Religion, philosophy and culture are three "elements" of the human reality. If the first could be compared to the feet with which Man journeys towards his destiny, philosophy could represent the eyes that scrutinize that journey, and culture, the earth on which Man is walking during his concrete pilgrimage. Interculturality represents the relativity (not the relativism) of everything human, and therefore of these three notions.
The question of the nature of philosophy is already a philosophical question, and intimately connected with what Religion stands for. An intercultural approach shows that one cannot separate Philosophy from Religion, and that both are dependent on the culture which nurtures them. In order to do justice to the problem, we need to introduce the function of mythos, which complements that of logos.  1 

Introduction
I. Philosophy
  1. What are we talking about?
  2. Homeomorphic equivalents
  3. What it is that we are talking about
II. Culture
  4. The encompassing myth
  5. Nature and culture
  6. Interculturality
III. Problems
  7. The transformative function of philosophy
  8. Interculturalization
  9. Mythos and logos

»Philosophy is but the conscious and critical accompaniment of Man's journeying towards his destiny. This journeying is called religion in many cultures.«

  Philosophy is but the conscious and critical accompaniment of Man's journeying towards his destiny. This journeying is called religion in many cultures.

  The following considerations, intending to put or discover a certain order in the world of religio-cultural galaxies, will serve as prolegomena to the unavoidable problem, today more than ever, of the meeting of religions.

  Intercultural philosophy situates itself in terra nullius (no man's land), in a virgin place that no one has yet occupied; otherwise, it would no longer be intercultural but would belong to a determined culture. Interculturality is no one's land, it is utopia, situated between two (or more) cultures. It must keep silent. Now today, since it is coming to vogue, and because historical archetypes repeat themselves, I fear that we are finding ourselves, like Moses face to face with a "promised land", but without anyone having promised it to us: maybe because it does not exist – except as an utopia.  2 

  When Aaron enters it, that land ceases already to be "promised" and he appropriates it as a Hebrew land, which must "expel" its original inhabitants. When Christianity and later modern science have entered these foreign lands they equally believed that these were promised lands they believed that their duty was to "expel" the ancient errors and convert the "Natives". It is not customary for philosophy to go out and conquer or convert, but it has often been the one that has justified such intercultural skirmishes.

»Interculturality is no one's land, it is utopia, situated between two (or more) cultures.«

  This somewhat polemical introduction would like to put us on our guard against the risk that the growing movement towards intercultural studies be nothing but the symptom of a culture, which, because it is in crisis, seeks to expand its "market," as does the capitalistic system with its investments in the "Third World".

  Interculturality is problematic. The very moment that I open my mouth to speak, I am obliged to use a concrete language, and thus I am completely in a particular culture: I am on a land which already belongs to someone. I am in my culture. cultivating my land, speaking my language. And if I must, moreover, be understood by my readers, I must necessarily enter a land which is common to all. While we have, in a certain sense, conquered space, since there are readers on all continents, we have been unable to dominate time, since we are necessarily contemporary. While assuming the past and taking into consideration the possible futures, we communicate in the present and cannot escape the myth of contemporaneity, no matter how polydimensional it may be. We are obliged to representation.

  What therefore is the territory that belongs to a problematic intercultural philosophy? My answer would be simple if we were not dealing with philosophy. It would then be sufficient to say that it is a territory acknowledged as common, for example that of music, and then approaching it according to the distinct perspectives of our respective cultures. But this is not valid in the case of that human activity which claims to leave thematically no territory outside of its critical reflection.

  It follows that we are thematically obliged to question the very nature of our question about philosophy and about the very soil where what we call "philosophy" has flourished.

  In the following text, after having put forward three reflections on the issue of philosophy, followed by three considerations on what is culture, we shall then dedicate three chapters to our specific problematic.  3 

  We have already insinuated that we initially and provisionally understand by philosophy, that human activity which asks questions about the very foundations of human life under the heavens and on earth.

»The question about philosophy is already philosophical and, thus, already belongs itself to philosophy. To which philosophy? Obviously, to all philosophy.«

  Let us repeat: the question about philosophy is already philosophical and, thus, already belongs itself to philosophy.

