 1947-1987. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, 344-364. The quote is from p. 358.) 

 9   

Kwasi Wiredu, 12

 10   

Ibid. 

 11   

Ibid. 

 12   

I am not convinced by Wiredu that what moves humans to act – or to not act – does not often transcend, or precede, the philosopher's idea of "reason" or "knowledge". After Nietzsche and Freud, how are we to believe that (1) our »rock bottom ... interests« are largely accessible and discursively articulate to us through »rational discussion«; or that (2) our most elegant »rational« discussions directly mirror our deepest interests? Wiredu is correct to recognize that dialogue can make possible »agreed actions without ... agreed notions«; in his systematics of consensual democracy, however, there is no recognition of the equal truth of the reverse: agreed notions do not necessarily produce agreed actions! 

 13   

Kwasi Wiredu, 12

 14   

Ibid. 



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