  To which philosophy? Obviously, to all philosophy, as we have just said. But the answer to be given to the question: what is that philosophy, is no longer a common one, since we shall give one answer or another according to the particular conception that we have of philosophy. Now, this conception depends on the culture within which we elaborate an answer. We are dealing here, not with what is called a hermeneutical but a prior philosophical circle. We cannot ask the question what is philosophy except within a specific philosophy, even if, in most cases, that philosophy is not explicit.

  The answers are varied. We know many of them: we ask about Being, about Reality, about the nature of the question itself, about what saves us, makes us aware, critical, free, happy, gives a meaning to our life, allows us to act, etc.

  What is it about? It is about knowing what different cultures have understood by philosophy.

  The "histories of philosophy" have much to say about that question. But what is the question asked by these philosophies? Obviously, they relate the "history" of the different conceptions of "philosophy". Within cultures where philosophy has a certain validity or importance, no major problem arises. But once again, what are we talking about when the word does not exist? How are we going to translate it, and what criterion do we have, in order to know that our translation is correct?

  This brings us to an unavoidable methodological issue.

»It is on the basis of that one culture and with instruments of that same culture that we have approached those foreign lands, those foreign cultures.«

  The majority of studies on this theme have been more or less monocultural. This is due to the global predominance of Western culture during the last 500 years, and to the concrete fact that an Hellenic word has been used to formulate the question. The question: what is philosophy, was asked on the basis of what the Greeks originally understood that word to mean. It is on the basis of that one culture and with instruments of that same culture that we have approached those foreign lands, those foreign cultures.

  This is all the more meaningful since the majority of learned people from other cultures have hastened to show us that what we call by that name also existed in their respective cultures. Thus we have important studies on Indic, Chinese, Bantu, Japanese and other, philosophy, as being so many branches that enrich the known studies on Ancient, Medieval, German, Spanish ... philosophy.

»Homeomorphic equivalents are not mere literal translations, any more than they merely translate the role that the original word claims to play, but they play a function which is equivalent or comparable to that supposedly played by philosophy.«

  These experts usually tell us that their respective philosophies are oftentimes more rich in certain aspects that have been neglected by Western philosophy, and that they help us to broaden and deepen the very conception of philosophy. But it is rare that they have asked themselves in a critical and thematic way, what question they were asking when asking the question of philosophy. We know today, for example. that there are idealists in India, materialists in China, mystics in Japan, a more sensuous and concrete philosophy in Africa. etc. The majority of those who cultivate (or engage in) philosophy have started from the Western model and have made known to us that what is called philosophy in the West. has existed and still exists in other cultures. But the Greek concept of philosophy, with all its variation and reforms, continues to be the paradigm according to which one proceeds to research what is philosophy in other cultures.

  When translating the word, one seeks equivalents to the concept of philosophy, equivalents conditioned by the original Greek model: even if the notion has somewhat evolved subsequently.

  I have introduced, a few years ago, the notion of homeomorphic equivalents, as a first step towards interculturality. One should, in our case, research both the eventual equivalent notions to philosophy in other cultures, and the symbols (not necessarily the concepts and even less a unique concept) that express the homeomorphic equivalents of philosophy. Homeomorphic equivalents are not mere literal translations, any more than they merely translate the role that the original word claims to play (in this case: philosophy), but they play a function which is equivalent (analogous) or comparable to that supposedly played by philosophy. It is therefore not a conceptual but a functional equivalent, i.e. an analogy of the third degree. One does not seek the same function (as that exercised by philosophy) but the function that is equivalent to that exercised by the original notion in the corresponding cosmovision.

  Let us consider a few examples that may help us. "Brahman" is not a translation for "God", since the concepts do not correspond (their attributes not being the same), and since the functions are not identical (brahman not having to be creator, providence, personal, as God is). Each one of these two words express a functional equivalence within the corresponding two cosmovisions.

  There is more. In that example, the correlation is almost biunivocal (one word homeomorphically corresponding to the other); but it could not be. We can for example translate "religion" by dharma without necessarily translating dharma by "religion." Dharma equally means duty, ethics, element, observance, energy, order, virtue, law, justice, and has been even translated by reality. But the word "religion" can also mean sampradâya, karma, jati, bhakti, marga, pûja, daivakarma, nimayaparam, punyasila ... Each culture is a world.

  If by philosophy, one then understands the intellectual activity which clarifies the use of our concepts or which purifies our language, we shall not seek what plays that role in the other culture. but what accomplishes the function equivalent to that which the clarification of concepts and words plays in the first conception that we have talked about.

»We cannot claim to define through one single word what intercultural philosophy is, nor even presuppose that such a philosophy exists.«

  There are at least 33 notions in classical Sanskrit which could he homeomorphically compared to the equivalent function of philosophy.  4 

  One can therefore discuss the issue of whether this activity of the human mind should be called philosophy. We believe that it is appropriate if we do not wish to condemn ourselves to a cultural Solipsism: but we must not forget that the relationship must be established in both directions, moving for example from the Greek equivalents to those of the other culture, and from the latter to the Hellenic ones.

  We cannot claim to define through one single word what intercultural philosophy is, nor even presuppose that such a philosophy exists. What is possible however is to inquire about the many homeomorphic equivalents, and, from within the other culture, to try to formulate what can correspond to what we are trying to say when we say the word philosophy.

  We must seek a middle way between the colonial mentality which believes that we can express the totality of the human experience through the notions of a single culture, and the opposite extreme which thinks that there is no communication possible between diverse cultures, and which should then condemn themselves to a cultural apartheid in order to preserve their identity. I am thinking of the case of Bhutan as a political example. Our problem is not merely a "speculative" one.

  Without claiming in the least to say something which is universally valid. let me venture, as I journey through this middle way, to sketch an answer to the problematic that we have set forth.

»What we could call intercultural philosophy would be a new genus of philosophy, an enriching of the term beyond its cultural limits.«

  Given the contingent fact that today's Western languages are somewhat intercultural vehicles, we could adopt the Hellenic word philosophy as a symbol of something, which, up till now, had no reason to be present in the meaning of what was called philosophy originally and that is still called philosophy.

  What we could call intercultural philosophy would then not be a new species of philosophy, alongside the classifications offered to us by the histories of philosophy, but it would be a new genus of philosophy, an enriching of the term beyond its cultural limits.

  Just as – as we shall see – the great cultures of mankind are not real species of a real genus, but each one of them is rather a genus (with subcultures as species), so the intercultural notion of philosophy would represent a distinct superior genus (which we could perhaps continue to call philosophy) and not another species of a unique genus.

»Philosophy could he understood as the activity by which Man participates consciously and in a more or less critical manner, in the discovery of reality and orients himself within the latter.«

  This kind of supergenus, of a purely formal character and valid only within a specific moment of time and space, would be a transcendental, and not a categorial relation with what, until now, has been called philosophy. This philosophy would be a formal transcendental and not a category. In this sense, intercultural philosophy does not exist as does an idealistic philosophy (one which presents certain common traits), or a Catalan philosophy (without content that is necessarily common, but cultivated by the Catalans or in the Catalan language). An intercultural philosophy exists only as transcendental to the different human activities which correspond homeomorphically to what, in a certain culture, we call philosophy.

  As I try to follow this middle way which avoids solipsism without falling into colonialism, I shall try to describe in a very provisional manner, as follows, the philosophical activity that would have a certain intercultural validity:

  Philosophy could he understood as the activity by which Man participates consciously and in a more or less critical manner, in the discovery of reality and orients himself within the latter.

  By saying activity, we wish to surmount the reductionism that is represented by a certain conception of philosophy as being something purely theoretical. An intercultural philosophy cannot eliminate the dimension of praxis, understood not only in a platonic and/or Marxist sense, but also eminently existential, to use another polysemic word. The word "activity" also indicates that it is a matter of acting, of a human agere, which need not therefore be limited to a mere mental or rational operation.

  By using the word Man, we refer to the philosophical activity which is specific to the human being. Neither angels nor animals philosophize. Philosophy is an activity, belonging to Man as such. Philosophy would be that primordially and specifically human activity.

  The notion of participation in our description claims to indicate the passive aspect of philosophical activity.

  Life, as well as the reality in which we live, has been given to us and we find ourselves immersed in it. We are, as we participate in it, something anterior and superior to ourselves, both individually and collectively. Philosophical activity is an activity of acknowledgement before being one of pure knowledge.

  By qualifying philosophical activity as conscious, we wish to indicate that consciousness embraces an activity and a reality which is much broader than reason, not only because Spanish and French words include very wisely moral conscience, i.e. the knowledge of good and evil, but also because while it includes rationality and intelligibility, it does not limit itself to the latter. We are aware that there is something that we do not understand, we are aware that both Nothingness and Being, even if they are unintelligible, can be real. There exists a thinking which is non discursive, non deductive, an imaginal, iconic awareness, a non reflexive intuition, etc. And experience shows us that many cultures have cultivated these types of consciousness which are not included in rationality – without necessarily falling into irrationality, the latter being incompatible with philosophical activity, thus abandoning the realm of the human strictly speaking.  5 

»Practically all philosophies have known that truth has a seductive appearance; it simultaneously reveals and hides itself.«

  We add the word critical because we seek to underline both the intellectual dimension of philosophical activity and its questioning character. Every man could potentially be a philosopher, but the word "critical" suggests that the first innocence has been lost, and that, in the vision of reality held by any man, the philosopher asks the why of what is given to him. The word "critical" comprises also reflection, skepsis and introspection. Human consciousness is constitutively consciousness: it is a gnosis which knows that we are not alone (ni estamos ni somos solos). We have added degrees to critical consciousness, for even if a minimum of self-consciousness seems to belong to all philosophy, it is not necessary to accept a Kantian type of "critique" as being essential to the notion of philosophy.

  No matter what, with a more or less critical consciousness, philosophy is a discovery of what is and of what we are. Not only is reality disclosed to us by itself, but we also discover it in virtue of our active participation in the dynamism of reality itself of which we are a part. There is no point in saying that this discovery or revelation takes place within some limited parameters that make us who we are and of which we are aware. Philosophical activity is as much a discovery of reality as that of what we are. It is a partial, hypothetical, doubtful, imperfect, contingent discovery but a revelation in the last analysis. A revelation which, because it is one, continues to be so; i.e. an unveiling which never ceases, not only because of a possible infinitude of reality, but because of our own finitude, which results in that every discovery is at the same time a covering over. Practically all philosophies have known that truth has a seductive appearance; it simultaneously reveals and hides itself. Not only would absolute truth dazzle us, but it would not enlighten us, for it could not be total if we ourselves were not in it. Or, as we shall insinuate further, all incursion of the light or of the intelligibility of logos within the obscure realm of the mythos is accompanied by another shadow that the logos leaves behind it and which the mythos discreetly covers anew. All demythization is accompanied by a remythization;  6  it is always necessary that something be "pre-sup-posed".

»From the starting point of interculturality, philosophy can be considered as the conscious and more or less critical companion of Man's journey – corresponding in many cultures to what could be translated by religion.«

  By reality, we understand all that is, or is thinkable, all that can enter our consciousness, the representation (whether realistic or idealistic), the idam of the Upanishads ... We exclude neither Being nor Nothingness, nor do we limit ourselves to what can be expressed by the verb to be. We use this word as the broader and (maybe) deeper of all – not as all (no theory whatsoever is formulated here), but as an ultimate symbol which would hence encompass also what could dialectically appear as non-real. Let us not forget that the great challenge of interculturality is the relativization of all apriori.

  The notion of orientation, finally, wishes to underline the vital aspect, both practical and existential, of philosophy. It is through philosophy that Man gives orientation to his life, forges his destiny and moves towards what he considers his goal (whatever may be its meaning). Philosophical activity would thus be that specifically human activity by which Man realizes as such – what many cultures have called the salvific character of philosophy, or of what it is customary to translate by religion. This orientation may postulate a North or at least a magnet, but it is philosophy, as conscious activity about the meaning of life or of reality, which puts the compass into our hands. And while some extremist positions say that we should do away with the compass, that waying on our own without an (external) compass, would also be the interiorization of a compass which does indicate no other direction but the one that we create or imagine. From the starting point of interculturality, philosophy can be considered as the conscious and more or less critical companion of Man's journey – corresponding in many cultures to what could be translated by religion.

  It is obvious that every word used will be differently interpreted by different philosophies. It follows that an intercultural philosophy questions all notions, and each one of the notions of a current in a given culture.

  After having taken all these precautions, I believe that one can speak provisionally of intercultural philosophy as being a transcendental relation to what we call philosophy. We have not thereby left our culture, we have not jumped over our own shadow but we have opened ourselves, as much as possible, to the experience of the reality of other cultures, ever ready to dialogue with the latter, as we shall now say.

  It is well known that the term "culture" has undergone during the 17th century in Europe, a certain mutation which has crystallized in a modern sense only since a little less than a century ago. It is a term, which remains suspect to some especially the Anglo-Saxons. Before that, culture meant something else.

  Cultura anima may be one of the better definitions of philosophy (Cicero: Tusculanae disputationes. II, 13). The word means I cultivate (cura, curatio, cultus), implying honor and veneration. Culture was always culture of something. Hence has it come to mean what we still mean when we speak of a cultivated man. And it is through the intermediary of "civilization" that "culture" has come to take on the meaning that is widespread today.  7 

»For the myth gives us the horizon of intelligibility where we must situate any idea, any conviction or any act of consciousness so that they may be held by our mind.«

  To the hundreds of definitions of culture that exist today, I shall risk adding one more, which has at least the advantage of being maybe the shortest of them all, and which finally coincides with the majority of accepted descriptions. All the latter say that culture is constituted by rituals, customs, opinions, dominant ideas, ways of life which characterize a certain people at a given period. If language is an essential element, history and geography are equally cultural factors.

  We summarize all that in the word myth, understood as symbolizing that which we believe at such a deep level that we are not even aware that we believe it: "it is useless to say it," "it is understood," "it is obvious," "we shall not pursue the investigation any further" ... We question myth only when we already partly stand outside it: this is because it is precisely the myth which offers us the basis from which the question as question makes sense. For the myth gives us the horizon of intelligibility where we must situate any idea, any conviction or any act of consciousness so that they may be held by our mind.

»Each culture is a galaxy which secretes its self-understanding, and with it, the criteria of truth, goodness, and beauty of all human actions.«

  Of course, there are particular myths and we must also distinguish between on the one hand, mythologies, mythologoumena, mythemes, and on the other, myth strictly speaking, which is what makes possible a narration of myths, a science about myths, more or less explicit groups of myths and the themes themselves as rational translations of what the myths themselves allow to appear as translatable. All this should not be confused with the myth strictly speaking, that horizon which gives the condition of intelligibility of everything that is subsequently said.

  Each culture, in a sense, could be described as the encompassing myth of a collectivity at a certain moment in time and space; it is what renders plausible, credible, the world in which we live, where we are. This accounts for the flexibility and mobility of myth as well as the impossibility of grasping our own myth, except when we hear it from the mouth of others because having accorded the latter a certain credibility or when it has ceased to be a myth for us. Myth and faith are correlative, just as there exists a special dialectic between mythos and logos (as well as between logos and mythos).

  Each culture possesses a cosmovision and reveals the world in which we live – in which we believe to be. Each culture is a galaxy which secretes its self-understanding, and with it, the criteria of truth, goodness, and beauty of all human actions.

  Cultures are not folklore, as certain mainly political milieux are in the habit of interpreting them, when they speak arrogantly and condescendingly of multicultural tolerance. Cultures are not mere specific forms of a genus called human civilization. Each culture is a genus. Cultures are not abstract species of a single sovereign genus. The sovereign genus, which would be human culture, exists only as an abstraction.

  Let us say it more academically: there are no cultural universals, i.e. concrete meaningful contents valid for all the cultures, for mankind throughout all times. What one calls human nature is an abstraction. And every abstraction is an operation of the mind which removes (abstracts) from a greater reality (as seen by this mind) something (less universal) which it considers as important. There cannot be cultural universals, for it is culture itself which makes possible (and plausible) its own universals.

»There are no cultural universals. But there are, for sure, human invariants. But the way according to which each one of the human invariants is lived and experienced in each culture is distinct and distinctive in each case.«

  By saying that there are no cultural universals, we are using a way of thinking which is foreign to the modern "scientific" mentality, in which predominates (when not dominates) simple objectivity (and objectibility) of the real. Culture is not simply an object, since we are constitutively immersed in it as subjects. It is the one that makes it possible for us to see the world as objects, since self-consciousness, i.e. subjectivity, essentially belongs to the human being.

  It ensues that all classification of cultures is nothing but a formal abstraction with a claim to objectivity to which no real culture can be reduced. Culture is the encompassing myth which makes it possible for us to believe the world in which we live. Every cosmology is the logos of a kosmos which shows itself to us as such, thanks to the mythos which renders it visible to us.

  There are no cultural universals. But there are, for sure, human invariants. Every man eats, sleeps, walks, speaks, establishes relationships, thinks ... But the way according to which each one of the human invariants is lived and experienced in each culture is distinct and distinctive in each case.

  It is undeniable that at certain given moments of mankind, there are myths that acquire a greater universality than others, but even in such cases, the way we usually interpret them, is distinct. "You shall not kill" can be the formulation of an abstract universal myth that we all interpret today as the condemnation of cannibalism: however, the real belief in an absolute "thou shall not kill" is far from being universal. Let us not forget that a myth is constitutively inobjectifiable and that it is myth (in the sense in which we use this word) only for those who believe in it. As for the others, these are myths only in a condescending and pejorative sense of the word, as used in the modern colonial era. We see the myths of others as more or less legendary mythologies – we do not see the beam in our own eye.

»Cultural respect requires that we respect those ways of life that we disapprove, or even those that we consider as pernicious.«

  It is very revealing to inquire whence and why a "mythology" was born (not the narrative, mythos-legein) as a rational science about others' myths (legends). All those who do not come from the South or the Center of England speak English with an accent: only the "natives", of course, speak without an accent ... Everything which did not fit into the mental framework of what is called the Enlightenment, which flourished precisely when the West had politically "conquered" more than three quarters of the planet, has been called primitive myth, and still nowadays, "on the way to development".

  Cultural respect requires that we respect those ways of life that we disapprove, or even those that we consider as pernicious. We may be obliged to go as far as to combat these cultures, but we cannot elevate our own to the rank of universal paradigm in order to judge the other ones.

  This is the great challenge of pluralism and one of the cements of interculturality.

»Man is a cultural animal. Culture is not extrinsic to him, but natural. Man is a being that is naturally cultural – or culturally natural.«

  We can pursue with a double assertion:

  a. Culture is the field that makes it possible for us to cultivate the world that it itself presents to us, so that Man may become fully human and achieve his fullness.

  b. Culture is the specific form of human nature. The nature of Man is cultural. Culture is not an additive to Man, it is not something artificial. Man is a cultural animal. Culture is not extrinsic to him, but natural. Man is a being that is naturally cultural – or culturally natural. The ultimate criterion for condemning another culture will therefore consist in showing that it is anti-natural – although the very idea of nature is already culture-specific.

  One could critique western civilization by saying that it is the culture which has championed a dichotomy between the natural nature and cultural nature of man, so that it has separated religion (a cultural fact), from what is natural, thus converting it either into something that is supernatural, or into an ideology (comparable to a mere doctrinal superstructure). By thus separating culture from nature, it has constructed a culture which is artificial in the pejorative sense (although it is said to be scientific). According to the Chinese proverb, one cannot stay too long on the tip of one's toes. It seems to me that it is a key for understanding Western culture.

  Yet the Western experience is fertile. We cannot separate nature from culture, but neither should we say that they are simply the same. The problem in the West has been acute ever since the Greeks. The physei, what corresponds to physis, to nature, is not identically the same as nomôi, as what pertains to nomos, to the norm. To separate them or to make them into something identical would lead to the destruction of the humanum. Their relation is non-dualistic, advaita. Culture is neither a mere accident of Man, nor is it his substance: it is not identical to human nature. There can be antinatural cultures.